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Summary
After six years of uninterrupted growth, the GDP of 
Latin America and the Caribbean is expected to fall by 
1.8% and per capita GDP by close to 2.9% in 2009. The 
international crisis hit the region hard at the end of 2008 
and in early 2009, taking a toll on all of its countries. 
However, a recovery began to take shape in the second 
quarter and became more widespread in the second half 
of the year. 
The break in economic growth cut into labour demand, 
and the unemployment rate is therefore expected to rise to 
about 8.3% for the region overall, and new jobs created 
will be of poorer quality.
The effects of the crisis were channelled through the 
real sector of the economies, damaging what had been 
the main engines of regional growth. Exports plunged, 
while the contraction of economic activity worldwide, 
together with the drop in international trade flows, lowered 
commodity prices, which hurt the region’s terms of trade. 
At the same time, income from remittances and tourism 
fell, with Mexico and countries of Central America and 
the Caribbean suffering the most, and foreign direct 
investment plummeted by 37%. 
Domestic activity also declined in some countries 
as a result of the tighter credit conditions in the private 
banking sector which stepped-up public sector lending 
failed to offset. 
This convergence of factors, combined with 
deteriorating expectations, triggered a slump in private 
consumption and investment. In fact, public sector 
consumption was the only component of demand that grew 
during the first semester, thanks to the countercyclical 
policies implemented by many of the countries in the 
region, which accelerated the recovery in the second 
half of the year.
The positive stimulus of fiscal policy action was one 
of the distinctive features of economic management in 
2009. The region’s primary balance fell from a surplus 
equivalent to 1.4% of GDP in 2008 to an estimated primary 
deficit of 1% of GDP in 2009. Fiscal revenues have been 
substantially curtailed, owing to lower levels of activity 
and falling commodity prices. Also, up to the third quarter 
of 2009, current expenditures increased significantly, as 
did capital expenditures, though to a lesser extent. 
The region’s central banks lowered monetary policy 
rates and adopted measures aimed at ensuring liquidity 
in financial markets. In many cases, public-sector banks 
played a strategic countercyclical role by offsetting the 
tight credit stance of private banks. In order to defend 
the real level of the exchange rate to some extent and to 
sustain domestic liquidity, many central banks intervened 
in the exchange market, which in some cases enabled 
them to replenish international reserves.
During the second half of the year, positive signs began 
to emerge in the economies of the region. Manufacturing 
and exports picked up, while renewed global activity and 
expanding international trade volumes spurred demand for 
commodities, raising prices and improving terms of trade.
The fiscal stimulus packages introduced to boost 
domestic demand, together with the factors mentioned 
above and the gradual return to normalcy in the financial 
markets, often with help from central banks, created the 
conditions for the resumption of economic activity and 
Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC)10
the improvement of labour-market indicators. In addition, 
renewed access to international credit for some countries 
and the recovery of the stock markets furthered the process. 
This allowed the private sector to restructure its assets and 
helped normalize lending which, together with improved 
labour market indicators and recovery of private-sector 
confidence, should boost domestic demand.
Growth is projected at 4.1% for 2010 and is expected to 
be somewhat higher in the countries of South America than 
in the rest of the region, given their larger domestic markets 
in some cases, greater export-market diversification and 
closer trade ties with China. On the other hand, growth is 
expected to be slower in some of the more open economies 
that have a less diversified portfolio of trading partners and 
a heavier dependence on manufacturing. The same can be 
said of the Caribbean economies, some of which are facing 
complex financial and exchange-rate situations.
However, it remains to be seen whether or not the 
developed economies will be able to sustain growth 
once the copious stimulus packages implemented by the 
United States and Europe are withdrawn. This, together 
with increasing unemployment and the still-volatile 
international financial market, raises questions about the 
strength of the recovery that began in 2009. 
The emergence from this crisis has been quicker 
than was expected, largely thanks to the ramparts that 
the countries of the region had built through sounder 
macroeconomic policy management. Upturns in several 
of the factors that drove demand in the years prior to 
the crisis, added in many cases to strong impetus from 
public policies, should enable a rapid recovery in the 
context of substantial idle capacity. But how can that 
recovery be transformed into a process of sustained 
growth beyond 2010?
In the short term, the countries of the region 
responded to the crisis to the best of their capacities —in 
the process revealing major differences among them. 
But the objective of regaining sustained growth poses 
fresh and more complex challenges. Accordingly, the 
Latin American and Caribbean countries now face the 
fundamental task of generating and expanding policy 
space. To do this, they must increase resources, create 
instruments and strengthen institutions, particularly 
those involved in coordination. 
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Chapter I
Introduction
After six years of economic growth, the GDP of the Latin American and Caribbean region will 
shrink by an estimated 1.8% in 2009, which translates into a contraction of around 2.9% in per 
capita GDP. The impact of the international crisis was felt heavily in late 2008 and early 2009, 
albeit in different ways, in all the countries of the region. A recovery began to take shape in the 
second quarter, however, and became more widespread in the second half of the year. The heaviest 
contractions in economic activity occurred in Mexico and some of the Central American and 
Caribbean countries. Generally speaking, positive growth rates are projected for South America 
although, in all cases, they fall far short of the rates posted between 2004 and 2008.
Figure I.1
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The Caribbean

















Bolivia (Plur. State of)
Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on 
the basis of official figures.
The economic slowdown, predictably, cut into labour 
demand and the unemployment rate is expected to rise to 
around 8.3% for the region overall and new jobs created 
are likely to be of poorer quality. The inflation rate dropped 
sharply from 8.3% in 2008 to around 4.5% in 2009, as 
a result of falling international prices for some of the 
commodities included in household consumption baskets, 
in addition to the effect of currency appreciation and the 
impact of slacker activity levels on demand.
 The emergence of some positive signals in the second 
half of 2009 has supported a gradual shift in economic 
prospects and lent weight to the hypothesis that the worst 
of the crisis may be over, even though financial markets 
continue to exhibit some volatility and the situation of the 
global economy is not risk-free.1 Beyond the short term, 
1
  For example, the events that occurred in the real-estate and financial 
markets of Dubai (United Arab Emirates) in late 2009 and their 
immediate repercussions on other markets, given the high levels 
of exposure of a number of European banks.
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however, a number of questions arise as to whether this 
rapid recovery will develop into sustained growth at the 
world level and in Latin America and the Caribbean.
Given the magnitude of the crisis, it reached every 
part of the world and the Latin American and Caribbean 
region was no exception. Yet it is increasingly evident that 
this crisis differs from those the region has experienced in 
the past. Not only because the epicentre of the crisis lay 
in the developed countries, although this plays no small 
part in accounting for recent economic trends, but, above 
all, because of the juncture at which the crisis broke out 
in the region and how the region was affected.
First, the combination of highly favourable external 
conditions and more prudent management of macroeconomic 
policy has enabled the region to reduce its outstanding debt 
and to renegotiate it on advantageous terms, while also 
building up international reserves. The Latin American 
economies thus went into the crisis with unprecedented 
liquidity and solvency, at least by comparison with their 
position during previous episodes since the 1980s, because, 
unlike on those occasions, the countries’ financial systems 
have not deteriorated and there has been no flight from 
local currency, which has helped to maintain calm in 
the region’s currency markets.2 As discussed in detail in 
Economic Survey of Latin America and the Caribbean 
2008-2009 (ECLAC, 2009a), a number of Caribbean 
countries are carrying hefty external debts and facing 
rather more complex exchange-rate situations.3
Also unlike the situation during previous crises, the 
broadened macroeconomic policy space in many of the 
region’s countries gave them substantial capacity for 
anti-crisis policymaking. In general, as will be discussed 
later, the public policy space is greater in some South 
American countries. The improved net financial position 
also afforded renewed access to international financial 
markets fairly promptly, which further boosted capacity 
to implement public policies. As a result, even though the
2
  There were some stress in the region’s foreign-exchange markets in 
the last quarter of 2008 which resulted in heavy currency depreciations 
in some countries. This episode was quickly neutralized, however, 
and had no major repercussions.
3
  See box I.2 in Economic Survey of Latin America and the Caribbean 
2008-2009 (ECLAC, 2009a).
downturn in real variables was very sharp, the recovery 
looks fairly solid.
Although poverty levels in the region remained high, 
despite the gains made in recent years, and the impact of 
the crisis on social variables was predictably negative, the 
deterioration was not as great as had initially been projected, 
owing to a number of factors. On the one hand, the drop 
in activity levels and its impact on the labour market were 
both smaller than expected, so the unemployment rate 
did not rise as much as the initial contraction led analysts 
to fear it would. On the other, international commodity 
prices, combined with currency appreciation, helped 
to significantly lower the rate of inflation and limit the 
erosion of real income, thereby at least partially offsetting 
the downturn in labour indicators.
The rise in social spending in the last few years and 
the increase in the number and effectiveness of social 
programmes played an important role in containing the 
social costs of the crisis. Learning the lessons from previous 
crises, the countries have sought to maintain —and even 
expand— the coverage of these programmes, even in the 
context of a gradually tightening fiscal space.
This chapter looks at the hallmarks of the current 
situation and considers the scenarios the region will face 
in 2010 and beyond. Section B below briefly examines 
the current international conditions. Section C reviews 
the main features of recent economic performance and 
examines the channels through which the crisis affected 
the economies of the region and its impacts on labour and 
social indicators. Section D analyses the macroeconomic 
policies implemented as the crisis deepened in late 2008 
and section E lays out the evidence available on the signs 
of recovery in the region’s economies, especially as of 
the second half of 2009. The last section discusses the 
short-term outlook and the risks that could threaten the 
fledging recovery and the main challenges for Latin 
America and the Caribbean beyond the crisis.
A.  The international context
The global economy is recovering from the deepest 
recession the world has seen in the last 60 years. The 
international financial crisis, which originated in the 
United States and other developed countries, spread 
rapidly to the rest of the world’s economies, and its effects 
were soon being felt in the real sector. From mid-2008 
to the first quarter of 2009, industrial activity worldwide 
fell by 11.6% and in the developed countries by 16.4%. 
International trade volumes meanwhile shrank by 19%. 
Given that the impact of the crisis was still strong in the 
first semester of 2009, world GDP is projected to fall 
by 2.2% over the year. 
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Nevertheless economic activity and international trade 
started to show some signs of recovery in the middle of the 
year. The rapid recuperation from the worst moment of the 
crisis was largely the result of the expansionary monetary 
policy response coordinated by the world’s main central 
banks, which was subsequently replicated by monetary 
authorities in the developing world. Copious amounts 
of liquidity were injected into the markets, and these, 
together with the fiscal stimulus packages that governments 
implemented, have been driving the incipient recovery now 
under way. Also, the relatively strong performance of the 
developing Asian economies, especially China, prevented 
an even greater slump in global demand. Initial fears of 
a long drawn-out depression thus dissipated, and the first 
signs of a synchronized emergence from the recession 
began to appear in the second quarter of 2009. 
Manufacturing activity has been picking up in general 
in the different regions of the world since the middle of the 
year (see figure I.2). In this regard, the industrial output of 
the developing Asian economies not only contracted less 
than that of other regions, it was also the first to pick up 
again at the beginning of 2009. 
Figure I.2
SEASONALLY ADJUSTED INDEX OF INDUSTRIAL  
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Source:  Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on 
the basis of data from Centraal Planbureau (CPB), Netherlands Bureau for 
Economic Policy Analysis.
a
 Three-month moving averages compared with the previous quarter.
The volume of international trade began to grow again 
towards the second half of the year (see figure I.3), largely 
driven by activity in the developing Asian economies. Their 
openness to foreign trade and their external orientation 
meant that most of them were hit hard by the decline in 
world trade, but, as is analysed below, this did not have a 
significant impact on economic activity levels thanks to 
the expansionary policies implemented by the authorities 
in those countries. 
The world’s larger economies began to show signs 
of recovery as of the second half of 2009. In the United 
States, seasonally adjusted and annualized GDP grew by 
2.8% in the third quarter of the year compared with the 
previous quarter, after falling for four consecutive quarters 
since mid-2008 and dropping by 5.4% and 6.4% in the last 
quarter of 2008 and the first quarter of 2009, respectively. 
All the components of demand posted positive growth in the 
third quarter of 2009, with the rise in imports and exports 
heralding the recovery of world trade. At the same time, 
household consumption, a key indicator in the United States 
economy (see figure I.4a), began to climb again thanks to 
growing consumer confidence and increased spending on 
durables, such as cars and household appliances. 
Figure I.3
VARIATION IN TRADE VOLUME (AVERAGE VOLUME OF IMPORTS 
PLUS EXPORTS), BY REGION a
(Percentages)
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Source:  Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on 
the basis of data from Centraal Planbureau (CPB), Netherlands Bureau for 
Economic Policy Analysis.
a
 Three-month moving averages compared with the previous quarter.
It should be noted that public-sector consumption is 
the only component of demand that continued to grow in 
three of the four quarters of the United States recession, a 
clear reflection of the fiscal effort put into counteracting the 
effects of the crisis. The United States economy is projected 
to grow at the same rate in the fourth quarter as it did in the 
third, closing 2009 with a downslide of 2.5%. Inventory 
shedding is down and its negative influence waning. The 
need to replenish stocks is expected to help push GDP growth 
in the United States up to around 2.0% in 2010. However, 
rising unemployment, which has already hit double-digit 
levels (10.2%), and the difficulties still affecting the financial 
markets at a time when both the public- and private-sectors 
are heavily burdened with debt, are warning signs of the 
possible future course of the United States economy.
The economies of the euro 16 area also began to 
recover in the third quarter of 2009, after five quarters of 
negative growth, thanks to the significant countercyclical 
role played by public consumption (see figure I.4b). 
After shrinking by 4.0% in 2009, aggregate GDP for 
the area is expected to recover slowly and gradually, 
growing by less than 1% in 2010. 
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Figure I.4
GROWTH IN GDP AND THE COMPONENTS OF DEMAND a
(Percentages)
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Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of official figures.
a
 Seasonally adjusted figures. Annualized variation from the previous quarter.
The Japanese economy came out of recession in the 
second quarter of 2009 after two quarters of drops of over 
10% in annualized GDP in relation to the previous quarter 
(see figure I.4c). After this sharp contraction, the economy 
grew again at an annualized rate of 2.7% in the second 
quarter of the year (compared with the previous quarter) 
and by an even more robust 4.8% in the third quarter. This 
recovery was driven by strong export growth and the fiscal 
stimulus package implemented by the Japanese authorities, 
as well as by the rise in transfers to the private sector which 
encouraged household consumption, albeit at the cost of 
further debilitating an already weak fiscal position. Despite 
the recovery recorded in the second semester, the heavy 
contraction of the economy at the beginning of 2009 (-12.2% 
annualized in relation to the previous quarter) means that 
GDP growth for 2009 overall is expected to be -5.9%. GDP 
growth for 2010 is projected at 1.1%. 
As noted earlier, the developing Asian economies 
were the first to reverse the negative effects of the crisis, 
and some countries, such as China, India and Indonesia, 
suffered slowdowns but never actually went into recession. 
This superior performance was largely achieved through 
the use of major fiscal and monetary stimuli. 
The Chinese economy was back on its path of robust 
growth towards the second quarter of 2009 thanks to the 
expansionary policies deployed on both the fiscal and 
monetary fronts. The government took advantage of 
the enormous fiscal space it had built up (after years of 
surpluses in public accounts and thanks to its position 
as the net creditor of the rest of the world) to launch an 
ambitious public programme that included an increase 
in infrastructure spending, tax cuts and the introduction 
of a new social security system. Also, unlike in other 
financial markets, lending in China soared, especially 
credit financing for infrastructure projects. These two 
factors fuelled domestic demand and contributed to a 
recovery in imports, which in turn stimulated regional 
and global trade. 
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Table I.1 
ANNUAL VARIATIONS IN WORLD GROWTH
(Percentages)
2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 a 2010 b
World 2.7 4.1 3.5 3.9 3.8 1.7 -2.2 2.5
Developed countries 1.8 3.0 2.5 2.7 2.5 0.4 -3.6 1.4
     United States 2.5 3.6 3.1 2.7 2.1 0.4 -2.5 2.0
     Euro area (16 countries) 0.8 2.1 1.7 3.0 2.7 0.6 -4.0 0.7
     Rest of Europe (11+3) 2.4 3.5 2.7 3.6 3.1 1.1 -4.1 0.7
     Japan 1.4 2.7 1.9 2.0 2.3 -0.7 -5.9 1.1
Developing countries 5.2 7.4 6.6 7.3 7.5 5.2 1.6 5.3
     Africa 5.5 9.2 5.5 6.2 6.1 6.0 1.9 4.3
     Latin America and the Caribbean 2.2 6.1 5.0 5.8 5.8 4.1 -1.8 4.1
     China 10.0 10.1 10.4 11.6 13.0 9.0 8.4 8.7
     India 6.9 7.9 9.2 9.8 9.3 7.3 5.9 6.5
     Recently industrialized countries 3.1 6.0 4.8 5.6 5.7 1.5 -2.4 3.6
     Rest of Asia 6.1 6.8 6.3 5.9 5.8 4.4 -0.1 3.8
Transition economies 7.5 8.0 6.7 8.3 8.7 5.7 -5.9 1.9
Developing countries (excluding China and India) 3.9 6.6 5.4 5.9 5.8 3.9 -0.9 4.0





B. Recent trends in the Latin American and  
 Caribbean economies
As noted in the introduction, in order to understand why the 
impact of this crisis on Latin America and the Caribbean 
was different from that of previous ones, it is important to 
understand the situation in which the region found itself 
when the crisis struck. First of all, the global economic 
crisis brought to a sudden end the longest and most intense 
phase of economic growth that the region had seen in a 
very long while. A similar period of steady per capita GDP 
growth of over 3% per year (as recorded in 2004-2008) 
had not been seen for 40 years, since the boom that lasted 
from the end of the 1960s to the oil shock at the beginning 
of the 1970s, during which the region posted comparable 
growth rates for seven consecutive years.
As shown in figure I.5, steady growth was 
accompanied by quantitative and qualitative improvements 
in macroeconomic fundamentals, making 2004-2008 a 
period of expansion unprecedented in the region’s recent 
history. On the one hand, the region enjoyed a current 
account surplus (largely generated by improvement in 
the terms of trade, especially in South America) as well 
as increasing remittance flows from migrant workers 
(mainly in Mexico and, above all, Central America). 
Meanwhile in public accounts, ever-larger primary 
surpluses were being posted, and the region’s overall 
deficit was drastically reduced (even turning into a 
surplus in 2006/2007).
Figure I.5
LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN: VARIATION IN PER 
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Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on 
the basis of official figures.
At a time of abundant liquidity in international financial 
markets, the current account surplus allowed countries to 
reduce their external debt burdens and to renegotiate more 
advantageous terms, as well as to accumulate reserves.4 
Greater fiscal slack, meanwhile, made it possible to slash 
public debt. 
4
 As noted earlier, the situation is rather different in some Caribbean 
economies.
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Therefore, although the crisis imposed heavy constraints 
on macroeconomic policy as it plunged the economies back 
into deficit positions on their external and public accounts, 
their favourable situation in terms of financial stocks (more 
assets, fewer and better liabilities) meant that, unlike in 
previous crises, in 2009, they did not have to contend with 
1.  Channels of transmission of the crisis
problems in the domestic financial systems, runs against 
domestic currencies or difficulties meeting their external 
obligations. This explains why this time around, with a 
few exceptions which will be discussed later, the strongest 
effects of the crisis were channelled not through the financial 
sector but through the real economy.
As noted above, the repercussions of the crisis on Latin 
America and the Caribbean were channelled through the 
real sector, damaging what had been in recent times one 
of the main engines of regional growth. 
Exports plummeted as of the second semester of 2008, 
both in volume and value terms. Even though the fall has 
slowed in the second half of 2009, Latin American export 
volumes are projected to fall by slightly over 9.5% by the 
end of the year. Mexico’s exports have suffered the most, 
and will slide by about 14% in real terms. Drops of about 
5% and 6.5% in export volumes are estimated for Central 
America and South America, respectively. 
The slowdown in economic activity worldwide, together 
with the drop in international trade flows, had a negative 
impact on commodity prices, which hurt the region’s terms 
of trade. Prices had soared in the first half of 2008, but the 
crisis hit the international goods markets hard, especially 
after the collapse of Lehman Brothers in September that 
year. Although the downtrend in international commodity 
prices bottomed out at the beginning of 2009, average 
price levels for the year are far lower than in 2008, which 
suggests that the terms of trade for the region as a whole 
worsened by an estimated 6.1%. This has implications mainly 
for South America, and for the oil and hydrocarbon and 
metal producers in particular, as well as, albeit to a lesser 
extent, for countries that specialize in food production. 
The terms of trade of Central America, which imports 
those commodities, on the other hand, can be expected to 
improve. This will only partially offset the worsening of 
the terms experienced in previous years, however. 
Tourism, which is of major importance to the 
economies of the Caribbean and Central America, 
declined sharply in the first part of 2009 as shown in 
figure I.7. The contraction was particularly notable in 
Mexico in the second quarter of the year due to the 
outbreak of influenza A (H1N1). Overall, tourism is 
expected to fall by 5%-10% in 2009, even though the 
latest available data reveal a slight upturn.
Figure I.6


























Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on 
the basis of official figures.
Figure I.7
LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN: YEAR-ON-YEAR 
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Source:  Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on 
the basis of the World Tourism Organization (UNWTO).
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Given that the main destinations of most Latin American 
and Caribbean emigrants are the United States and Spain, 
two of the countries worst hit by the crisis, it is not surprising 
that remittances to the region have plummeted. The latest 
available data suggest that this trend might be being reversed, 
but even then, annual falls of close to 10% in remittances 
have been recorded in some Central American countries, 
such as El Salvador and Guatemala, and even larger drops 
in countries such as Colombia, Ecuador, Jamaica and 
Mexico. Smaller declines have been estimated for the 
Dominican Republic and Nicaragua. 
Meanwhile, foreign direct investment (FDI) in the 
region as a whole is expected to fall by 37%, by far the 
largest drop for at least 30 years. Between 1999 and 
2003, FDI flows fell by about 47%, but then the drop was 
concentrated in only two countries (Argentina and Brazil), 
while this time around, the downturn is spread across the 
region, although diminished flows to Brazil account for 
a significant proportion of the total decline.
Although, generally speaking, the impacts of the 
international crisis were felt mainly through the channel 
of the real economy, in some cases there were impacts on 
financial systems that may have had significant repercussions 
on activity levels. Although the turbulences in the region 
were mostly related to trade rather than reversals of capital 
inflows, there were three major exceptions: Brazil, Chile 
and Peru, whose financial systems were more exposed 
than those of the rest of the region in late 2008.5
As shown in figure I.9, the manifestation of this 
situation in these countries’ financial systems was a 
major contraction in private bank credit in real terms. 
The public banks then played an active role in many 
countries as part of countercyclical strategy although, with 
the exception of Brazil (where public banks account for 
a large proportion of total credit), the capacity to offset 
the contraction in private bank credit was fairly small.
This factor been crucial in explaining the relative 
weakness of the Chilean economy between late 2008 and 
the third quarter of 2009, despite its sound macroeconomic 
fundamentals and the active intervention of the State 
through countercyclical policies. The evidence shown 
in figure I.10 regarding the magnitude of credit to the 
private sector as a proportion of GDP speaks for itself 
as regards the impact on activity levels of shrinking 
private bank lending in the Chilean economy, compared 
with the Brazilian and Peruvian economies and, in 
general, the rest of the region.
5
 See ECLAC (2009a), in which box I.1 gives an analysis of the 
consequences of the shocks experienced by the region after 
the crisis deepened in late 2008. Figure I.4 of that publication 
shows the net external position of the financial systems of the 
Latin American countries and discusses certain aggregates in 
developed countries and emerging economies. These data are 
based on information from the Bank for International Settlements.
Figure I.8
LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN: YEAR-ON-YEAR 
VARIATION IN REMITTANCES FROM MIGRANT  
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Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on 
the basis of official figures.
a Projections for 2009.
Figure I.9
BRAZIL, CHILE AND PERU: PRIVATE BANK LENDING
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Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on 
the basis of official figures.
Figure I.10
LATIN AMERICA (SELECTED COUNTRIES): BANK LENDING TO 





















Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on 
the basis of official figures.
Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC)20
Generally-speaking, the expectations of consumers 
and businesspeople alike worsened towards the end of 
2008 and at the beginning of 2009, which translated into 
lower levels of both private consumption and investment. 
In fact, as shown in figure I.11, public consumption was 
the only type of consumption to increase in the first part 
of the year when many countries in the region had at 
least some room to implement countercyclical policies 
that partially offset the negative performance posted by 
the other components of domestic demand and helped 
speed up the recovery in the second part of the year as 
discussed below.6 
Figure I.11
LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN: BREAKDOWN OF  
TOTAL SUPPLY AND DEMAND
(Percentages)
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Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on 
the basis of official figures.
2.  The social effects of the crisis
The sudden slowdown in economic growth had a negative 
impact on the labour market: the employment rate 
fell for the first time in six years, as shown in section 
III.C. Unemployment rose by almost one percentage 
point from 7.4% to 8.3%. The slack labour supply, as 
indicated by the participation rate, averted a larger rise 
in unemployment.7 Governments implemented a series 
of measures (see box I.1) whose impact is impossible to 
gauge on the basis of the information available to date, but 
which probably helped stem the rise in unemployment. 
The improvements under way in recent years in job 
quality, however, stopped as the creation of wage jobs in 
the private sector and of formal employment in general 
slowed considerably.
On the other hand, the crisis contributed to the lowering 
of regional inflation from 8.3% in 2008 to 4.5% in 2009. 
This was the result of the dual impact of the global recession 
and the decline in trade on food and energy prices, on the 
one hand, and of the widening of the gap between observed 
and potential GDP brought about by the regionwide drop 
in demand, on the other (see box I.3). 
Lower inflation staved off a fall in real wages, which 
partly explains why the negative impact on poverty was 
more moderate than initially projected.8 
The smaller-than-expected increase in poverty can also 
be attributed to the social spending policies implemented 
6
  As no disaggregated data are available on investment, no distinctions 
could be made between public investment which, as  noted below, 
increased over the year, and private investment, which contracted 
sharply and whose weight is far greater, masking the compensatory 
effect of public investment.
by most of the countries of the region, especially to 
those deployed by the larger countries that have a more 
tightly woven institutional fabric, which enables them to 
implement strategies that, by being more targeted, tend to 
be more effective during crises than the general subsidies 
on consumption of certain goods and services. As shown in 
box I.1, general subsidies tend to be the instruments most 
commonly used in some Central American and Caribbean 
countries whose institutional framework is weaker. 
Figure I.12
LATIN AMERICA: VARIATION IN NOMINAL WAGES,  
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Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on 
the basis of official figures.
a 
 Simple average (10 countries).
8
 As noted in Social Panorama of Latin America (ECLAC, 2009c).
7
 The projected rise in the unemployment rate is smaller than mid-
year forecasts. For example, in ECLAC/ILO (2009), it is estimated 
that unemployment could come close to 9% for the year overall.
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Box I.1
SOCIAL MEASURES IN LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN
The Latin American and Caribbean countries 
have announced social measures that may 
be classified under consumption subsidies, on 
the one hand, and support for poor families, 
on the other. The consumption subsides 
consist of subsidies for fuel, food and other 
items, transport and electric power. Support 
for poor families has encompassed mainly 
help with housing, health care and education 
for vulnerable groups. Of the 33 countries 
and 2 dependent territories in the region, 27 
have information on these measures (9 of 11 
in South America, 8 of 9 in Central America 
and 10 of 15 in the Caribbean). 
Regionwide, a total of 45 measures 
were registered. Of the 33 countries and 2 
dependent territories, 24 have announced 
measures to support poor families and 18 
to subsidize consumption. Accordingly, the 
portfolio leans slightly towards support for 
poor families (57%).
A breakdown of the measures by 
subregion, however, shows a major difference 
in portfolio composition. In South America 
and Mexico, three quarters of the measures 
announced involve support for poor families, 
while in Central America and the Caribbean 
countries the distribution is fairly balanced, 
with half of the measures announced 
corresponding to consumption subsidies 
and the other half to family support. 
COMPOSITION OF PORTFOLIO OF SOCIAL PROGRAMMES IN SOUTH AMERICA  
AND MEXICO, CENTRAL AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN
(Percentages)
















South America and Mexico Central America The Caribbean
C.  Macroeconomic policy
Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), The reactions of the Governments of the Americas to the international crisis: an overview of 
policy measures up to 30 September 2009 (LC/L.3025/Rev.5), Santiago, Chile, October 2009.
Apart from the different ways in 
which the crisis may have affected the 
different subregions, these divergences 
may also have to do with disparities in 
institutional capabilities for carrying out 
social policies. Targeted policies tend to 
be more effective during crises, since they 
reach those who need them directly, but 
they make greater demands on institutions. 
By contrast, consumption subsidies are 
relatively simpler to implement, but less 
effective because they are spread across 
the entire population and may even 
be regressive insofar as their benefits 
may accrue excessively to those who 
consume most.
Many countries in the region had some room to implement 
countercyclical policies that not only allowed them to at 
least partially offset the negative evolution of most of the 
components of domestic demand, but also to speed up 
the recovery process, which took hold in some countries 
as of the second quarter and in nearly all by the third 
quarter of 2009. 
One characteristic feature of the crisis has been the 
capacity shown (by some countries more than others) 
to implement macroeconomic and sectoral policies to 
mitigate the negative effects of the crisis on economic 
activity and employment. To different extents, according 
to the type of problem faced and, above all, according to 
each country’s capacity (in not only financial, but also 
institutional terms) to put into practice public policies, 
the governments of the region have introduced a wide 
array of initiatives which can broadly be grouped into 
the following categories: fiscal measures; monetary, 
financial and exchange measures; and social and 
employment measures.
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1.  Fiscal policy
The positive stimulus of fiscal policy action was one of 
the distinctive features of economic management in 2009. 
The region’s primary balance fell from a surplus equivalent 
to 1.4% of GDP in 2008 to an estimated deficit of 1% 
of GDP in 2009. This drop of more than two percentage 
points, which is a measure of the size of the fiscal stimulus, 
reflects both the decline in public revenues and the increase 
in public expenditures (including both current and capital 
expenditures), as shown in figure I.13.
Figure I.13
LATIN AMERICA: REVENUE, PRIMARY SPENDING AND  
PRIMARY BALANCE
(Simple average, percentages of GDP)
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Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on 
the basis of official figures.
Revenues, which are examined in detail in the 
corresponding chapter, have been conditioned by economic 
growth (which in turn has determined tax receipts) and by 
the fall in the prices of the commodities that the region 
exports and that in some countries account for a high 
proportion of public income.
In addition to these factors, in many cases, policy 
measures taken in association with anti-crisis strategies 
to stimulate domestic demand have reduced tax receipts. 
Income tax rebates and other tax benefits for both 
companies and private individuals are among the most 
widely used instruments, having been introduced in 12 of 
the 19 countries of Latin America. 
The governments in the region also announced fairly 
ambitious spending plans. As far as their implementation is 
concerned, in most of the countries for which information on 
actual spending is available for up to the third quarter of the 
year, current expenditures (which can generally be stepped up 
more quickly) increased significantly in the first half of the 
year, while capital expenditures (which are usually slower to 
materialize) did so to a lesser extent. The drop in commodity 
prices reduced the fiscal space available in some of the 
countries that are highly specialized in commodities, however, 
which prevented them from implementing countercyclical 
measures.9 This occurred in the Bolivarian Republic of 
Venezuela, where the drop in fiscal revenues compelled the 
authorities to take steps to contain public spending, which 
gave fiscal policy a procyclical start.
Figure I.14
LATIN AMERICA (SELECTED COUNTRIES): VARIATION IN PUBLIC 
EXPENDITURE, NINE MONTHS OF 2008 COMPARED  

























Current spending Capital spending
Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on 
the basis of official figures.
a  Variation in total spending.
9
  See chapter II.A.
2.  Monetary and exchange-rate policy
As soon as the crisis broke out, the central banks of the 
region prioritized a series of wide-ranging measures 
aimed at guaranteeing either recovery or the liquidity of 
local financial markets, or both. The widespread fall in 
inflation freed up monetary policy both in countries that 
run inflation-targeting schemes and those that use other 
targets, such as certain monetary aggregates.
As discussed in chapter II, the substantial lowering 
of monetary policy rates by most of the region’s monetary 
authorities occurred most quickly in the countries with inflation-
targeting schemes. In many cases, however, although interest 
rates plummeted, inflation rates fell even faster, cancelling 
out in real terms the effect pursued by policy action.
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Box I.2 
MONETARY POLICY OBJECTIVES IN LATIN AMERICA
The principal mandate of central banks 
in countries that run inflation-targeting 
schemes is to keep prices rises under 
control. In such a system the credibility of 
the monetary authority is crucial because 
it is expected to act to ensure that inflation 
targets are met. However, goods prices 
are not the only macroeconomic variable 
that fluctuates in an economy. Variations 
in real exchange rate and in GDP can, 
at particular times, also cause concern 
for central banks. For example, in their 
monetary policy and inflation reports, the 
central banks of those countries have 
noted that the reduction in monetary policy 
reference rates since the first semester of 
2009 has also been intended to help revive 
domestic demand amid slack economic 
activity. Sharp fluctuations in the nominal 
exchange rate, which are also passed 
through to the real exchange rate, have 
also prompted central banks to intervene 
in the foreign-exchange markets.a In Chile, 
for example, in response to the nominal 
appreciation of the peso in 2009, the central 
bank announced and implemented a series 
of interventions aimed at strengthening the 
international reserve position. 
All this goes to show that, under 
cer tain circumstances, monetary 
authorities may respond to variables 
other than price movements. In order to 
evaluate these observations empirically, a 
modified Taylor rule was estimated using 
autoregressive vectors and including the 
cyclical components of GDP and the real 
exchange rate for Brazil, Chile, Colombia, 
Mexico and Peru.b As will be recalled, 
the dependent variable for this rule is 
the monetary policy reference rate. In 
other words, the idea is to estimate how 
a central bank will respond to deviations 
from trend in these variables. 
The fo l lowing equat ion was 
estimated:
(1) TRPMt= β0 + β1∗ιΕ + β2∗(         )+ 
 β3*(                 )+ β4*(                   )+ετ
where iE is the equilibrium rate of 
interest,             represents the deviation 
of effective inflation from target inflation, 
                      is the deviation of effective 
GDP from trend, estimated using a Hodrick-
Prescott filter, and                         is the 
deviation of the real exchange rate, 
whose trend was estimated using the 
aforementioned methodology for quarterly 
data, given that these countries have an 
inflation-targeting scheme. 
Preliminary results show that central 
banks react to variables other than deviations 
from the inflation target. The figure below 
shows response impulse functions for Chile 
and Colombia. The response variable is the 
monetary policy reference rate, while the 
impulses are provided by standard deviations 
in inflation, GDP and the real exchange rate. 
The longitude of the response graphed in 
the figure is 10 periods. In the case of Chile, 
the monetary policy reference rate reacts 
basically to changes in the deviation of 
inflation and output and, to a lesser extent, to 
real exchange rate variations. In Colombia, 
the monetary policy reference rate reacts to 
all three variables. This evidence is consistent 
with that found in other regions, in Asia for 
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Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of J.B. Taylor, “Discretion versus policy rules in practice”, Carnegie – Rochester 
Conference Series on Public Policy, N° 39, 1993; y F. Neumann y S. Yi Kim S., “What do they target? A profile of Asian central banks”, Macro Asian Economics, 
HSBC Global Research, 2009.
a
 See section on exchange-rate policy in this publication.
b 
 Since the study is at a preliminary stage, only the results for Chile and  Colombia are presented.
Also, the central banks’ efforts to inject more liquidity 
into the financial system failed to translate into an increase 
in credit in the private banking sector (see figure I.15). As 
noted earlier, in response to this situation, many governments 
of the region had the public banking sector play a role 
in their countercyclical strategies and stepped up public 
lending to compensate, in some cases partially, in others 
totally, the tighter stances of private banks. Naturally, the 
impact of this instrument depends on the magnitude of 
the official banking sector in the financial system. Hence, 
it has been very significant in Brazil, where public bank 
lending represents around 35% of total credit.
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many of the region’s economies, resulted in large inflows of 
capital that pushed down the exchange rate in most of South 
America. The notable exception has been Mexico, where the 
exchange rate is 22% higher in real terms than it was before 
September 2008 when the international crisis unfolded. 
In order to defend the real exchange rate to some 
extent and to sustain domestic liquidity levels, many central 
banks intervened in the exchange market, which in some 
cases enabled them to restore international reserve levels to 
those seen prior to the last quarter of 2008.10 One notable 
example is Brazil, where international reserves rose by 19% 
to over US$ 37 billion and the real exchange rate fell by 
26% between December 2008 and October 2009.
The changes observed in the countries’ international 
reserves over 2009 are particularly interesting. The increase 
recorded by Brazil was larger than that posted by Latin 
America and the Caribbean as a whole. The situation 
varied across the region, with the increases in reserves 
in some countries managing to offset the losses observed 
at the end of 2008, while in others, such as Argentina 
and Mexico, the increments were minimal in terms of 
their impact on the total regional rise. It should be noted 
that in some cases, especially in the smaller economies, 
such as those of the Caribbean, the expansion of reserves 
was mainly the result of the recent allocation of Special 
Drawing Rights by the International Monetary Fund.
D.  The recovery of the economies of Latin America and 
 the Caribbean in the second half of 2009
According to the indicators calculated by ECLAC using 
the methodology presented in ECLAC (2009a), six of 
the largest economies of the region, Argentina, Brazil, 
Chile, Colombia, Mexico and Peru, which together 
account for about 90% of regional GDP, were on the 
road to economic recovery in the third quarter of 2009 
(see figure I.16).11 
11
 See Cantú, Acevedo and Bello (2009).
Figure I.16 
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Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on 
the basis of official figures.
Figure I.15 
LATIN AMERICA (SELECTED COUNTRIES): VARIATION IN PUBLIC 
AND PRIVATE BANK LENDING BETWEEN DECEMBER 2008  
AND SEPTEMBER 2009
(Percentages)


























Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on 
the basis of official figures.
As far as exchange rates are concerned, once the strain 
experienced at the end of 2008 (which in some cases lasted 
into the beginning of 2009) was over, the general trend in 
South America was a return to the appreciation of local 
currencies under way prior to the crisis. The search for higher 
returns during a time of abundant liquidity in the international 
market, together with the relatively robust performance of 
10
 The collapse of Lehman Brothers produced some stress in the 
financial and exchange markets of the region, which led central 
banks, among other things, to step in to prevent an even greater 
depreciation of local currencies than that seen in the last quarter of 
2008. This sapped about US$ 50 billion of the region’s international 
reserves, approximately 10% of total holdings. 
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Expectations that the downturn witnessed in economic 
activity between the fourth quarter of 2008 and the second 
quarter of 2009 will be reversed are in keeping with 
the improvements detected in the analysis of the latest 
information on most of the variables for the real economy 
referred to in section C. 
Export volumes began to expand again as of the 
third quarter of 2009 (see figure I.3), as shown in chapter 
IV.A, while the increase in global economic activity and 
international trade is having a positive effect on demand 
for commodities and has been pushing up commodity 
prices since the second quarter of 2009. This is, in turn, 
reversing the worsening of the region’s terms of trade, 
which are expected to improve by 3.8% in 2010 for the 
region as a whole, and by even more in the hydrocarbon- 
and metal-exporting countries of South America and in 
Mexico. The terms of trade of Central America, in contrast, 
are projected to worsen.
Figure I.17 














Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on 
the basis of official figures.
Remittance flows, which were one of the other 
engines of growth in 2003-2008, are beginning to pick up 
again. Moreover, the onset of economic recovery in the 
United States and Spain, the two main destinations for 
Latin American and Caribbean emigrants, adds weight to 
expectations of a recovery in foreign-exchange inflows to 
the region in the form of remittances. Indicators for the 
Latin American labour markets meanwhile show that both 
the downturn in employment and the rise in unemployment 
halted in the third quarter of the year.12
As noted in the preceding section, domestic demand 
is continuing to receive fiscal stimulus in the second half of 
2009 which, along with the factors referenced earlier and as 
a result of a gradual return to normalcy in financial markets, 
12
  See Ratha, Mohapatra and Silwal (2009).
in many cases with the additional support of official banks, 
is leading to a recovery —at fairly rapid rates, in some 
cases— which is reflected in the gradual improvement in 
labour-market indicators for the region (see figure I.19). 
Figure I.18 
EMPLOYMENT STATUS OF LATIN AMERICAN CITIZENS IN THE 
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Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on 
the basis of official figures.
At the same time, the increased tolerance for risk 
in a context of high liquidity in international financial 
markets —along with a positive perception of prospects 
for several of the economies in the region— is resulting, 
as noted in the previous section, in a number of countries 
regaining access to international credit. This is having a 
positive effect on stock markets, which are returning to 
levels seen prior to the worsening of the crisis. In turn, 
the private sector should be able to restructure assets and 
lending activity should return to normal which, together 
with the gradual improvement in labour market indicators 
and the renewed confidence within the private sector, as 
indicated by surveys of business and consumer expectations, 
should sustain a recovery in domestic demand for both 
consumer and capital goods.
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Figure I.19 
LATIN AMERICA (SELECTED COUNTRIES): SEASONALLY 
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Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on 
the basis of official figures.
Figure I.20 
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Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on 
the basis of figures from Bloomberg.
E.  Prospects, risks and challenges facing the region
1.  Anticipated developments in the economies of Latin America 
 and the Caribbean in 2010
Given the speed of the recovery that became evident in the 
second quarter of 2009, in 2010 the region could return 
to growth rates that, in some cases, will come close to 
matching those seen prior to the crisis. While this is the 
most likely scenario, it is not without risks. Moreover, 
there is considerable scepticism as to whether this recovery 
will lead to sustained growth.
The projected growth rate for 2010 is 4.1%, with 
expectations of stronger growth in South America than 
in the other subregions, given the larger size of the 
domestic markets in some of the countries (particularly 
Brazil and, to a lesser extent, Argentina and Colombia), 
the diversification of export markets, and the greater role 
played by Asia, China, in particular, as export markets 
for a number of countries (Argentina, Brazil, Chile and 
Peru). By contrast, slower growth is expected in more open 
economies that have a less diversified portfolio of trading 
partners and are more heavily reliant on manufacturing 
trade, such as Mexico and the Central American economies. 
The Caribbean economies may be similarly placed and 
many face additional difficulties arising from a complex 
financial and exchange-rate situation.
In this context of increased growth and higher 
prices for a number of commodities in which the region 
specializes, there is reason to expect a rise in public 
revenues and, to the extent that private sector demand 
increases, a gradual decline in government consumption 
throughout the year.13 However, in countries that specialize 
more heavily in natural-resource-intensive processed 
goods, higher fiscal revenues will boost the governments’ 
capacities to inject impetus into domestic activity. Capital 
expenditures, responding more slowly, will continue to 
increase as a result of various projects initiated in 2009. 
This should not prevent an improvement in the fiscal 
balance, however.
13
 Some countries have already begun, in 2009, to reduce current 
spending, while others, such as Mexico, have announced fiscal reform 
programmes that would involve a major increase in tax collections.
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Figure I.21 
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Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on 
the basis of official figures.
To the extent that growth takes hold and approaches 
potential growth rates, inflation could begin to edge up, 
which could lead to a tightening of monetary policy, 
perhaps towards the end of the year. Here, however, central 
banks will again face the choice between maintaining 
price stability and limiting currency appreciation, in an 
environment in which exchange rates will very probably 
be subject to downward pressure (currency appreciation) 
owing to a surplus of hard currency resulting from abundant 
international market liquidity.
While there is reason to expect a deterioration in the 
balance-of-payments current account compared to 2009, 
mostly as a result of an upturn in imports, the availability 
of external financing, together with increased FDI inflows, 
will probably suffice not only to cover this larger deficit, but 
even to continue restoring international reserve levels.
Economic growth should help to increase rates (and, 
probably, the quality) of employment, although it will likely 
mean a corresponding increase in the participation rate, 
which will partially offset the impact on unemployment. 
All in all, it is estimated that unemployment could fall 
to around 8%, settling mid-way between pre- and post-




An economy’s growth potential —how 
much it would grow if production resources 
were fully employed— is an important 
concept for economic analysis and, in 
particular, for economic policymaking. 
This growth potential is not something 
that can be observed however, but must 
be estimated. 
This box offers a brief explanation of the 
estimation of Latin America’s potential growth 
for the period 1980-2020,a measured by 
means of the production function methodology, 
whose main advantage is that it is built on 
a sound theoretical model that is lacking 
in other, purely statistical, methodologies. 
Production function methodology calls for 
the estimates of total factor productivity 
(TFP), on the one hand, and the valuation 
of the factors of production (employment and 
capital) at full potential, on the other. 
TFP is obtained from the difference 
between the variation rates of GDP, 
employment and capital stock (with this 
last variable adjusted using an installed 
capacity use index).
The capital stock of the different types 
of production activity under way in the 
economy is estimated from 1950 onwards 









where        is the investment of    age 
expressed at constant prices,     is the 
retirement function, which determines the 
proportion of investment made      periods 
ago that is currently surviving and  
represents the age-efficiency profile, which 
tracks the production efficiency loss of 
assets as they age. 
In order to achieve the largest possible 
geographical and time coverage, the 
analysis used only two types of production 
asset: machinery and equipment and 
construction,b which are assumed to have 
average useful lives of 20 and 50 years, 
respectively.c 
The capital services flow is obtained 
from the effect of variations in installed 
capacity use over the business cycle. 
Since this is a particularly hard variable to 
measure, variations in installed capacity 
use are approximated using energy 
consumption series.
Potential employment is measured by 
discounting the trend unemployment rate, 
estimated using a Hodrick-Prescott filter, 
from the economically active population 
published by the International Labour 
Organization (ILO). 
The results shown in the figure show 
that Latin America’s growth potential has 
increased steadily in the last two decades, 
from rates of just over 2% in the early 1990s 
to over 4%in the last few years. The steady 
rise over time is mainly the result of increases 
in productivity and capital. Accordingly, rising 
investment rates accounted for the jump 
in growth potential from 2004 to 2008 and 
drove actual growth above potential. This 
trend went unbroken until 2009, when GDP 
growth fell well below potential. Effective 
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Potential GDP Effective GDP
Source:  C. Aravena, “Estimación del crecimiento potencial de América Latina”, Santiago, Chile, Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), 
2009, unpublished.
a 
 The growth potential of Latin America was calculated on the basis of growth registered by Argentina, the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Ecuador, 
Mexico, Paraguay, Peru, the Plurinational State of Bolivia and Uruguay.
b 
 Based on official fixed gross capital formation figures from each country.
c 
 A sensitivity analysis conducted for different average lifespans and rate of efficiency losses showed variation of less than 10% in capital variation at the extremes.
Box I.3 (concluded) 
2.  Risks resulting from the external scenario
Beyond the problems that persist in some economies 
of Eastern Europe, it remains to be seen whether the 
developed economies will be able to grow as they phase 
out the substantial stimulus initiatives associated with 
the countercyclical policies implemented in the United 
States and Europe. Added to the increase in unemployment 
and the still volatile international financial market, this 
raises questions about the strength of the recovery that 
began in 2009. 
As mentioned earlier, expansionary monetary policy, 
led by the world’s principal central banks, with the 
emerging economies following suit, led to historically 
low interbank interest rates (see figure I.22). This greater 
liquidity, however, was not reflected in increased credit 
to the private sector, which has been slowing in much of 
the world, and even declining in year-on-year terms in 
the United States and the euro area.14
The credit squeeze is the result of a combination 
of factors limiting both supply and demand, associated 
with declining economic activity and the loss of wealth 
experienced by economic agents most notably towards the 
end of 2008. Since then, banking institutions have been 
14
 The Latin American and Caribbean region has been no exception 
to these trends, as noted in section D.2.
focusing on shoring up their balance sheets and reducing 
their exposure, and are maintaining greater liquidity in 
order to deal with potential problems. Added to the banks’ 
more conservative stance is the reduced solvency of 
many businesses whose balance sheets —and, thus, their 
eligibility for credit— were damaged by the crisis. 
Figure I.22 
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Source:  Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on 
the basis of official figures and International Monetary Fund (IMF).
a
 Three-month moving average.
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The challenge facing the global economy is how to 
leverage credit to speed up the recovery, particularly with 
regard to financing consumption and SMEs, at a time when 
the public sectors of many developed countries will have 
greater need for financing to cover the massive deficits 
built up by their fiscal stimulus measures. 
This situation creates a tension between the need to 
maintain the policy stimulus if private sector demand is 
slow to pick up, and the increasing problem this creates 
in terms of availability of credit for businesses and 
consumers, as well as the burden of financing the enormous 
deficits accumulated in some countries. All of this must 
be considered against a backdrop of continued limitations 
in supply due to uncertainty and the bias toward liquidity 
that are still evident in financial markets. 
The other major risk is that concern over the need 
to progressively close fiscal gaps will take precedence 
over other policy objectives, and that this will lead to a 
premature withdrawal of fiscal and monetary stimulus 
measures that, at least thus far, have been the principal 
factors buttressing demand, and the main (in some cases 
the only) engine driving the global economic recovery.
Figure I.23 
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Source:  Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on 
the basis of official figures and International Monetary Fund (IMF).
a
 Year-on-year growth, three-month moving average.
3.  Challenges beyond the short term
It is highly probable that the crisis will lead to profound 
changes that will produce a less growth-friendly international 
environment than the conditions the region experienced between 
2003 and 2008. One factor is that the post-crisis world is 
likely to see slower overall growth, given the drop in aggregate 
demand in the developed countries, counterbalanced in part 
by rising overall demand in the developing countries. 
As a result, the emerging economies may be expected 
to play a stronger role in world growth, but within the 
framework of a slowdown in trade flows. The drop in 
demand for imports among developed economies will mean 
that emerging economies will have fewer opportunities to 
place their products in those markets, which will exacerbate 
competition and encourage the adoption of domestic-market-
oriented strategies, at least in the larger economies. At the 
same time, this shows up the need to redefine patterns of 
production and trade specialization and encourage innovation, 
the building-in of knowledge and product diversification, on 
the one hand, and to build up a highly diversified portfolio of 
destination markets, with many in Asia, on the other. 
The global financial crisis has also highlighted the 
need to reform the international financial architecture and, 
in particular, the regulatory and oversight systems, in order 
to ensure greater international financial stability. Though it 
is clear that the reform impetus is weakening as the global 
economy recovers, it may be expected that a new, more 
transparent banking model will be developed, with less 
incentive for risk-taking and lower levels of leveraging. 
This could lead to a reduction in international financial 
flows and, therefore, a partial reversal of the pattern of 
financial integration seen prior to the crisis.
Although it is not yet clear how these factors will 
affect interest rates in general, there is a risk they will rise, 
given projections of steadily mounting public debt in some 
developed countries and the lack of any tax or fiscal reform 
that might lead to lower demand for resources on the part 
of the public sector in those countries. Nevertheless, this 
situation could change, insofar as awareness increases of 
the risks to growth, fiscal reforms are put in place and 
saving rates begin to rise. 
Be this as it may, resource flows from the most 
demanding segments of the international capital markets 
to higher-risk countries are very likely to decrease, given 
the greater caution prevailing in the wake of the financial 
crisis and the possibility of regulatory changes that could 
limit risk-taking. This could deepen the differences among 
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developing countries in terms of access to the international 
capital markets, which would oblige less well-endowed 
or more macroeconomically vulnerable countries to rely 
more heavily on financing from multilateral agencies or 
on more expensive, less advantageous financing.
The question then arises as to how the region 
can make further inroads in a world characterized, on 
the one hand, by lower growth rates in the developed 
countries and developing countries playing a larger role 
in global growth, and, on the other, financial systems 
that are subject to stricter regulations and oversight, 
with less dynamic credit markets and higher interest 
rates? How, moreover, is this to be accomplished in a 
way that allows for sustained growth at rates that will 
make it possible to meet social needs, while at the same 
time providing for more equitable distribution of the 
benefits of that growth? 
The recovery from the crisis seems to have been quicker 
than expected, largely thanks to the domestic strengths built 
up by the countries of the region as a result of sounder 
macroeconomic policies. Upturns in several of the factors 
that drove demand in the years prior to the crisis, added in 
many cases to strong impetus from public policies, should 
enable a rapid recovery in the context of substantial idle 
capacity. But how can that recovery be transformed into a 
process of sustained growth beyond 2010?
Answering these questions satisfactorily is well beyond 
the scope and ability of this publication, which confines 
itself to offering a brief discussion of the role of public 
policies in this connection. Aside from differences from 
country to country, the Latin American and Caribbean 
economies have certain features in common that underscore 
the importance of State involvement. In the short term, 
the countries of the region acted to offset the effects of 
the crisis to the best of their capacities —in the process 
revealing major differences in terms of this capacity. But the 
objective of regaining a sustained growth path poses fresh 
and more complex challenges. For this reason, the Latin 
American and Caribbean countries face the unavoidable task 
of generating and expanding the policy space, for which 
they must (with few exceptions) increase the resources 
available for financing policies, create instruments and 
strengthen their institutions, particularly those involved 
in coordinating different policy areas.
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Chapter II
Economic policy
A.  Fiscal policy 
As noted in previous publications by ECLAC, in the period from 2003 to 2008 the particular 
combination of external conditions, macro environment and macroeconomic policy management 
helped to broaden the fiscal space available to most of the countries of the region.1 During this 
period, most of the countries were able to reduce their external vulnerability and lower their 
public debt burdens, thanks to favourable international conditions and improved macroeconomic 
policy design and management.
1
 The policy space available to governments for pursuing their 
objectives is a function of three factors: the volume of fiscal resources 
available, the number of independent instruments for meeting their 
proposed objectives and the competency of the policies competing 
for the use of resources and instruments.  Macroeconomic shocks 
affect the fiscal space not only because they affect resources, but 
also because they determine the extent and intensity of competition 
among policies. For a more detailed account of fiscal space, see 
ECLAC (2008) and Fanelli and Jiménez (2009).
In 2009 a number of factors were involved in shaping 
the fiscal position in Latin America and the Caribbean. 
First, slackening economic activity, which impacted 
heavily on fiscal revenues. Second, prices for natural 
resources, which dropped from the values seen in mid-
2008 to figures close to those recorded in 2004-2005, 
cutting into the fiscal income of the exporting economies. 
Third, the implementation of measures to lessen the 
impact of the crisis by propping up aggregate demand 
and offsetting the damage to the most vulnerable sectors, 
which pushed up public spending. These combined 
effects led to a deterioration in the public accounts in 
the countries of the region (with the exception of some 
Caribbean countries, including Barbados, Dominica, the 
Dominican Republic, Grenada, Guyana, Saint Kitts and 
Nevis and Saint Lucia). In order to compensate for the 
fall in revenues and finance the counter-crisis measures, 
the countries that operate fiscal rules limiting either their 
structural balances (Chile) or spending and borrowing 
(Argentina, Brazil and Peru) relaxed the respective 
targets for 2009.
Latin America’s central governments recorded a 
primary fiscal deficit of 1.0% of GDP, as a simple average, 
at the close of 2009, compared with a surplus of 1.4% 
of GDP in 2008. The overall balance (including public 
debt servicing payments) was in deficit by 2.8% of GDP, 
compared to a deficit of 0.3% in 2008. The deterioration 
in the average fiscal balance in the region reflects the 
position of the fiscal accounts more or less across the 
board. In 2009, of the 19 Latin American countries 
Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC)32
shown in table II.1, only six posted a primary surplus 
(31% of the total), which stands in sharp contrast to the 
position in 2008, when 13 countries (68% of the total) 
ran a primary surplus.
In the Caribbean, the combination of falling revenues 
and rising expenditures led to a worsening of the subregion’s 
fiscal deficit, which rose slightly from 2% of GDP in fiscal 
year 2007-2008 (simple average) to an estimated 2.3% 
of GDP in 2008-2009, as shown in table II.1. Jamaica’s 
estimated fiscal deficit of 11% of GDP was a record high 
for Latin America and the Caribbean and comparable to 
the deficit of 13% of GDP recorded in the United States. 
Trinidad and Tobago experienced a major fiscal adjustment 
of over 13 percentage points of GDP, from a surplus of 7.8% 
of GDP in fiscal year 2007-2008 to a deficit of 5.3% in 
fiscal year 2008-2009. The increase of over 10 percentage 
points of GDP in the fiscal surplus of Saint Kitts and Nevis 
reflected a 120% rise in grants received in the second quarter 
of 2009, compared with the year-earlier period.
The generalized deterioration in the public accounts 
reflected the combination of differing performances in the 
countries of the region, as shown in figure II.1, whose two 
axes depict the evolution of fiscal revenues and expenditures 
in 2008-2009 in percentages of GDP. Most of the countries 
show lower revenues and higher spending (upper left 
quadrant). Only four countries registered increases in both 
spending and revenues (Argentina, Colombia, Paraguay 
and Uruguay) and another four have seen both income 
and spending fall (the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela, 
the Dominican Republic, Ecuador and the Plurinational 
State of Bolivia). Coincidentally, three of these last four 
rely heavily on natural resources for their fiscal revenues. 
As might be expected, the empty quadrant corresponds 
to higher income and lower spending.
Figure II.1 








































Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on 
the basis of official figures.
The leitmotiv of public accounts in 2009 has been 
the decline in fiscal revenues, which are expected to have 
dropped by 1.4 percentage points of GDP. This is the first 
such fall relative to GDP since 1998 and places them at 
a similar level to that of 2005. 
Figure II.2 
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Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on 
the basis of official figures.
a
 Estimate.
Fiscal income slumped in almost all the countries 
of the region (15 of 19), in some cases by over six GDP 
percentage points, owing to a range of factors including 
the fall in the prices and volumes of commodity exports, 
slackening economic activity and, in some countries, 
countercyclical tax measures.
The sharp drop in fiscal resources shows how highly 
exposed public revenues were to the crisis. It will be 
recalled that the rise in public resources in 2002-2008 
was heavily driven by exploitation of natural resources. 
This sector provides over 30% of fiscal resources in the 
Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela, Ecuador, Mexico and 
the Plurinational State of Bolivia, and between 14% and 
18% in Argentina, Chile, Colombia and Peru. Accordingly, 
much of the drop in income in 2009 was a function of the 
great significance of natural resources —whose prices 
plummeted— as a financing source in many of the region’s 
countries.2 Hence, the exposure of fiscal systems to the 
crisis was differentiated chiefly by the type of resources 
sustaining each country’s public revenues. Countries 
whose public revenues depend on resources from primary 
goods may therefore be distinguished from those without 
large endowments of natural resources, whose tax income 
relies basically on activity in the domestic economy. 
2
 For a detailed analysis of the differentiated impact of the crisis on 
fiscal income, see Gómez Sabaini and Jiménez (2009).
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Within the first group, the most exposed countries were 
the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela, Ecuador, Mexico 
and the Plurinational State of Bolivia, which may be 
considered highly specialized in natural resources. Their 
combined fiscal income fell by 3.9 percentage points of 
GDP.3 Another group is formed by countries which have 
an intermediate level of natural resources specialization 
(Argentina, Chile, Colombia and Peru). Their average 
fiscal income fell by 1.3 GDP percentage points. 
By contrast, the countries of the region that do not 
specialize in natural resources experienced a combined 
negative variation of 0.5 GDP points. Here, fiscal income 
is highly sensitive to changes in output, as shown by the 
GDP elasticities of fiscal aggregates, which are generally 
above 1. This is basically because tax receipts rise more 
than proportionately to output during expansionary cycles, 
since the upturn in the formal economy drives a more 
than proportionate increase in imports and in related 
taxes. Conversely, during recession the tax take falls 
faster than output because of the reversal of these same 
mechanisms, as well as a significant rise in tax evasion. 
As discussed in box II.1, the countries of the region have 
adopted a range of measures in response to the crisis. Most of 
these measures consisted of different forms of public spending 
hikes, but some countries (such as Brazil and Chile) also 
created tax incentives, which had repercussions on receipts.
3
 In Ecuador, although non-oil revenues rose on the back of receipts 
from income tax, VAT and other taxes, the drop of just over 40% 
in oil income (owing to the fall in oil prices) led to a contraction 
of over 10% in the central government’s total income.
The various tax cuts implemented in Brazil since 2008, at 
an estimated fiscal cost of 0.8% of GDP, include: deferment 
of tax payments, tax breaks on purchases of automobiles, 
accelerated reimbursement of tax credits, reduction of 
financial transactions tax and lower rates for personal 
income tax. In Chile, the tax measures carried an annual 
cost of around 0.8% of GDP and included the elimination 
of stamp tax on loans extended in 2009, the temporary 
reduction of first category monthly provisional payments, 
early corporate tax refunds, and tax incentives and subsidies 
to encourage worker retention and training.
Table II.2 
LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN: VARIATION  












Countries not specialized 
in commodities -0.5 -0.3
Total -1.4 -1.4
Source:  Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on 
the basis of official figures.
Box II.1 
FISCAL POLICY RESPONSES TO THE INTERNATIONAL CRISIS
Countries responded to the crisis with 
a broad range of measures that sought 
mainly to strengthen aggregate demand 
and offset the regressive social effects on 
the more vulnerable sectors of either the 
crisis itself or the adjustment measures it 
may have triggered. 
The fiscal measures adopted vary 
widely, given the different capacities each 
country has to manage and execute them, and 
depending on the availability of resources. The 
measures announced may be grouped into 
two categories of instruments: (i) measures 
involving tax systems and (ii) measures 
involving fiscal spending.a
The following table provides a schematic 
view of the wide range of government 
measures. On the income side, these run 
the gamut from changes to the income tax 
structure, through adjustments to the tax 
base (deductions, exemptions or accelerated 
depreciation systems) or to nominal tax 
rates, to reform of taxes on goods and 
services (VAT, specific taxes or tariffs). On 
the spending side, the measures sought 
mainly to boost investment in infrastructure, 
housing, programmes to support small- and 
medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) and 
small farmers, or financed variety of social 
programmes.
However, falling fiscal revenue, tight 
credit conditions and limited capacity in 
some countries to execute investment 
projects have delayed implementation of 
many of these measures. Some initiatives 
that have been or are being implemented 
are discussed below.
Tax measures: 
Although tax cuts or expanded tax 
benefits were not as common as spending 
measures in the Latin American and 
Caribbean countries, some specific cases 
are worthy of note. Brazil temporarily 
lowered the industrialized products tax 
(IPI), which is levied on vehicles, electrical 
appliances and construction materials, cut 
the rate of tax on financial transactions and 
introduced lower personal income tax rates 
(of 7.5% and 22.5%) for those earning up 
to US$ 875 per month.
As part of its fiscal stimulus plan, Chile 
temporarily reduced monthly income tax 
withholdings, eliminated stamp duty on 
loans extended during 2009 and broadened 
tax incentives for some sectors.
Uruguay implemented a bonus in the 
form of a waiver of the economic activities 
income tax (IRAE), for up to 120% of the 
value of investments made in 2009, under 
the law on investments, which especially 
benefits projects that create new jobs.
Several countries, such as Chile and 
Peru, implemented mechanisms for early tax 
rebates and accelerated tax reimbursements 
for companies and exporters. 
Fiscal spending measures:
This type of measure seeks mainly to 
stabilize aggregate demand and mitigate the 
effects of the crisis on the most vulnerable 
sectors. However, these policies need to be 
implemented in a timely manner in order 
to have a real effect.
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LATIN AMERICA (19 COUNTRIES): MAIN FISCAL MEASURES ANNOUNCED













































































































Corporate income tax 
(cuts/depreciation) X T X T X X T X X X T
Personal income tax 
(cuts) X X T X X X X T X X X
Foreign trade taxes X X T X X T T X X
Taxes on goods and services T X X X X X
Social contributions X T
Other X T X T X T X X
Public spending
Infrastructure investment X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X
Housing X X X T X X X X X X X X X X X X
Support for SMEs or 
agricultural producers X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X
Support for strategic sectors T X X X X X X X X X
Direct transfers to families T X T X X X X X
Other social programmes X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X
Other spending X X X
Source:  Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC). 
a
 T= Temporary measures
Box II.1 (concluded)
The Government of Argentina sought 
to sustain public investment, increasing the 
national public sector’s real direct investment 
by an annualized 82.4% during the first half 
of 2009, with a sharp rise in investment 
going to infrastructure and energy.
Chile also adopted a number of spending-
side countercyclical measures, including its 
fiscal stimulus plan (PEF), which provided 
for a US$ 700-million increase in public 
investment in urban and rural roads, housing, 
public health, educational facilities and 
irrigation works, a plan to stimulate lending, 
job creation and training schemes, as well 
as other measures aimed at strengthening 
social protection. By June 2009, 58.7% of 
the resources allocated to investments under 
PEF had been executed.
In Mexico, the National Agreement 
on Family Economy and Employment 
(ANFEFE) was set up in January 2009. Like 
the countercyclical measures contained 
in the Growth and Employment Stimulus 
Programme (PICE), ANFEFE was aimed 
at hastening recovery from the negative 
impacts of the crisis. Also, in response to the 
epidemiological emergency, 6 billion pesos 
were deposited in the trust fund of the health 
protection system, and 27 billion pesos 
were allocated to the sectors worst affected 
(such as the swine industry, hotels, aviation, 
restaurants and leisure activities).
Peru implemented a two-year economic 
stimulus plan for 2009-2010 worth some 3.6% 
of GDP, which focuses on infrastructure projects 
and measures to jumpstart economic activity 
and address social protection issues.
Many countries sought ways to 
strengthen social programmes, including 
financial assistance for the most vulnerable; 
for example, the Plurinational State of Bolivia 
introduced the Juancito Pinto grant for 
school children, the Juana Azurduy grant for 
expectant mothers and the “Dignity Income” 
programme for those over 60 years of age. 
Chile offered two one-off payments for low-
income families, each of approximately US$ 
70 per dependant, which benefited about 
1.5 million people. Costa Rica extended 
the period of social security unemployment 
benefits, subsidized transport and food and 
raised pensions under the non-contributory 
scheme by 15%.
Other fiscal measures:
Several countries, such as Brazil, Chile, 
Colombia, Panama and Peru, lowered their 
primary surplus targets. For example, Brazil’s 
budgetary guidelines Act of 2007 set the 
primary surplus target for the consolidated 
public sector at 4.25% of GDP for 2009. The 
2008 budgetary guidelines act adjusted the 
2009 target downwards, to 3.8% of GDP. 
Later, the target was further reduced to 2.5% 
of GDP in response to the crisis.
Colombia also adjusted its deficit target 
for the consolidated public sector, from 
1.5% of GDP at the beginning of the year 
to 2.6% of GDP in the latest revision.
Chile, whose structural balance rule 
initially specified a surplus of 1% of GDP, 
lowered the target to 0.5% early in 2009, 
then reduced it again to 0%, where it will 
remain for 2010. Peru modified its fiscal 
responsibility and transparency law to allow 
increased public spending. Panama’s fiscal 
social responsibility law, which went into 
force in January, capped the fiscal deficit at 
1% of GDP, then raised that ceiling to 2.5% 
of GDP in June.
To compensate for the fall in transfers to 
subnational governments (occasioned by the 
decline in central governments’ tax revenues), 
some countries, including Peru, implemented 
compensatory transfer mechanisms, while 
others eased restrictions on subnational 
governments. For example, Argentina’s 
fiscal responsibility law, which had imposed 
spending and borrowing caps on provincial 
governments, was reformed so as to lift its core 
restrictions during fiscal years 2009 and 2010.b 
Brazil provided partial relief to the finances 
of subnational governments by allowing 
subnational governments to renegotiate their 
debts owed to social security.
Lastly, to support investment financing 
through increased lending, Brazil poured 
capital into the National Economic and Social 
Development Bank (BNDES) amounting to 
three percentage points of GDP over a two-
year period. Chile also injected fresh capital 
into government agencies such as the Chilean 
Development Corporation (CORFO) and 
Banco Estado, to support lending to SMEs and 
microenterprises, and into the State-owned 
copper company (CODELCO).
Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), The reactions of the Governments of the Americas to the international crisis: an overview of 
policy measures up to 30 September 2009 (LC/L.3025/Rev.5), Santiago, Chile, 30 October 2009.
a 
 This distinction is important because the use of different fiscal policy instruments does not produce the same outcomes. See study on the potential outcomes of different 
fiscal policy instruments in Gómez Sabaini and Jiménez (2009).
b 
 Under this reform, provincial primary spending growth can outstrip GDP growth, governments can run deficits, the provinces can finance current spending by selling fixed 
assets and budget entries, such as capital expenditures, can be reallocated to current expenditures.
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The evolution of tax resources in some of the 
countries of the region in 2009 shows the largest fall in 
receipts occurring in the second quarter, with the drop 
easing in the third quarter. Among the countries for which 
information is available, Chile stood out in both quarters, 
with a real negative variation of as much as 30%. Year-
on-year variation in tax revenue was still negative in the 
third quarter, but significantly less so than in the second 
quarter, pointing to an upturn in receipts.
Figure II.3 
LATIN AMERICA (6 COUNTRIES): REAL TAX RECEIPTS OF CENTRAL 
GOVERNMENT, NOT INCLUDING SOCIAL SECURITY










Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q1 Q2 Q3
2008 2009
Argentina Brazil Chile Colombia Mexico Peru
Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on 
the basis of official figures.
In the case of Argentina, the slight real decrease in 
tax revenue is caused by a rise in revenues from payment 
instalment schemes, which compensate the downturn in 
income tax receipts to a certain extent (by 5% in real 
terms up to September). This, in turn, was associated with 
changes in income tax regulations and in social security 
contributions, which affected the receipts from personal 
income tax and reduced revenues from tax withholdings and 
prepayments by wage-earners and independent workers. 
The smaller tax collection also reflected the option of 
reduced tax advances for certain firms, a decrease in the 
amounts corresponding to income tax returns and a fall 
in imports, which affected customs receipts. Resources 
from export duties dropped 21% in real terms, owing 
to the fall in exports in dollars and tariff reductions on 
some products. In the case of Brazil, slackening economic 
activity, especially in manufacturing, combined with the tax 
cuts mentioned earlier, generated a reduction in nominal 
federal receipts. The largest drops occurred in corporate 
income tax (IRPJ), the industrial products tax (IPI), and 
the contributions to the financing of the social security 
system (COFINS and the social integration programme 
PIS/PASAEP). Over 93% of the year-on-year fall in 
total tax revenues is accounted for by these three items. 
In Chile, the slump in tax receipts was due mainly to the 
42% drop in income tax revenues, which reflected a fall 
of 83% in real terms in tax payments by private mining 
(because of the lower copper price) and a drop of 18% in 
income tax receipts from other taxpayers (as a result of 
the temporary reduction in monthly provisional payments 
under the fiscal stimulus plan and slackening economic 
activity). Receipts of value added tax (VAT) fell by a 
cumulative 15.8% up to September, mainly owing to a 
decline in consumption and a rise in rebates. In Mexico, 
non-oil tax receipts dropped by 12.8% in real terms in 
January-September, owing to falls in takings from VAT 
(down 19.5%), income tax (down 12.0%) and flat-rate 
business tax (IETU) (down 7.5%). Colombia is the only 
country to show an increase in tax revenues in the second 
and third quarters of 2009, on the back of a rise in income 
tax which was basically due to income from withholding 
tax, especially the higher payments projected from the 
mining sector, mainly ECOPETROL.
The deterioration in central government fiscal revenue 
directly affects the finances of lower levels of government 
in the more decentralized countries in the region, because 
the income structure of the subnational governments is 
based essentially on transfers from central government. 
Transfers make up over 7% of GDP in Argentina, Mexico 
and the Plurinational State of Bolivia, and around 5% of 
GDP in Colombia and Ecuador, and represent 80% of the 
total income of subnational governments in Ecuador and 
Mexico. Given the importance of transfers in financing the 
operations of subnational governments and their sensitivity 
to national tax receipts, it is important to monitor their 
evolution during  times of crisis such as this. As shown in 
figure II.4, transfers slowed heavily since the first quarter 
of 2009 and fell outright in the third in Argentina, Brazil, 
Peru and the Plurinational State of Bolivia.  Peru made 
a transfer to local government in July 2009 as a one-off 
support package, to offset the impact of the previous 
fall. Accordingly, transfers rose by 12% in real terms, 
otherwise they would have dropped by 17%.
As for expenditures, since the end of 2008, in line with 
growing consensus about the countercyclical role of fiscal 
policy in times like these, the countries have made many 
announcements involving mostly greater expenditures 
(whether current or capital expenditures).4 However, not 
all of these announcements were implemented in 2009, 
for a number of reasons. First, the combination of reduced 
4
 See box II.1 for a detailed list of the fiscal measures announced in 
response to the crisis.
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fiscal revenues and tightened credit at the beginning of 
the year reduced the fiscal space needed to implement 
the announced expenditure increases. An example of this 
is Guatemala’s National Emergency Economic Recovery 
Programme, which was announced in 2009 but has seen 
limited results because of funding shortfalls. Several 
countries of the region have had problems executing their 
expenditures, which has stymied many of the announced 
public investment programmes.
Figure II.4 
LATIN AMERICA (4 COUNTRIES): EVOLUTION OF  
GOVERNMENT TRANSFERS IN REAL TERMS









Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q1 Q2 Q3
2008 2009
Argentina Bolivia (Plur. State of) a Brazil
Peru b Peru (without extraordinary support) b
Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on 
the basis of official figures.
a
 Includes the benefit known as “dignity income”.
b
 Does not include fees or royalties, or ordinary resources from transfers of items 
beginning in 2009.
Figure II.5 
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Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on 
the basis of official figures.
a
 Estimate.
The evolution of expenditures over the year is related 
to the capacity of the governments to deploy countercyclical 
policies. The countries can be broken down into three 
groups: those that increased spending, those that kept it 
relatively constant and those that reduced it.
Chile is the most notable in the first group. Its 
countercyclical strategy consisted of a fiscal stimulus 
plan equivalent to 2.8% of GDP, the main measures of 
which were public investment, home-buying subsidies, 
loans to SMEs and microenterprises and grants for 
lower-income families. Costa Rica is also in this 
first group, with higher outlays mainly in the form 
of current expenditures resulting from policy action 
such as expanded unemployment coverage, food and 
transport subsidies and a rise in pensions. Argentina’s 
higher expenditures reflected expansions in social 
security benefits and coverage, transfers for financing 
welfare funds in the provinces, public wage hikes and 
the implementation of infrastructure, housing and 
energy programmes.
The second group includes the countries of Central 
America, many of which announced significant measures 
(for example, Guatemala and El Salvador), though 
implementation had to be postponed because of falling 
revenue and a lack of financing. The authorities of these 
countries expect the effects of these measures to begin 
to be seen in 2010. 
The third group encompasses the countries that are 
highly specialized in natural resources and the Dominican 
Republic, whose public expenditures have contracted. In 
the case of the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela, spending 
was most reduced in the area of capital expenditures, 
which reflects the drop in capital transfers and a cutback 
in fixed-asset acquisitions. As for current spending, public 
sector wages were increased below the rate of inflation, 
representing a drop in wage outlays in real terms. In Ecuador 
capital spending tumbled in 2009 from the extraordinary 
level recorded in 2008, but remained quite high compared 
with 2007.
As figure II.6 shows, after several years of successive 
reductions, the ratio of public debt to GDP edged up in 
2009. Up to June 2009, public debt had increased as a 
percentage of GDP in most of the countries of the region, 
which was reflected in an increase in the indebtedness of 
the region as a whole.
Several factors that had helped to reduce the debt-
to-GDP ratio in 2002-2008 reversed their trends in 2009. 
The drop in primary balances and in the level of economic 
activity were the main factors affecting variations in 
public debt stock.
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Figure II.6 
LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN (18 COUNTRIES): GROWTH 






















































Primary balance contribution Interest-rate effect
Exchange-rate effect Inflow-balance effect
Growth effect Public debt (right axis)
Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on 
the basis of official figures.
As can be seen in table II.1, the averages mask some 
very diverse situations among the countries: Chile’s debt-
to-GDP ratio is 4%, whereas Guyana’s and Jamaica’s are 
over 115%. Thus, average levels of indebtedness differ 
greatly between the countries of Latin America (28% of 
GDP) and the Caribbean (79% of GDP).
As ECLAC (2009a) has indicated, the public debt 
of most of the English-speaking Caribbean countries 
has exceeded levels that could in any way be defined as 
sustainable, and the situation only worsened in 2009 (see 
box II.2). In table II.1 it can be observed that, except for 
Bahamas, Suriname, and Trinidad and Tobago, at the close 
of 2009 this subregion showed levels of public debt that 
ranged from 60% of GDP in Saint Lucia and Saint Vincent 
and the Grenadines, to almost 120% in Jamaica. 
Box II.2 
SUSTAINABILITY OF PUBLIC DEBT IN THE ENGLISH-SPEAKING CARIBBEAN
The high level of public indebtedness 
of most English-speaking Caribbean 
countries raises questions about future debt 
sustainability. Machado (2008) calculates 
the primary balance needed to stabilize 
the ratio between public debt and GDP. 
This primary balance correlates positively 
with the real interest rates of both debt 
types (external and domestic) and with the 
rate of depreciation, whereas it correlates 
negatively to the GDP growth rate. 
The first table shows the figures used 
to calculate the primary balance needed to 
stabilize the ratio of public debt to GDP in 
four English-speaking Caribbean countries 
in fiscal year 2009-2010. Shown are the 
implicit interest rates on internal and 
external debt in 2006, the debt burden at 
the close of the most recent fiscal year, 
inflation rates for 2007 and the average 
annual GDP growth rate for 2002-2007. For 
Guyana and Jamaica, the nominal rates of 
depreciation recorded in 2007 (1.2% and 
6.2%, respectively) are used. 
The second table shows the primary 
balance in fiscal year 2008-2009, the primary 
balance needed for the ratio between public 
debt and GDP to remain constant in fiscal 
year 2009-2010 and the primary balance 
needed to reduce the level of public debt 
to 40% of GDP in 20 years.
THE CARIBBEAN (FOUR COUNTRIES): FIGURES USED TO ANALYSE
THE SUSTAINABILITY OF PUBLIC DEBT
(Percentages)
Ratio of external debt 
to GDP, 2009
Ratio of domestic debt 
to GDP, 2009
Interest rate on 
external debt a
Interest rate on 
domestic debt a
Inflation rate in
2007 (close of year)
Average annual GDP 
growth rate, 2002-2007 b
Barbados 29.1 72.6 6.9 5.0 4.0 3.0
Belize 74.6 12.2 6.6 9.3 4.1 4.6
Guyana 78.0 37.2 1.8 3.8 4.2 c 1.7
Jamaica 51.6 66.9 7.2 5.7 5.8 c 1.8
Source:  Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of official figures.
a 
 Interest paid in fiscal year 2006-2007 on the debt burden at the close of the previous fiscal year.
b 
 In dollars at constant 2000 prices.
c 
 Corresponds to 2006.
THE CARIBBEAN (FOUR COUNTRIES): ANALYSIS OF PUBLIC DEBT SUSTAINABILITY 
(Percentages of GDP)
Primary balance observed,  
2008-2009
Primary balance needed to maintain constant the ratio 
of public debt to GDP in 2009-2010
Primary balance needed to reduce the level 
of public debt to 40% of GDP in 20 years
Barbados 0.1 -1.5 3.1
Belize 1.6 -1.5 2.3
Guyana -4.0 -2.9 3.8
Jamaica 3.0 1.7 3.9
Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of official figures.
According to these calculations, 
Barbados, Belize, Guyana and Jamaica 
would have to post primary surpluses 
of between 2.3% and 3.9% of GDP over 
the next 20 years in order to reduce their 
current public debt to 40% of GDP, a level 
considered to be sustainable. Based on 
their primary balances and public debt at 
the close of fiscal year 2008-2009, next 
year, Barbados would have to make a fiscal 
adjustment of 3% of GDP, whereas for 
Belize and Jamaica the adjustments would 
need to be in lesser amounts, 0.7% and 
0.9% of GDP, respectively. Guyana’s fiscal 
undertaking would have to be immense as 
it would need to convert a primary deficit of 
4% of GDP into a primary surplus of 3.8% 
of GDP. In every case, it is important to bear 
in mind the marked recessionary effects 
of such fiscal adjustments, as well as their 
economic and social costs, which would be 
magnified if the current recessionary climate 
and economic slowdown resulting from the 
international crisis were to continue.
Source: R. Machado, “The sustainability of public debt”, Un gasto que valga. Los fondos públicos en Centroamérica y República Dominicana, R. Machado (ed.), Washington, 
D.C., Inter-American Development, Bank (IDB), 2008.
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 Although the region is better placed, in fiscal terms, 
to face the crisis than it has been in times past, the greatest 
need for State intervention comes just as the gap between 
fiscal revenues and growing demand for public expenditures 
is being stretched wider.  This means that significant 
challenges lie ahead if the capacity of the public sectors 
is to be increased, both to respond to critical episodes 
and to meet the many existing demands. 
The state of affairs in the Caribbean countries merits 
separate mention. The virtual insolvency of the public 
sectors in these countries is of great concern, because 
debt servicing saps large amounts of funds from the public 
treasury. In Jamaica, these payments reached a record 14% 
of GDP in fiscal year 2008-2009. Furthermore, the weight 
of public debt, which is fed by chronic fiscal deficits, 
significantly limits the design and implementation of fiscal 
policy and, in many cases, jeopardizes the sustainability 
of the subregion’s macroeconomic regimes.
Lastly, it should be stressed that each country’s 
potential to implement a countercyclical public measure 
has less to do with the need for the measure than with 
its ability to fund it, which requires an assessment of the 
fiscal space attained.
These different capacities seem to have two faces: 
first, in those countries that specialize in natural resources 
they are a function of the response to the increase in public 
revenues driven in many cases by higher export prices. 
Second, particularly in countries which exhibit high poverty 
levels and experience terms of trade losses, once again 
a debate has arisen regarding the consequences of the 
crisis and the need to address them with countercyclical 
policies shows up the inadequacy of public sectors to 
respond to the needs of the population, not only because 
of institutional deficiencies (a clear sign of this is a limited 
capacity to execute policies), but also because of very 
low tax burdens.
B.  Exchange-rate policy 
As can be seen in figure II.7, in 2009 the extraregional 
real effective exchange rate of Latin America and the 
Caribbean (which excludes trade among the countries 
in the region) appreciated slightly compared with 2008. 
Although the regional average was almost unchanged 
in 2009, some important differences were observed 
among the countries of the region. Between December 
2008 and October 2009, the currencies of the countries 
of South America experienced real appreciation (with a 
few exceptions), while Mexico, Central America and the 
Caribbean experienced effective depreciation. 
The international financial crisis that emerged in the 
third quarter of 2008 triggered rapid nominal depreciation 
(in relation to the dollar) of the currencies of those countries 
that had the highest levels of exchange-rate flexibility, 
monetary policy regimes with explicit inflation targets and 
the greatest access to international capital markets, such 
as Brazil, Chile, Colombia and Mexico. The currencies 
of other countries in South America that depend heavily 
on commodities prices or that have close relations with 
Brazil, such as Paraguay and Uruguay, also depreciated 
(see figure II.8). During this period, the dollar appreciated 
in relation to other currencies as international investors 
sought liquid assets they perceived as low-risk, such as 
United States treasury bonds. In Central America and the 
Caribbean, other than the sharp depreciation of Jamaican 
currency, the only currency that showed notable depreciation 
as a result of the economic crisis was the Guatemalan 
quetzal, which fell because of lower export prices and a 
considerable decline in remittances from emigrants. 
Figure II.7 
EXTRAREGIONAL REAL EFFECTIVE EXCHANGE RATE











































































































































































Latin America (20 countries) South America (10 countries)
Central America + Mexico + The Caribbean (10 countries)
Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on 
the basis of official figures.
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Figure II.8 
LATIN AMERICA (SELECTED COUNTRIES): NOMINAL EXCHANGE 
RATES IN RELATION TO THE DOLLAR



















































































































Mexico Brazil Chile Uruguay Colombia
Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on 
the basis of official figures.
Currencies continued to depreciate nominally until 
March 2009. At that time, a number of factors converged 
to cause those currencies that had depreciated most to 
begin appreciating, a trend that would extend through 
the remainder of the year. With the United States facing 
low interest rates, a large fiscal deficit and ballooning 
public debt, and with expectations among the international 
capital markets improving as some indicators suggested 
that the worst of the crisis had passed for several countries 
(including many emerging countries), the demand for 
dollar-denominated assets fell.  This was accompanied 
by investors showing an increased appetite for risk, which 
boosted demand for assets denominated in the currencies 
of several countries in the region. Also, the prices of some 
commodities, such as oil, some metals (copper, for instance) 
and of exports produced by countries in South America 
began to rise from the lows they had touched as a result 
of the international crisis. All of these factors increased 
investor interest in the assets of emerging countries, such 
as Brazil, and stimulated the nominal appreciation of their 
currencies during the period. Specifically, between March 
2009 and November 2009: the Brazilian real appreciated 
by 25.4% in relation to the dollar; the Colombian peso, 
by 20%; the Uruguayan peso, by 13.5%; and the Chilean 
peso, by 11.9%. Thus, these currencies regained the trend 
of appreciation, as in 2007 and 2008, prior to the crisis.
For its part, the Mexican peso appreciated nominally 
by 9.3% during the period, on account of the appreciation 
that occurred between March and April, as shown in figure 
II.8. From then onwards and through November 2009, the 
Mexican peso hovered 30% above the level it held prior to 
the international crisis, owing partly to investor expectations 
about the short-term outlook for the economy.
Between March 2009 and November 2009, nominal 
exchange rates in Central America and the Caribbean 
registered few changes or minor depreciations: -2.7% in 
Guatemala, -1.5% in Costa Rica and -1.1% in the Dominican 
Republic. These countries, unlike those in South America, 
saw a decline in the inflows of international currencies 
owing to the drop in exports and shrinking remittances 
from emigrants. 
In parallel with what was happening internationally 
—depreciation followed by appreciation of currencies 
of many countries in South America and Mexico— 
the central banks of those countries disaccumulated 
reserves or at least made no significant accumulations 
of reserves (between June 2008 and March 2009). As 
of March 2009 and through September 2009, they 
resumed their accumulations. This can be seen in 
figure II.9, which shows the exchange-rate interventions 
of Brazil, Colombia and Uruguay, three of the four 
countries whose currencies registered the highest 
nominal appreciations, as of March 2009. Brazil’s 
accumulations were particularly strong, having acquired 
US$ 31.276 billion between April 2009 and October 
2009. This pattern was repeated in other countries, 
such as Argentina, Mexico, Paraguay and Peru. There 
were some exceptions to this pattern in South America, 
however: the Plurinational State of Bolivia accumulated 
reserves in both periods, after having fixed its exchange 
rate; and the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela saw a 
significant decrease in its international reserves owing 
in part to the central bank’s transfer of reserves to the 
National Development Fund (FONDEN), to be used 
for a number of the Fund’s projects.
Figure II.9 
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Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on 
the basis of official figures.
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As was pointed out in the Economic Survey of 
Latin America and the Caribbean 2008-2009, since the 
international economic crisis began in the third quarter 
of 2008, the countries of the region with the freedom 
to do so, implemented a monetary policy that sought 
to reduce the impact the crisis on GDP in a context of 
decreasing inflation. Specifically, this policy called for 
significant reductions of interest rates and, in several 
cases, increases in monetary aggregates; in other cases, 
such as in Brazil, it meant taking additional measures to 
inject liquidity into the private sector, in both domestic 
and international currencies. This approach to monetary 
policy was maintained throughout 2009.5
5
 See the section on monetary policy for more details.
Despite the significant lowering of the monetary 
policy rates and the Brazilian central bank’s intervention 
as a purchaser in the exchange market, as has already been 
mentioned, the real appreciated by 25.4% in relation to 
the dollar between March 2009 and November 2009.  In 
response to this, on 20 October 2009, Brazilian authorities 
decided to impose a tax on investment capital inflows 
(direct foreign investment was exempted). Later, on 
19 November 2009, a 1.5% tax was imposed on American 
Depositary Receipts (ADR) of Brazilian companies listed 
on the New York Stock Exchange, in order to increase 
the effect the tax had on the market value of the real 
(see box II.3).
Box II.3 
LATIN AMERICA: MEASURES ADOPTED TO MODERATE CAPITAL INFLOWS
In March 2009, the currencies of many 
countries of the region began to appreciate 
against the dollar, resuming a trend that 
had been in place until the international 
crisis began. In particular, capital flows 
into those countries, among which 
Brazil, Chile and Colombia stand out, 
were an important element behind the 
appreciation of their currencies. Since 
the first quarter of 2009, given the high 
levels of international liquidity, low interest 
rates in industrialized countries such as 
the United States (and the prospects that 
they will remain low in the near future), 
the limited growth of their economies and 
the fundamental variables of emerging 
countries, financial flows to emerging 
economies have been strong.
As occurs in other parts of the world, 
in the Latin American countries whose 
currencies have been appreciating steadily, 
authorities have, by and large, adopted the 
policy of accumulating international reserves 
to prevent excessive currency volatility or 
to counteract significant fluctuations driven 
by expectations that do not necessarily 
correlate with changes in the fundamental 
variables of the economy. As the sections 
in this document that deal with exchange 
rates and capital flows have shown, this 
practice has enabled the countries of the 
region to build sizeable reserves.
There have been, however, instances 
in which the countries of the region have 
turned to instruments other than intervention 
in the foreign-exchange market to achieve 
these aims. At times, they have used 
tools such as legal reserve requirements, 
taxes on incoming capital and restrictions 
imposed on sales to foreigners of some 
assets that are denominated in national 
currency to influence capital flows and 
their impact on exchange rates.
Some of these recently implemented 
alternative instruments are examined 
below: 
Chile imposed reserve requirements 
on capital entering from abroad during 
the 1990s, as a control mechanism, in 
response to a surge in inflows at the start 
of the decade (Cowan and De Gregorio, 
2005). In June 1991, a non-yield-bearing 
reserve requirement, initially set at 20%, 
was applied to capital inflows for periods 
that varied according to investment 
type. As Cowan and De Gregorio (2005) 
indicate, in 1992 and 1995, the reserve 
requirement also applied to international 
currency and currency obtained through 
offerings of American depository receipts 
(ADR), and the reserve requirement 
was raised to 30% of capital flows for 
a fixed 12-month term, regardless of 
an instrument’s maturity or nature. In 
June 1998, in response to the crisis 
that year, the reserve requirement was 
lowered to 10%, and in September, to 
0% (Forbes, 2002). The central bank did 
away with the requirement completely 
in April 2001 (see [online] http://www.
bcentral.cl/prensa/comunicados-consejo/
pdf/16042001.pdf). It should be noted 
that the free trade agreement between 
Chile and the United States allows Chile 
to impose restrictions on capital inflows 
and outflows for periods of up to one year 
without these becoming susceptible to 
dispute (DIRECON, 2009).
Since June 2005, Argentina has 
required a deposit, in dollars, against 
international currency inflows, equal 
to 30% of the dollar value of the total 
operation. Through November 2009, this 
obligatory deposit was being applied, with 
some exceptions,  to a variety of types of 
inflows: financial debts of the financial and 
non-financial private sectors; initial stock 
offerings by resident companies that are 
not offered through initial public offerings 
or publically traded in self-regulating 
markets (insofar as these are not equity-
related funds); portfolio investments by 
non-residents leading to ownership of 
local currency and financial assets and 
liabilities of the financial and non-financial 
private sectors, as well as acquisition of 
secondary-market warrants for securities 
issued by the public sector and initial 
subscriptions to bonds issued by the central 
bank; international currency that enters the 
local exchange-rate market from sales of 
external assets by private sector residents, 
in amounts exceeding US$ 2 million per 
calendar month; and funds entering the 
local foreign exchange market for the 
purpose of subscribing to initial offerings 
of debt instruments, bonds or certificates 
of participation issued by the fiduciary of a 
trust.b  International debts assumed and 
refinanced by residents are subject to a 
minimum 365-day term and may not be 
cancelled before the term expires.
From May 2007 to October 2008, 
Colombia required that foreign investors 
make a non-yield-bearing deposit for 
foreign portfolio investments in stocks 
and that foreign direct investment remain 
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in the country for minimum of two years. 
The required deposit, originally set at 40% 
of the total to be invested, was raised to 
50% on 30 May 2008 (see Bulletin No. 19 
of Banco de la República de Colombia). 
These requirements were lifted as part 
of the policy to counteract the effects of 
the international crisis, specifically in the 
case of new inflows for the purchase of 
stocks and bonds that are convertible into 
common stock, as well as investment in 
mutual funds consisting exclusively of 
stocks or convertible bonds. However, 
the deposit requirement continued to 
be imposed on other foreign portfolio 
inflows, especially investments in fixed-
income assets. 
The Central Reserve Bank of Peru, 
in addition to making direct interventions 
in the foreign exchange market, uses 
adjustments to dollar reserve requirements 
as a tool for managing internal liquidity 
in foreign currency (Rossini, Quispe and 
Gondo, 2008). The upsurge of capital 
inflows in early 2008 caused the bank 
to adopt other measures to limit capital 
inflows, in addition to its heavy intervention 
in the exchange market and increases to its 
reserve requirements for both nuevos soles 
and dollars (in order to reduce the need for 
sterilization).c For a time, the bank stopped 
issuing certificates of deposit, replacing 
them first with auctions of non-transferable 
deposits and, later, with certificates of 
deposit with restricted negotiability. These 
could only be acquired by domestic 
financial entities, thus restricting their role 
to that of liquidity control instruments and 
disallowing their conversion into attractive 
investment assets for foreign investors. 
Negotiation of these instruments was 
limited to those who had participated in 
the placement auction.  According to the 
central bank’s January 2008 inflation report, 
on 5 February 2008 non-residents owned 
30% of the certificates of deposit. Another 
measure taken at that time was to impose 
a commission on transfers of ownership of 
certificates of deposit to non-residents. It 
should be noted that, as of the signing of 
its free trade agreement with the United 
States, Peru is restricted when it comes 
to imposing discriminatory measures on 
United States investments. 
The most recent example is Brazil; on 
20 October 2009 a 2% tax went into effect 
on capital inflows to be used to purchase 
stocks and bonds, though foreign direct 
investment was exempted. One month 
later, in order to make the capital inflows 
tax more effective, Brazil decided to levy a 
1.5% tax on ADRs of Brazilian companies 
listed on the New York Stock Exchange. 
During the previous period, when the real 
was appreciating significantly in nominal 
terms, Brazil had imposed a 1.5% tax on 
foreign investment in fixed-income assets. 
This tax was subsequently eliminated 
in October 2008 with the onset of the 
international crisis. 
Interest in instruments such as 
the ones mentioned, for the purpose of 
(potentially) modifying capital inflows, 
is not limited to policymakers in Latin 
America, but extends to the other emerging 
markets as well, as exemplified by Taiwan 
Province of China’s decision to prohibit 
term deposits by non-residents. 
Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of K. Cowan and J. De Gregorio, “International borrowing, capital controls and 
the exchange rate: lessons from Chile”, Working document, No. 322, Santiago, Chile, Banco Central de Chile, May 2005; K.J. Forbes, “One cost of the Chilean 
capital controls: increased financial constraints for smaller traded firms”, MIT Sloan Working Paper, No. 4273-02, December 2002; Dirección General de Relaciones 
Económicas Internacionales de Chile (DIRECON), Chile: 20 años de negociaciones comerciales, Santiago, Chile, Foreign Ministry, November 2009; Banco Central 
de la República Argentina, Communiqué, No. 49561, 19 November 2009; R. Rossini, Z. Quispe and R. Gondo, “Macroeconomic implications of capital inflows: Peru 
1991–2007”, Financial Globalisation and Emerging Market Capital Flows, BIS Papers, No. 44, December 2008.
a
 Especially, if these movements cause the exchange rate to reach levels that raise concerns about possible currency misalignment. 
b
 Among the exceptions are loans in foreign currency issued by local financial entities, foreign direct investment, investments by non-residents for the purchase of real estate 
and financial borrowing from the international non-financial private sector if the term of debt is not less than two years and is for the purpose of investment in non-financial 
assets (see Banco Central de la República Argentina, Communiqué No. 49561).
c
 In 2008, marginal reserve requirements for deposits of non-residents reached 120%.
Box II.3 (concluded)
In Central America, Mexico and Jamaica, remittances 
from emigrants began to fall off in the fourth quarter 
of 2008, a downturn that became even sharper in the 
first two quarters of 2009, as is covered in the section 
of this document that addresses the external sector. As 
remittances play an important role in the external sectors 
of the countries of the region (especially the smaller ones), 
their decline was a factor in the depreciation of several 
of the currencies of the region.
Regarding the total effective exchange rate, between 
December 2008 and October 2009, the currencies of only 
five countries in the region showed effective appreciation: 
Brazil, by 26.2%; the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela, by 
13.3%; Colombia, by 10.2%; Uruguay, by 9.1%; and Chile, 
by 8.5%. As is discussed in the section of this document 
that deals with inflation, the overall inflation rate started 
dropping abruptly when the international financial crisis 
began. It is important to note that the Bolivarian Republic of 
Venezuela has maintained a fixed and unchanged exchange 
rate since March 2005, in a context of high inflation.  This 
has caused the real effective exchange rate to appreciate 
sharply, though still less than its real appreciation in relation 
to the dollar given the real appreciation of the currencies 
of its trading partners in the region.
In addition to the Central American countries, Ecuador, 
the Plurinational State of Bolivia and Paraguay also 
registered depreciation of their effective exchange rates 
during the period. In the case of the Plurinational State 
of Bolivia and Paraguay, the depreciation stems mostly 
from the significant appreciation of the currencies of their 
trading partner since March 2009 (especially the Brazilian 
real), which improved their relative competitiveness. In 
Ecuador’s case, the weakness of its legal currency (the 
dollar), beginning in the second quarter of 2009 (especially 
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in relation to trading partners such as Colombia), led to 
its effective depreciation. 
As a result of currency depreciation in 2008 and the 
subsequent appreciation experienced by several countries 
in South America, in October 2009, the real effective 
exchange rates for the region were as they appear in 
figure II.10, where they are presented in relation to 20-
year historical averages.6 Two important points should be 
emphasized: first, the real effective exchange rate of the 
currency of the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela was, 
in October 2009, 50.7% below (appreciation) its 20-year 
historical average, the lowest level for the past 30 years. 
Secondly, one can observe how the process of nominal 
appreciation of the currencies of Brazil, Chile, Colombia 
and Uruguay led to, in a short time, significant reductions 
in the exchange rates of those countries. However, in the 
case of the latter two countries, exchange rates were not 
far off their historical averages.
6
 More specifically, during the period 1990-2009. 
Figure II.10 
LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN (SELECTED COUNTRIES): 
TOTAL REAL EFFECTIVE EXCHANGE RATES
(Rates in December 2008 and October 2009,  
compared to averages for 1990-2009)
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Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC).
C. Monetary policy
In 2009, with the exception of Mexico, the countries of 
the region that run inflation-targeting schemes —Brazil, 
Chile, Colombia, Paraguay and Peru— recorded inflation 
below or within the target range set by their central banks. 
Though this stands in contrast to the pattern of inflation 
seen in 2008 (see figure II.11), it also differs from the 
three years prior to 2008, inasmuch as inflation is actually 
below the target range in quite a few of the countries. In 
2009, the central banks of these countries did not raise 
their inflation target ranges, their interpretation being 
that the inflationary surge had been associated with the 
effect of external turmoil on international commodity 
and oil markets driving up the prices of those goods, 
especially between the third quarter of 2007 and the 
second quarter of 2008. 
Monetary policy began to be loosened in September 
2008. In response to international financial shocks the 
central banks began to take a number of measures, including 
the opening of special lines of credit to inject liquidity 
into national financial systems, both in national currency 
and in dollars (see box II.4). Reflecting the prevailing 
uncertainty and liquidity squeeze, the interbank rate 
rose in the fourth quarter of 2008, especially in Uruguay 
(see figure II.12a and b). The central banks followed 
these infusions of liquidity with cuts in monetary policy 
benchmark rates, which passed through to a greater 
or lesser degree to the interest rate structures in the 
economies. The interbank rate was no exception, as the 
two rates are closely related under normal conditions of 
liquidity within the financial sector. Another indicator 
that liquidity problems seemed to have been solved in 
a number of the region’s  countries in 2009 was that 
as of the second quarter some central banks began to 
accumulate international reserves, a shift from what 
had occurred in the fourth quarter of 2008 and first 
quarter of 2009.7 
7
 See the section on exchange-rate policy for more details. 
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Figure II.11 
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Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of official figures.
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Box II.4 
MONETARY POLICY MEASURES TAKEN IN THE REGION IN RESPONSE TO THE INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL CRISIS
Monetary policy began to be loosened 
in September 2008. In response to 
international financial shocks the central 
banks began to take a number of measures, 
including the opening of special lines of 
credit to inject liquidity into national financial 
systems, both in national currency and in 
dollars  (see table).a 
In addition to adjusting monetary 
policy reference rates, central banks 
also modified legal reserve requirements 
and took steps to inject liquidity into the 
financial system and guarantee its stability. 
Regarding the first of these measures, 
monetary authorities of 12 Latin American 
and Caribbean countries lowered their cash 
reserve requirements in both domestic and 
international currency, in order to increase 
the secondary expansion potential of the 
money supply. The reserve requirement 
was also lowered for foreign-currency 
deposits, in the case of the Plurinational 
State of Bolivia, to below the requirement 
for deposits in bolivianos, thus encouraging 
holdings in domestic currency. 
Twenty-seven countries in the region 
implemented a variety of measures aimed 
at increasing liquidity in the financial 
system, including the early repurchasing 
of bonds issued by central banks or the 
net redemption of securities (which, in 
practice, means reducing the balance of 
outstanding bonds issued by the central 
bank), increasing lines of credit with 
the financial system or securing loans 
against the credit portfolios of institutions, 
expanding repurchasing operations and 
injecting liquidity through debt repurchases. 
Some of the measures taken represented 
innovative ways of supplying liquidity to 
the financial system. For example, the 
central bank of Uruguay offered banks 
the possibility of swapping tax rebate 
certificates for cash, and the central bank 
of Colombia replaced liquidity absorption 
operations with a more liquid instrument: 
interest-bearing deposits. 
Lastly, other examples of measures 
taken can be seen in Argentina, where tighter 
regulation was imposed on international 
transfers, prohibiting operations with 
countries that do not facilitate access to 
information, in order to avoid deposits in 
banks outside of Argentina;b or in Brazil, 
which expanded the central bank’s power 
to intervene in troubled financial institutions. 
El Salvador, Barbados, Guyana and 
Trinidad and Tobago proposed measures 
to improve regulation and supervision of 
the financial system.
LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN:  MONETARY POLICY MEASURES
AR BO BR CL CO CR CU EC SV GT HT HN MX NI PA PY PE DO UY VE BS BB BZ GY JM SR TT AI AG DM GD MS KN LC VC CA US
Monetary and 
financial policy
Change in banking 
reserve X X X X X X X X X X X X
Injection of liquidity 
in national currency X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X
Changes in benchmark 
interest rate X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X
Other neasures X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X
a 
 See ECLAC (2009) for a descriptions of the measures taken by each country.
b 
 This measure was taken jointly by the Federal Public Revenue Administration (AFIP), the central bank of the Republic of Argentina (BCRA) and the National Securities 
Commission (CNV).
Figure II.12 













































































































Uruguay: Oct 2008 = 29.99
Nov 2008 = 17.96
Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of official figures.
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The main measure taken by the central banks in 2009 was 
to maintain their expansionary stance by lowering reference 
rates, once clear signs had emerged that inflationary pressures 
were easing.8 The first central banks to lower benchmark 
rates were those that run inflation-targeting schemes (see 
figure II.13a). The Bank of Mexico began lowering its rate 
in January, the same month inflation began to slow in that 
country. In Brazil, Chile and Colombia, whose year-on-year 
inflation rates began to subside in November 2008, monetary 
authorities started to lower their monetary policy rates upon 
receipt of the December inflation rate. The Central Reserve 
Bank of Peru lowered its rate in February, after inflation 
dropped for three months in a row. The central bank of 
Uruguay lowered its interest rate in April, while the central 
bank of Trinidad and Tobago did so after four consecutive 
months of decreasing inflation. The central bank of Jamaica 
lowered its rate for the first time in July, after seven consecutive 
months of falling year-on-year inflation.
Figure II.13 
LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN (SELECTED COUNTRIES): 
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Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on 
the basis of official figures.
8
 The central banks of Honduras and Paraguay were the only ones to 
break the downward trend of benchmark rates: rate cuts ran from 
September 2008 to July 2009 in Honduras and from October 2008 
to April 2009 in Paraguay. 
In most cases, monetary policy benchmark rates were 
adjusted several times during the year, amid expectations 
of disinflation owing to slack economic conditions, which 
gave monetary authorities greater leeway to leverage 
demand-stimulus policies. The central bank of Colombia 
lowered its rate nine times; the central banks of Chile, 
Guatemala, Mexico and Peru did so seven times; Trinidad 
and Tobago, six; Honduras, five; the Dominican Republic 
and Jamaica, four; and Costa Rica and Uruguay, twice 
and once, respectively. Overall, the cuts were similar 
in magnitude in all the countries. In absolute terms, the 
largest rate reductions took place in the Plurinational State 
of Bolivia (1,000 basis points), Chile (775 basis points), 
the Dominican Republic (550 basis points), Colombia 
(550 basis points), Peru (525 basis points) and Brazil 
(501 basis points), while the smallest were recorded in 
Uruguay (25 basis points), Argentina and Costa Rica (109 
basis points each). These three countries also showed the 
smallest relative variation in reference rates, measured as 
the ratio between recent highs and lows (80%, 92% and 
90%, respectively). The countries with the largest relative 
variation were Chile, where the rate dropped to a low that 
represented 6% of its maximum value; Peru, at 19%; the 
Plurinational State of Bolivia, 23%; Colombia, 35%; and 
the Dominican Republic, 42%.9 In Brazil, Chile, Colombia 
and Peru, the nominal rates at the end of November were 
the lowest recorded since those countries adopted an 
inflation-targeting system, and in Mexico the lowest since 
August 2003. Despite these efforts, because of the sharp 
fall in inflation, some central banks showed increases in 
their reference rates in real terms (see figure II.14).
The effect of these lowered rates on average bank 
lending rates varied among countries. In Colombia, the 
Dominica  Republic, Mexico and Uruguay, the reduction 
of the o etary policy benchmark rate led to an even 
greater absolute drop in bank lending rates, whereas in 
Chile, Costa Rica, Peru, the Plurinational State of Bolivia, 
and Trinidad and Tobago the bank lending rate came 
down by less. In Brazil, the reductions in the two rates 
were similar. Proportionally speaking, however, lending 
rates dropped less than monetary policy benchmark rates 
(lending rates remain high compared with the reference 
rates in the region overall). In October 2009, the ratio 
between the average lending rate and the benchmark rate 
ranged from 1.9 in Uruguay to 23.3 in Chile. In Peru, the 
ratio was 12.4, though the ratio of the average preferential 
9
 The central bank of Jamaica lowered its reference rate by 450 basis 
points and the ratio of the rates at their lowest and highest points was 
74%. The Bank of Mexico cut its benchmark rate by 3.75 percentage 
points, and the respective ratio was 55%. In the case of the central bank 
of Guatemala, these figures were 2.75 percentage points and 62%, 
respectively, and in the case of the monetary authority of Trinidad 
and Tobago, 2.50 percentage points and 71%, respectively. 
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lending rate to the monetary policy benchmark rate was 
1.2. The spread between bank lending and deposit rates 
did not fall below the 2008 fourth-quarter spread until the 
third quarter of 2009, with the exception of Chile, Costa 
Rica, Honduras and the Plurinational State of Bolivia. 
In some countries, the liquidity generated by net 
redemption of securities by the central bank is not necessarily 
channelled into the private sector, but has also gone to finance 
the public sector. This is the case in the Plurinational State of 
Bolivia, where the treasury increased its domestic-currency 
bond issues by 39.3% between October 2008 and October 
2009. This increase in bond issues is equivalent to 49.3% 
of the drop in the central bank’s open market operations. To 
September, Paraguay saw a 39% year-on-year drop in the 
balance of monetary regulation instruments, which has been 
partially offset by the issuance of treasury bonds. 
Figure II.14 
LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN (SELECTED COUNTRIES):  REAL MONETARY POLICY  
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Source:  Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of official figures.
1.  Bank loans and deposits
In 2009, the rate of growth of private lending, as may be 
expected following the economic downturn, slowed in all 
of the countries (including Chile, Colombia, Honduras, 
Mexico and Uruguay), as  compared with the four previous 
years (see figure II.3). Consumer and commercial credit 
fell off the most. Figure II.4 shows the evolution of lending 
by public banks, which increased considerably, except in 
Uruguay, showing that some of the region’s governments 
have tried to use public banks to compensate for sluggish 
private lending. A further sign of slump in lending is the 
increase in non-performing loans as a percentage of total 
loans. In year-on-year terms, for September 2009, this 
indicator was up in Argentina from 2.8% to 3.7%; the 
Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela, from 2% to 2.6%; in 
Brazil, from 2.8% to 4.4%; in Chile, from 0.9% to 1.3%; 
in Colombia, from 4.1% to 4.5%; in Mexico, from 2.8% to 
3.5%; and in Peru, from 1.2% to 1.6%. In contrast, in the 
Plurinational State of Bolivia, the rate dropped from 5% to 
4.2%. However, the banking systems of the aforementioned 
countries have sufficient loan-loss provisions.
One fact worthy of note is that this weak phase 
of the economic cycle, generated by the international 
financial turmoil, brought no major bank failures in Latin 
America. The only exception was when, in November, the 
Superintendency of Banks and Financial Institutions of 
the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela intervened in four 
banks that accounted 7.1% of total private bank deposits. 
Meanwhile, in the Caribbean the financial system felt 
the impacts of the international crisis. In January 2009, 
Trinidad and Tobago intervened in the CLICO Investment 
Bank and two of its subsidiary insurance companies. The 
bank held 11% of the country’s financial assets, and the 
insurance companies 50% of all insurance policies. Between 
February and April, the governments of Bahamas, Barbados, 
Belize, Guyana, Suriname, as well as authorities in the 
Eastern Caribbean Currency Union (ECCU), assumed 
control of CLICO subsidiaries. The Stanford Bank was 
also intervened in 2009, in Antigua and Barbuda. As a 
result of these developments, financial services in the 
Caribbean countries recorded a downturn in 2009. 
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Table II.3 
LATIN AMERICA (SELECTED COUNTRIES): EVOLUTION OF PRIVATE BANK LENDING
(Percentage annual variation)
Country Period
Industrial Commercial Mortgage Consumer Rural Total
2008 2009 2008 2009 2008 2009 2008 2009 2008 2009 2008 2009
Brazil September to September 33.80 -4.17 29.29 -4.37 34.01 25.55 21.32 6.38 18.06 -4.90 26.84 1.11
Chile September to September ... ... -2.68 -3.86 22.49 18.28 3.33 -0.91 ... ... 1.20 -1.10
Colombia September to September .... ... 11.23 0.25 3.69 0.22 7.27 -3.25 ... ... 8.88 -1.12
Costa Rica September to September 23.10 4.76 1.58 -6.03 22.49 18.28 32.51 -4.03 5.49 10.86 17.63 7.79
Honduras September to September -3.40 0.01 3.91 -34.44 ... ... 13.66 -10.97 -0.89 11.93 20.83 -0.36
Mexico June to June ... ... 16.74 2.20 12.08 3.81 10.82 -19.02 ... ... 14.32 -3.26
Paraguay September to September ... ... 50.85 17.44 ... ... 74.16 17.68 41.84 14.06 40.21 32.51
Peru September to September 13.32 -2.20 28.34 0.77 12.88 22.43 35.68 -3.14 4.84 5.91 24.21 6.24
Uruguay September to September 14.05 -20.98 37.28 -8.92 ... ... 49.87 13.97 25.08 -23.82 26.23 -11.37
Source:  Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of official figures.
Table II.4 
LATIN AMERICA (SELECTED COUNTRIES): EVOLUTION OF PUBLIC BANK LENDING 
(Percentage annual variation)
Country Period
Industrial Commercial Mortgage Consumer Rural Total
2008 2009 2008 2009 2008 2009 2008 2009 2008 2009 2008 2009
Brazil September to September 30.56 22.23 25.74 20.10 25.90 40.76 26.18 37.58 12.59 7.71 26.00 33.00
Chile September to September ... ... -3.60 33.62 12.72 9.33 5.31 10.38 ... ... 3.81 20.67
Colombia September to September ... ... 30.21 32.40 -0.17 -2.16 9.78 30.19 ... ... 19.97 36.19
Costa Rica September to September -10.60 8.53 21.79 11.27 17.57 7.72 16.08 3.20 15.08 11.23 15.40 5.82
Honduras September to September ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ...
Mexico June to June ... ... -14.27 11.11 71.60 59.67 16.11 15.67 -13.28 27.56
Paraguay September to September 13.32 -2.20 -19.16 77.30 ... ... 28.34 9.34 -11.74 21.93 -2.14 35.18
Peru September to September ... ... -3.29 7.60 -17.78 3.15 ... -9.01 ... ... 10.65 10.19
Uruguay September to September 50.11 -28.13 4.78 56.54 ... ... 85.67 -22.96 35.04 39.00 63.82 -2.18
Source:  Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of official figures.
No major changes are expected on the monetary 
front in the near future, barring the occurrence of external 
turmoil that could alter current macroeconomic conditions 
and unless further changes are made to reference rates, 
such as the decision in late November by Colombia’s 
central bank to reduce its rate from 4% to 3.5% in order 
to offset shrinking trade with the Bolivarian Republic 
of Venezuela. 
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Chapter III
Domestic performance
A.  Economic activity and investment
For Latin America and the Caribbean, GDP is expected to decline by 1.8% in 2009, which 
represents a drop of 2.9% in per capita GDP for the region. These figures reflect the impact 
of the international economic and financial crisis, which the countries of the region began 
to feel with increasing intensity in the last quarter of 2008. Economic activity declined 
most sharply in Mexico, owing to its closer proximity to, and greater dependence on, the 
United States economy and the impact of the influenza A (H1N1) outbreak in the second 
quarter of the year, and in the English- and Dutch-speaking Caribbean, which experienced 
a 2.1% downturn in GDP owing to the effects of the crisis on tourism and on external 
demand for commodities. Meanwhile South America and Central America will post a rise 
of 0.2% in GDP.1 Economic performance varied considerably across the region, and despite 
the negative average variation for the region as a whole, GDP in a significant number of 
countries increased in 2009.2
1
 Includes Costa Rica, Cuba, the Dominican Republic, El Salvador, 
Guatemala, Haiti, Honduras, Nicaragua and Panama.
2
 The simple average rate of change in GDP is -0.4%, while the 
median is 0.0%.
The steepest rises in GDP were in the Plurinational State of 
Bolivia (3.5%), the Dominican Republic (2.5%), Panama 
(2.5%) and Haiti (2%), while the sharpest declines were 
in Mexico (-6.7%) Paraguay (-3.5%), Honduras (-3%), El 
Salvador (-2.5%) and the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela 
(-2.3%). In the remaining countries, the variation in GDP 
was between -1.5% and 1.2%.
Despite declining, per capita GDP in 2009 exceeded 
that of 2007. The sole exception was Mexico, where 
the 7.7% drop brought this indicator down to levels last 
seen in 2004. 
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With the exception of El Salvador, Guatemala, Haiti, 
Mexico, Nicaragua and Paraguay, per capita GDP in 2009 
was between 15% and 50% higher than in 2004 —the 
year in which regional economic activity began to gain 
greater momentum.
Figure III.1 
LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN: CHANGE IN GROSS 
DOMESTIC PRODUCT, 2008-2009
































































































































































Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on 




LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN: PER CAPITA  
GROSS DOMESTIC PRODUCT, 2004-2009
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Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on 
the basis of official figures.
a
 Estimate.
The effects of the abrupt change in international 
economic conditions during the final months of 2008 were 
felt more acutely by the economies of Latin America and 
the Caribbean in 2009. Up to the third quarter of 2008, 
the economic performance of the region as a whole had 
been notably robust, having been driven by strong external 
demand and rising domestic demand, which pushed up 
both consumption and investment. This, bolstered by 
the appreciation of national currencies with respect to 
the United States dollar, had led to a marked rise in the 




LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN: PER CAPITA GROSS 
DOMESTIC PRODUCT, BY COUNTRY, 2004 AND 2009 
























































































































































Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on 
the basis of official figures.
a
 Estimate.
In the fourth quarter of 2008, this scenario changed 
noticeably. There was an acute drop in external 
demand, the volumes and prices of the region’s exports 
plummeted, and restrictions on supply and higher 
interest rates made accessing credit increasingly 
difficult. All of this occurred in an environment of 
heightened uncertainty about the fallout of the crisis 
in the international financial system, the capacity of 
developed economies to recover, the impact of the crisis 
on emerging economies, and changes in the price of 
commodities and exchange rates.
Expectations among economic agents worsened, and, 
in an environment of increased uncertainty and tighter 
credit, this led to a major decline in total spending. Fears 
of unemployment and the sharp drop in remittances 
from emigrants lowered household consumption, which 
provoked a downturn in retail sales in many of the region’s 
countries. Gross fixed capital formation plummeted 
as investment projects were halted and investment in 
machinery and equipment plunged as a result of the rise 
in unused installed capacity and the higher cost of imports 
caused by the depreciation of a number of the region’s 
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national currencies in the fourth quarter of 2008 and the 
first quarter of 2009.3 As a result, the volume of imported 
goods contracted sharply.
The analysis of the effect of the current economic 
crisis on regional macroeconomic aggregates reveals 
certain similarities with what occurred during the 
crises of 1995 and 1999. In those years, domestic 
demand contracted sharply, with investment being the 
most severely affected component. While the crises of 
1995 and 1999, like the present one, were triggered 
by external factors, their strong impact on the region’s 
economies was due primarily to domestic imbalances 
that proved to be unsustainable. Moreover, these crises 
originated in emerging economies, and in that period, 
demand in the developed economies continued to grow, 
particularly in the United States, where GDP grew at an 
average annual rate of 3.8% between 1993 and 2000. 
In both periods, regional economies, suffered balance-
of-payments crises, and their inability to continue 
financing external imbalances led to contractions of 
domestic demand and currency devaluations. In this 
context, the rising volume of goods exports was the 
main component of aggregate demand, and the factor 
that allowed the region’s economies to start their 
economic recovery.
A number of factors differentiate the present crisis 
from previous ones. The current one originated in the 
developed countries, at a time when the countries of 
the region generally did not have significant external 
imbalances. However, the sharp contraction of external 
demand meant that the countries with greater trade openness 
and less diverse export markets were the hardest hit. The 
external turmoil, which was aggravated by uncertainty 
surrounding the future course of the international economy, 
caused the volume of goods and services exports, as 
well as commodity prices, to plummet (thus reducing 
the export-based revenues of agents in both the public 
and private sectors), and economic agents adjusted their 
spending and production levels accordingly. Import 
volumes also shrank considerably, in fact, more than 
export volumes, so net exports contributed positively to 
economic growth. Domestic demand fell over the year, 
but not as much as expected considering the sharp decline 
in imports, owing to the major reductions in inventories. 
Public consumption was the only component, at the 
3
 Imports of capital goods fell sharply in most of the countries during 
2009. In September of that year, as compared to September 2008, 
the value of such imports declined by 35% in Argentina, 25.6% in 
Peru, 23.4% in Mexico, 14% in Brazil and 6.4% in the Bolivarian 
Republic of Venezuela.
regional level, that continued to grow. Although this 
aggregate had also been a positive factor in previous 
crises, its impact on the region was even greater this 
time because a number of countries had managed to 
boost their savings as a result of the increased revenues 
obtained from commodity exports.
Figure III.4 
LATIN AMERICA: ANNUAL CHANGE IN GROSS DOMESTIC 
PRODUCT AND IN COMPONENTS OF AGGREGATE  
DEMAND, 1991-2009
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Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on 




LATIN AMERICA: YEAR-ON-YEAR VARIATION IN QUARTERLY 
GROSS DOMESTIC PRODUCT, 1998-2009











































































































































































































Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on 
the basis of official figures.
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Box III.1 
MAIN CONSEQUENCES OF THE DISASTERS IN LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN
In 2009, large-scale disasters caused 
damages and losses in the region totalling 
over US$ 10 billion, more than the average 
losses incurred in 2000-2008 (US$ 8.6 
billion). The seriousness of the disasters in 
Latin America and the Caribbean particularly 
impacted tourism and agriculture. Tourism 
suffered mainly as a result of the influenza 
A (H1N1) outbreak in Mexico, but the 
worst damage in the agricultural sector 
was caused by floods in north-eastern 
Brazil and in El Salvador. This is worrying 
inasmuch as natural disasters have been 
identified as one of the factors that will 
adversely affect agriculture in the future 
and they are expected to increase in terms 
of frequency and intensity as a result of 
climate change. 
The year 2009 was exceptional in terms 
of major health disasters in the region. In 
addition to influenza A (H1N1), several 
countries suffered outbreaks of dengue 
fever, which spread most aggressively in 
the Plurinational State of Bolivia. 
As can be seen in the following 
table, climatic disasters are both the most 
common type (accounting for nearly 80% 
of all disasters) and the most damaging 
as far as the region’s population is 
concerned (accounting for 55% of deaths 
and 78% of number of people affected). 
In economic terms, however, 90% of 
disaster-associated costs in 2009 were 
attributable to health disasters, mainly 
as a result of the influenza A (H1N1) 
outbreak and the ensuing downturn in 
economic activity in Mexico, where the 
costs incurred were equivalent to 1% 
of GDP. 
LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN: PRELIMINARY OVERVIEW OF THE IMPACT OF DISASTERS, 2009 a
Type
Disasters Deaths Population affected Economic impact
Number Percentage Persons Percentage Persons Percentage Millions of dollars Percentage
Climatic 37 79 642 55 2 375 532 78 1 088 11
Geological 8 17 378 32 239 748 8 200 2
Health 2 4 144 12 415 925 14 9 008 87
Total 47 100 1 164 100 3 031 205 100 10 297 100
Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of data from ReliefWeb and from EM-DAT.
a 
 Preliminary data up to 20 November 2009.
In addition to the outbreak of influenza 
A (H1N1), excess humidity, hurricanes 
and storms, followed in importance by 
strong seismic activity in Central America, 
incurred high costs in the northern part 
of the region. South America was marked 
by floods in north-eastern Brazil, which 
affected nearly two million people and 
caused damage to vast livestock-raising 
and crop-growing areas, and by dengue 
fever in the Plurinational State of Bolivia. 
The spread of this disease was worsened 
by inadequate solid waste management 
and increasingly heavy rains in the 
affected area.
Although in absolute terms, Brazil 
and Mexico were hit the hardest by 
disasters in 2009, El Salvador was the 
country most severely affected in the 
region in relative terms. In absolute terms, 
Mexico accounted for 90% of the costs, 
while Brazil accounted for 60% of the 
population affected by disasters in Latin 
America. Both Mexico and El Salvador 
suffered costs equivalent to 1% of GDP, 
but El Salvador also had the highest 
percentage of affected population in 
the region (3.6%), owing primarily to the 
powerful earthquake of May 2009 and the 
serious flooding in November. 
LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN: PRINCIPAL DISASTERS, 2009
Mexico: Tropical depression Ximena
Area affected: Southern Baja California
Cost: US$ 100 million
Persons affected: 72,000
Mexico: Influenza A (H1N1) 
Area affected: Mexico City, Yucatán, 
Quintana Roo, among others
Cost: US$ 9 billion
Persons affected: 239,000
El Salvador: Floods
Area affected: La Libertad, Cuscatlán,
La Paz and San Vicente
Cost: US$ 224 million
Persons affected: 123,000
El Salvador: Earthquake
Area affected: Santa María Ostuma, 




Area affected: Rotán Island and Guanaja
Cost: US$ 100 million
Persons affected: 16,000
Brazil: Floods
Affected area: Maranhão, Ceará, 
Alagoas and Spíritu Santo
Cost: US$ 500 billion
Persons affected: 1.8 million
Plurinational State of Bolivia:
Dengue fever
Area affected: Santa Cruz, 
Cochabamba and Tarija
Cost: US$ 9 million
Persons affected: 177,000
Paraguay: Drought
Affected area: Concepción, Neembucú, 
Presidente Hayes and Boquerón
Cost: Undetermined
Persons affected: 185,000
Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC). 
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After posting quarterly year-on-year growth rates of 
5% or more between the first quarter of 2004 and the third 
quarter of 2008, regional GDP rose by only 1.2% in the 
last quarter of 2008 and then declined by about 2.5%, on 
average, in the first three quarters of 2009.
As of the second quarter of 2009, and to an even 
greater extent in the third quarter, the region’s economies 
began to show signs of recovery in relation to the figures 
posted in the first half of the year, although at varying paces. 
This recovery was driven by several factors: the stimulus 
programmes and economic initiatives implemented by 
authorities; the reduction in benchmark interest rates; the 
rise in real wages in most of the countries brought about 
by the sharp drop in inflation; and the increase in financial 
sector activity (particularly lending, which had come to a 
halt in the fourth quarter of 2008), generated by expectations 
regarding the future of the international economy and by 
the recovery of industrial activity (albeit from a low starting 
point and because the inventory shedding process came to 
an end) That was spurred by both domestic and external 
demand. Activity in the construction and trade sectors also 
picked up, consumer confidence indicators improved, and 
export volumes began to rise. In most countries, however, 
the increased economic activity in the second half of 2009 
has not been sufficient to offset the negative results seen 
in the first half of the year.
Figure III.6 
LATIN AMERICA: GROSS FIXED CAPITAL FORMATION, 2009 a
(Dollars at constant 2000 prices)
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Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of official figures.
a 
 Estimate.
In regional terms, domestic demand in 2009 shrank by 
4.0%, private consumption by 1.3%, and investment by 15.5%. 
The sizeable decline in investment reflects the downturns 
seen in investment in all the countries; the decline in private 
consumption largely reflects the sharp drop in this type of 
consumption in Mexico. Gross fixed capital formation fell 
by 9.8% because investment in machinery and equipment 
and construction activity plummeted despite increased 
public investment on the part of both general government 
and public enterprises in a number of countries (Brazil, 
Colombia and Peru). Gross fixed capital formation in constant 
dollars (expressed as a percentage of GDP) thus fell from 
21.9% in 2008 to 20.1% in 2009. The countries registering 
the steepest declines in gross fixed capital formation were 
Brazil, Chile, Honduras, Nicaragua, Mexico and Paraguay. 
The contraction in domestic demand, meanwhile, resulted 
in an appreciable drop in the volume of imported goods and 
services (-11.5%). Goods and services export volumes also 
fell (-8.4%) owing not only to the slump in goods imports, 
but also to the decrease in the volume of service exports, 
particularly those connected with tourism. As mentioned 
earlier, government consumption was the only component 
that grew in 2009, rising by 3%.
In current dollars, regional gross domestic investment 
in the region declined from 23.0% of GDP in 2008 to 
19.5% of GDP in 2008. Regional domestic savings also 
fell, from 22.3% of GDP in 2008 to 19.1% of GDP in 2009. 
Income account deficits were smaller, but the disposable 
gross national income of the countries of the region shrank 
by 3.3% owing to the severe loss of earnings generated 
by the worsening of the terms of trade and decreases in 
net current transfers. 
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Figure III.7 
LATIN AMERICA: GROSS FIXED CAPITAL FORMATION  
IN CONSTRUCTION AND IN MACHINERY AND  
EQUIPMENT, 1990-2009
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Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on 




LATIN AMERICA: FINANCING OF INVESTMENT, 1990-2009
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Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on 
the basis of official figures.
a Estimate.
The variations in aggregate supply and demand 
reflected the changes in activity levels in the different 
sectors. Agricultural activity diminished slightly in the 
region overall, with the situation varying from country 
to country. Agricultural activity declined in Argentina, 
Costa Rica, Paraguay and Uruguay but expanded in 
Cuba, the Dominican Republic, El Salvador, Haiti, 
Peru and the Plurinational State of Bolivia, as well as 
in several countries of the English-speaking Caribbean. 
The performance of the mining sector was also mixed, 
with output falling in Chile and the Dominican Republic, 
as well as in most of the English-speaking Caribbean, 
but rising in Belize, Suriname and Trinidad and Tobago. 
Oil production in the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela, 
Ecuador and Mexico fell, while the mining sectors 
of Argentina, Colombia, Peru, and the Plurinational 
State of Bolivia posted growth. Manufacturing was 
the worst-hit and suffered declines in all the countries. 
The production of capital goods and durable consumer 
goods and specific segments, such as the textile and 
maquila industries, experienced the sharpest downturns. 
In comparison with production in the same period in 
2008, automobile production in the first 10 months of 
2009 contracted by 40.3% in Argentina, 35% in Mexico 
and 10.3% in Brazil. 
Figure III.9 
LATIN AMERICA: ANNUAL CHANGE IN GROSS DOMESTIC 
INVESTMENT, GROSS DISPOSABLE NATIONAL  
INCOME AND DOMESTIC SAVINGS
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Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on 




LATIN AMERICA: TWELVE-MONTH CHANGES IN INDUSTRIAL 








































Industrial Production Index Three-month moving average (centred)
Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on 
the basis of official figures.
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Activity in the construction sector declined in all 
countries except Ecuador, Panama, Peru and the Plurinational 
State of Bolivia. Trade also fell, owing in large part to 
the strong contraction in Mexico and the lower levels of 
activity recorded in the hotels and restaurants segment as 
a result of the drop in tourism.4 Activity in the government 
and personal services sector increased on account of the 
rise in public spending.
4
 According to statistics from the World Tourism Organisation, 
cumulative figures for January-August 2009, compared to the 
same period of 2008, show that tourist arrivals fell by 5.1% in the 
Caribbean and 6.9% in Central America but increased by 3.6% in 
South America.
B. Domestic prices 
Inflation in Latin America and the Caribbean was lower in 
2009 than in 2008, and, for 2009 as a whole, the weighted 
average for the region is projected to drop from 8.3% 
(its 2008 level) to around 4.5%. The simple average of 
inflation in the region fell from 9.3% in 2008 to 3.6% for 
the 12 months ending October 2009. All of the countries 
had lower inflation in 2009 than in the previous year. In 
2009, as in 2008, the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela 
had the highest inflation in the region and was the only 
country to post double-digit inflation.
Figure III.11 
LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN: CUMULATIVE  





















































































































































































Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on 
the basis of official figures.
a The 2008 rate is for the period from December 2007 to December 2008, while the 
2009 rate is from October 2008 to October 2009.
There are two main reasons for the high inflation in 
the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela, which has persisted 
despite price controls on a large group of consumer goods 
and services. First, there is the limited availability of foreign 
currency at the official exchange rate which meant that a 
large proportion of the imported goods on the domestic 
market were brought in and valued at the parallel-market 
exchange rate. Second, structural limitations on domestic 
supply, stemming from the surge in domestic demand 
between 2003 and 2008, led to shortages of certain products 
of mass consumption in the domestic market. 
Beginning in October 2008, inflation fell sharply across 
the region thanks to the marked decline in international prices 
for foods (cereals, oils and oilseeds) and fuel (natural gas, 
gasoline and other oil derivatives). International food prices 
have a huge influence on inflation in the region because 
of the relatively large weight of food and beverages in the 
basket of goods on which Latin American and Caribbean 
countries’ national consumer price indices are based. 
Similarly, the drop in international prices for oil and fuel 
brought down domestic transportation and energy prices. 
Domestic demand also shrank significantly, as national 
economies felt the effects of the international crisis. 
International price declines were transmitted to domestic 
prices, at first moderately, as a result of the national currency 
depreciations of late 2008 and early 2009, and then more 
sharply as those currencies appreciated in the second half 
of 2009. Currency appreciations also cushioned the effect 
of rising international fuel prices. These prices, although 
they remained far below their October 2008 levels, rose 
throughout 2009, and by year’s end were well above the 
levels at which they had started the year.
Inflation fell steadily in the South American countries 
and Mexico in 2009 and even more steeply in the Central 
American countries, which had experienced the highest 
inflation rates in 2008.
A number of the region’s countries (Chile, the Dominican 
Republic, El Salvador, Guatemala, Haiti and Nicaragua) 
even experienced deflation as a result of: lower domestic 
demand; the influence of international prices on domestic 
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prices; changes in the prices of certain key products; and 
the high baseline for measuring changes in inflation (given 
that inflation had been accelerating up to October 2008).
Except in Argentina, the Bolivarian Republic of 
Venezuela and Paraguay, wholesale price indices have also 
decreased significantly as a result of the fall in prices for 
energy products and raw materials. As a simple average for 
the region, wholesale prices fell by 0.2%, after increasing 
by 8.1% in 2008.
Figure III.12 































































































Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on 
the basis of official figures.
Core inflation began to come down in the first few 
months of 2009. This reflected the fact that reductions in 
food and energy prices were being passed on to other areas 
—principally the service sectors where price formation 
mechanisms are indexed to the aggregate inflation of the 
preceding months. As in 2008, this was most noticeable 
in the prices of basic services and in health and education 
services. An additional factor was the contraction in 
domestic demand, which limited the transmission of 2008 
inflation to non-tradables.
Figure III.13  
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Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on 
the basis of official figures.
Figure III.14 
LATIN AMERICA: CONSUMER PRICE INDEX AND CORE 
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Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on 
the basis of official figures.
C.  Employment and wages
The end of the five-year phase of relatively robust economic 
growth had repercussions in the labour market in 2009. 
The employment rate declined by 0.6 percentage points, 
which led to an increase of nearly one percentage point 
in the unemployment rate (from 7.4% to 8.3%). The rise 
in unemployment would have been even greater had the 
participation rate not remained stable.
In addition to affecting employment numbers, the 
decline in growth interrupted the upward trend in job quality 
seen in preceding years. Demand for labour diminished 
sharply. In many countries, this was reflected in a reduction 
of private-sector wage employment, as well as weaker job 
creation in the formal sector. These factors were partially 
offset by growth in own-account (informal) employment 
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and in public-sector employment. At the same time, real 
wages rose in most countries, primarily because of the 
drop in inflation.
The decline in the employment rate was fairly 
widespread, occurring in 12 of the 16 countries for which 
information is available, and amounting to as much as one 
percentage point or more in some cases (Barbados, Chile, 
Costa Rica, the Dominican Republic Ecuador, Jamaica and 
Mexico). This lower employment rate does not equate to 
a reduction in the absolute number of employed persons, 
since the absence of a social protection network obliges 
many people to work under far-from-ideal conditions. 
For the year as a whole, the number of urban employed 
increased by 1.0%.
The slowdown in the region’s economies dampened 
labour demand, resulting in a sharp decrease in the creation 
of wage jobs, most notably in the private sector. In some 
countries, such as the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela, 
the Dominican Republic Costa Rica, Mexico and Panama, 
the number of private-sector wage earners actually dropped 
in absolute terms. Meanwhile, a number of countries, 
including the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela, Brazil, 
the Dominican Republic and Costa Rica, saw significant 
increases in public-sector employment, as a result of either 
specific development strategies or temporary countercyclical 
measures. As a simple average of eight countries, private-
sector wage employment dropped by 0.5%, while public-
sector employment increased by 3.0%. Another category 
that partially compensated for low labour demand in the 
private sector was own-account work, which expanded in 
a number of countries, at a simple average rate of 3.4% 
for those eight countries.
The weakness of labour demand in the private sector 
was also reflected in a marked slowdown in formal 
employment (see figure III.15). This process began 
in Mexico, where it also peaked in terms of absolute 
numbers. However, in most of the countries for which 
information is available, formal employment increased, 
on average, in comparison with the previous year.5 In 
some countries, such as Argentina and Costa Rica, 
the increase in public-sector employment softened the 
impact of the reduction in formal private-sector jobs, 
while in others, such as Brazil and Uruguay, formal 
employment in the private sector also expanded, in part, 
perhaps, as a result of the formalization of previously 
existing jobs.
5
 Figure III.15 shows only those countries that publish monthly 
information. Argentina, which publishes quarterly data, also suffered 
a major slowdown in the creation of formal jobs, with year-on-year 
growth rates falling from 6.7% and 5.0% in the third and fourth 
quarters of 2008, respectively, to 1.7% in the first quarter of 2009 
and -2.0% in the second quarter. 
Figure III.15 
LATIN AMERICA (7 COUNTRIES): YEAR-ON-YEAR CHANGE 
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Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on 
the basis of official figures.
a
 Data on Brazil are for wage-earners who pay into the social security system (workers 
with carteira assinada); data on Chile, Costa Rica, Mexico, Nicaragua and Uruguay 
are for those who contribute to social protection systems (limited to private employees 
in the cases of Mexico and Nicaragua); and data on Peru are for employees of 
companies with 10 or more workers.
Of the main economic sectors, manufacturing and 
construction were the worst-hit in employment terms. The 
13 countries for which information is available show that, 
on average, manufacturing jobs declined by 0.7 percentage 
points as a proportion of total employment, and jobs in 
construction by 0.3 percentage points. On the other hand, 
trade, financial services and business, as well as social, 
community and personal services, increased their share 
in total employment by between 0.2 and 0.4 percentage 
points. The situation in the agricultural sector varied. The 
sector apparently served as an employer of last resort in 
some countries (the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela, 
Colombia, the Dominican Republic, Honduras and 
Panama), especially for a segment of the rural population, 
which led to an increase in employment in the sector as a 
proportion of all employment. The long-term downward 
trend in the sector’s contribution to total employment, 
however, continued in other countries (Chile, Costa Rica, 
Mexico, Trinidad and Tobago and Uruguay).
Worsening labour conditions in a number of countries 
were reflected in underemployment in per-hour terms, 
which rose in Argentina, Chile, Ecuador, Honduras and 
Mexico, while remaining largely unchanged in Brazil and 
Peru and declining in Colombia and Uruguay.
In terms of both employment and unemployment, the 
economic slowdown in 2009 had a greater impact on men 
than on women. In most of the countries, the employment 
rate for women declined less sharply than for men, 
and in six countries it even increased (see table III.1).6 
6
 Among those countries for which information is available, only 
Colombia and Uruguay showed an increase in employment 
among men.
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The only countries in which the change in the employment 
rate was worse for women than for men were the Dominican 
Republic —where tourism and the free zones (two areas 
with significant numbers of women workers) contracted 
noticeably— and Uruguay, where employment remained 
high for both men and women. 
Table III.1 
LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN (SELECTED COUNTRIES): EMPLOYMENT, PARTICIPATION AND UNEMPLOYMENT RATES,  
BY GENDER AND NATIONAL TOTAL, FIRST THREE QUARTERS OF 2009 COMPARED WITH FIRST THREE QUARTERS OF 2008 a
(Percentages)
Employment rate Participation rate Unemployment rate
Men Women Men Women Men Women
Brazil -0.8 +0.1 -0.5 +0.1 +0.5 -0.1
Chile -2.4 -0.2 -0.6 +0.4 +2.6 +1.3
Colombia +1.2 +1.5 +1.8 +2.3 +0.6 +0.9
Costa Rica -2.7 -1.2 -1.0 +0.4 +2.4 +3.7
Ecuador -2.4 -2.2 -1.3 -1.2 +1.7 +2.1
Jamaica -2.8 -1.0 -1.9 -1.4 +1.4 -0.4
Mexico -2.6 -0.6 -1.3 0.0 +1.7 +1.4
Panama -1.2 +0.4 -0.6 +1.1 +0.7 +1.4
Peru -1.7 +0.5 -1.5 +0.2 +0.4 -0.5
Dominican Republic -0.5 -3.9 0.1 -4.2 +0.9 -0.4
Uruguay +1.1 +1.0 +1.1 +0.8 -0.1 -0.6
Venezuela  
(Bolivarian Republic of) -0.2 +0.7 0.0 +1.0 +0.2 +0.5
Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of official figures.
a  Data on Brazil are for six metropolitan areas. For Ecuador, data are based on national figures for urban areas. Figures for Peru are for metropolitan Lima. Data on Costa Rica are 
for July, on Panama for August and on the Dominican Republic for April. 
There are two possible reasons for the increase 
in employment among women. In some cases, the 
characteristic trend in men’s and women’s employment 
rates has also been observed in formal employment. In 
Chile, for example, the average for the first three quarters 
showed that the number of male employees contributing 
to the pension system fell by 0.8%, while the number of 
female employees rose by 4.2%. In others, the increase in 
female employment appears to be linked to own-account 
employment, such as jobs in commerce, where entry 
barriers are low and jobs are of poor quality.
The decline in regional output may have had a larger 
impact on male than female employment because of the 
structure of the labour market: men represent a larger 
proportion of wage earners in the areas most affected 
by the economic downturn (industry and, particularly, 
construction) than they do in the services sector.7 
7
  In Chile, for example, between the third quarter of 2008 and the 
third quarter of 2009, the number of unemployed men rose by 
31%, while the number of unemployed women rose by 17%. The 
manufacturing and construction industries accounted for 43% of 
the rise in unemployment among men and for 7% of the increase 
among women, while 31% of the increase in women’s unemployment 
was linked to job seeking by women who had recently entered the 
labour market –a factor that was responsible for only 12% of the 
rise in unemployment among men. 
The regional participation rate remained stable, although 
there were major differences by country and gender. Of 
the 15 countries for which information is available, labour 
participation for the year as a whole increased in five, 
including Argentina, the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela 
and Colombia, while it declined in nine, including Brazil, 
the Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Jamaica and Peru. In 
Mexico, it remained unchanged. 
At the regional level, the participation rate for men 
fell sharply, while the participation rate for women 
continued its long-term upward trend. Thus, although 
some of the increase in the participation rate for women 
was due to temporary factors (entry in the labour market 
to replace income lost because another member of the 
household was unemployed), it also seems to reflect the 
growing phenomenon of increased integration of women 
in the labour market. Thus, eight of the twelve countries 
for which information is available showed a rise in the 
participation rate for women (see figure III.1).
Changes in the participation rate varied between 
age groups. In 2009, there was a decline in the number 
of young people and older adults who joined the labour 
market. In the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela, Brazil, 
Chile, Costa Rica, Mexico and Peru, the participation rate 
of people aged between 24 and 29 fell by between 0.7 and 
2.4 percentage points, and except in Brazil and Chile, 
the participation rate for older adults also decreased. On 
the other hand, in the intermediate age brackets, labour 
participation increased. The reduction in the participation 
rate among young people has a positive side inasmuch as 
more young people are staying in the education system 
for longer. In fact, in Mexico, the number of students, as 
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a percentage of the entire population in their age bracket, 
increased between the third quarter of 2008 and the same 
period a year later (from 52.1% to 54.4% among 14- to 
19-year-olds, and from 8.8% to 10.0% in the 20-29 age 
bracket). The proportion of people otherwise economically 
inactive thus declined. 
Rising unemployment was a widespread phenomenon 
in 2009, with only Peru and Uruguay showing a (slight) 
decline (see table A-17). In Uruguay, this coincided with an 
increase in the employment rate. In many countries, such as 
Barbados, Chile, Costa Rica and Mexico, the unemployment 
rate increased by more than one percentage point.
While the change in employment rates was generally 
more favourable –or less unfavourable– to women than to 
men, the unemployment situation affected both, reflecting 
the aforementioned increase in women’s participation in the 
labour market. In four of twelve countries, unemployment 
among women rose more than among men. In three 
countries, however, unemployment rose less for women, 
while in five countries it actually declined. Nonetheless, 
rates for participation, employment and unemployment 
still show large and persistent gender gaps.
At the regional level, the rise in the unemployment rate, 
from 7.4% to 8.3%, represents an increase of 2.3 million 
urban unemployed, bringing the number to 18.2 million.
In a context of falling inflation, real wages in the 
formal sector in the large majority of the countries remained 
stable or rose (see table A-19). One reason for this was the 
increase in nominal wages introduced to offset the real 
losses caused by high inflation in 2008.8 Nevertheless, 
year-on-year growth of nominal wages declined in 2009, 
reflecting the worsening labour market conditions. In some 
countries, such as Brazil and Uruguay, increases in the 
minimum wage also contributed to the improvement in 
wages. As a result of these changes, the median increase
8
 In 2008, the median change in real wages in the formal sector was 
-0.5%.
in real average wages in the formal sectors of eleven 
countries was 4.4%, with the weighted average of the 
increase being 2.2%. In many countries, this improvement 
in wages helped prevent a drop in household purchasing 
power and, thus, in private consumption as well.
Third-quarter data from a number of the region’s 
countries show signs of an incipient revival in the labour 
markets. Significant job creation occurred, for example, 
in Brazil and Chile in the third quarter (0.9% and 0.7%, 
respectively, over the second quarter on a seasonally adjusted 
basis). In addition, Brazil’s unemployment rate in October 
of 2009 was back down to its October 2008 rate. Even in 
Mexico, the country most severely hit by the crisis and 
where the impact on the labour market was felt earlier and 
stronger and lasted longer, the employment rate recovered 
0.5 percentage points in the third quarter on a seasonally 
adjusted basis (compared with the previous quarter). The 
Uruguayan labour market has been least affected by the 
worsening macroeconomic environment. Employment 
there has continued to rise on average throughout the 
year, as has formal employment, while unemployment 
and underemployment have declined slightly. In addition, 
average real wages in Uruguay have continued the recovery 
begun in 2005, and are reaching the levels seen before 
the crisis at the start of the decade.
In comparison, formal employment continued on 
a downward path in Costa Rica in the third quarter of 
2009, both on a year-on-year basis and with respect to 
the immediately preceding quarter. In the Bolivarian 
Republic of Venezuela, Ecuador and Jamaica, employment 
fell significantly in the third quarter compared with the 
preceding quarter and, as in Argentina, the unemployment 
rate rose on a seasonally adjusted basis from its second-
quarter level, indicating that, in these countries, the labour 
market it not yet recovering.
Box III.2 
JOB CREATION MEASURES IN THE CRISIS ENVIRONMENT
One of the priority goals of governments 
in Latin America and the Caribbean as the 
macroeconomic climate worsened was to 
protect jobs. Various types of measures 
were taken for this purpose. 
A number of countries implemented 
countercyclical policies whose immediate 
objective was neither to create nor protect 
jobs, but which nonetheless played an 
important role in doing so. In addition to 
introducing many high-impact policies, 
examined in other sections of this work, 
governments took steps to improve access 
to credit for micro-small and medium-
sized enterprises, which, although main 
job creators, tend to encounter greater 
financial problems when the macroeconomic 
situation is perceived to be risky. Increased 
public investment, which formed part of a 
number of national packages implemented 
to counteract the effects of the crisis, has 
also played a major role in protecting 
employment.
In addition, many countries put in place 
specific employment policy instruments. In 
some cases, this involved activating existing 
mechanisms; in others, it was a matter of 
establishing new programmes.
Some of the most noteworthy initiatives 
are described below:
Measures were taken to protect •	
existing jobs that were at risk of being 
eliminated as a result of the difficulties 
that firms faced. In Argentina, Chile, 
Mexico and Uruguay, for example, 
programmes were designed to prevent 
layoffs by reducing the number of hours 
worked in order to lower labour costs, 
or by establishing training programmes. 
To compensate for the decline in 
workers’ incomes, wage subsidies 
or training subsidies were provided, 
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using unemployment-insurance or 
public funds.
Chile increased the subsidy for •	
hiring young people from low-income 
households given that the difficulty 
this segment has in entering the 
labour market is accentuated during 
economic crises. 
Few of the region’s countries have •	
unemployment insurance, and a 
number of those that do, such as Brazil, 
Ecuador and Uruguay, have expanded 
access to unemployment benefits 
and, under certain circumstances, 
extended their duration.
Training has been used not only •	
to increase workers’ likelihood of 
remaining employed, but also to 
improve their job options. Peru 
has launched a job-retraining 
programme for those who are 
laid off, and the Bahamas has 
established a programme to train a 
significant portion of the unemployed 
population. Colombia has expanded 
its national apprenticeship service 
to create 250,000 additional trainee 
positions (most of these to be 
added in 2009) and to prepare more 
people for future integration in the 
labour market. 
Although not directly related to the •	
job market, conditional transfer 
programmes that encourage students 
to remain in the education system 
longer support the goals of labour 
policies. These programmes originally 
targeted primary schooling, but 
more and more countries (such 
as Costa Rica) are using them to 
encourage students to complete 
secondary school.
A number of countries, including •	
Chile, Mexico and Peru, have 
strengthened emergency job 
programmes that finance labour-
intensive public works projects 
designed to maintain or build socially 
useful infrastructure. One notable 
case is Chile, which has established 
labour market indicator thresholds 
so that financing for this type of 
activity is automatically triggered 
and provided. In some cases, such 
as the Construyendo Perú (“Building 
Peru”) programme, an effort is made 
to link these temporary jobs with 
training designed to improve workers’ 
opportunities for future integration 
in the labour market.
Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of official information from the countries of the International Labour Organization 
(ILO).
Box III.2 (concluded)
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Chapter IV
The external sector
A. Balance-of-payments current account
In 2009, the balance-of-payments current account is expected to close with a slight deficit, 
equivalent to 0.5% of GDP, compared with 0.6% of GDP in 2008. This narrowing of the deficit 
was primarily the result of slackening domestic demand, which led to a sharp contraction in 
imports (-24.4%) in excess of the drop in exports (-23.6%). An increase in the trade surplus 
is also projected, from 0.3% of GDP in 2008 to 0.4% in 2009, while the current transfers 
surplus is forecast to narrow from 1.6% to 1.4% of GDP. The deficit on the income balance 
is expected to edge down from 2.6% to 2.3% of GDP.
As can be seen in figure IV.2, the current account improved 
in Central America and in the mineral-exporting countries 
(Chile and Peru), but worsened in South America and 
the oil-exporting countries (the Bolivarian Republic of 
Venezuela, Colombia, Ecuador and the Plurinational 
State of Bolivia). 
In the English-speaking Caribbean countries and 
Suriname, the current account surplus will dip from 5% of 
GDP in 2008 to 4.4% in 2009. The current account balance 
of this group of countries largely reflects the sizeable trade 
surplus of Trinidad and Tobago. Excluding that country, the 
subregion has not run a current account surplus in recent 
years. Its deficit peaked at over 16.9% of GDP in 2008, 
falling to around 8.7% of GDP in 2009. The large external 
gaps common to all of the countries of the English-speaking 
Caribbean except Trinidad and Tobago is especially worrisome, 
given that nearly all involve some combination of public-
sector over-indebtedness, insufficient international reserves 
and sustained exchange-rate appreciation in the framework 
of fixed or quasi-fixed exchange-rate regimes.
Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC)62
Figure IV.1 
LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN: STRUCTURE OF THE 
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Current account balance Balance of goods and services
Income balance Current transfers balance
Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on 
the basis of official figures.
a Preliminary data. Does not include Cuba. 
Figure IV.2 
LATIN AMERICA (19 COUNTRIES): CURRENT ACCOUNT, 2008-2009 a
(Percentages of GDP)
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Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on 
the basis of official figures.
a  Preliminary data. 
Figure IV.3 
THE ENGLISH-SPEAKING CARIBBEAN AND SURINAME (13 COUNTRIES): CURRENT ACOUNT, 2008-2009 a
(Percentages of GDP)
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Source:  Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of official figures.
a  Preliminary data. 
1.  Goods and services balance
International trade was one of the main channels through 
which the international crisis was transmitted to the 
region. Globally, merchandise trade volumes dropped 
by 7.1% during the first half of 2009, and this was 
reflected in the region’s trade. 
External demand dropped. As shown in figure IV.4, 
imports to the United States, the European Union and China 
from Latin America and the Caribbean first slowed, then fell 
outright with respect to the preceding year. These falls bottomed 
out in the second quarter of 2009, and import figures have 
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stabilized somewhat since then. For Latin America overall, 
the reduction in exports in 2009 is projected at around 23.4% 
in current terms, or 9.6% in constant terms.
Imports are expected to post a steeper decline: 24.4% 
in current terms and 16.3% in constant terms. This heavy 
drop is primarily the result of slowing consumption and 
investment at the national level. The contraction in imports, 
associated with lower domestic demand amid the financial 
crisis, is largely responsible for the improvement in the 
current account balance. 
As can be clearly seen in figure IV.5, both exports and 
imports fell steeply practically across the board. A breakdown 
of price and volume variations in exports shows that in 
commodity-exporting countries the sharper contraction 
took place in unit values, whereas in countries that export 
manufactures volumes fell more heavily. In the case of 
imports, unit values fell less in countries whose imports 
have a higher manufacturing component, since these prices 
are normally less sensitive to short-term market conditions, 
making declines in volume the dominant effect there. 
Figure IV.4 
YEAR-ON-YEAR VARIATION IN IMPORTS FROM LATIN AMERICA 
AND THE CARIBBEAN, BY DESTINATION a


























































European Union (16 countries) United States China
Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis 
of figures from Bloomberg, the Statistical Office of the European Communities 
(EUROSTAT) and the United States International Trade Commission.
a  Data on the European Union (16 countries) and China do not include imports from 
the Caribbean.
Figure IV.5 
LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN (19 COUNTRIES): VARIATION IN EXPORTS AND IMPORTS,  
BY VOLUME AND UNIT PRICE, 2009 a
(Percentages)
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Source:  Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of official figures.
a  Preliminary data.
It is also useful to analyse separately the results of the 
different Latin American subregions and country groups. In 
the case of exports, a number of different trade performance 
patterns may be identified. As table IV.1 shows, Mexico 
experienced the greatest contraction in exports in constant 
terms, owing to its economy’s close link to the United States 
market, which absorbed around 80% of Mexican exports in 
2008. The oil-producing countries and the four countries 
making up MERCOSUR also saw exports decline heavily 
(by 6.4% and 7.1%, respectively, in constant terms). 
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Table IV.1 
LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN: VARIATION IN EXPORTS 
AND IMPORTS, BY VOLUME AND VALUE a
(Percentages)
Exports Imports









Latin America -23.4 -9.6 -24.4 -16.3
South America -25.5 -6.6 -25.9 -16.8
The Caribbean -30.7 ... -29.3 ...
Central America -8.6 -4.6 -18.5 -9.7
MERCOSUR -21.8 -7.1 -27.8 -18.0
Mexico -22.0 -14.3 -24.0 -17.4
Mining countries -21.7 -4.9 -30.3 -19.7
Oil-producing countries -34.4 -6.4 -19.6 -12.2
Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on 
the basis of official figures.
a  Figures for the subregions and country groups are weighted averages based on the 
value of exports and imports of the countries in each group. Data are preliminary.
Although the Central American countries (Costa Rica, 
El Salvador, Guatemala, Haiti, Honduras, Nicaragua, 
Panama and the Dominican Republic) have strong links 
with the United States market (the destination for 44% 
of their exports), their exports slowed by only 4.6%, 
less than the regional average. 
In the case of the English-speaking Caribbean 
countries and Suriname, the international crisis had a 
different impact. Although the value of these countries’ 
exports slid by around 30.7%, the sharp drop in 
international food and energy prices —along with the 
contraction in domestic economic activity, especially 
during the first half of the year— contributed to a drop 
of 29.3% in the import bill. 
The crisis also affected trade in services. The drop-
off in merchandise trade hurt related services, such as 
transportation, freight and insurance. There was also 
a downturn in tourism services, which are important 
for this subregion, especially for the countries of the 
English-speaking Caribbean and Central America, 
where tourist spending is a major source of revenue. 
In 2008, this spending generated revenue equivalent 
to 17.3% of GDP in the English-speaking Caribbean: 
here, the countries most reliant on tourism are Saint 
Lucia, Antigua and Barbuda, and the Bahamas, where 
this revenue amounted to 31.5%, 29.6% and 28.6%, 
respectively, of GDP. Tourism also plays an important 
role in Central America, where tourist spending in 
2008 was equivalent to 5.5% of GDP on average and 
accounted for even more in Panama (9.6% of GDP) and 
the Dominican Republic (9.2% of GDP). 
Figure IV.6 shows the variation in international tourist 
arrivals during the first six months of 2009, signalling 
major declines, primarily in the English-speaking 
Caribbean countries. By contrast, some countries, including 
Colombia, Nicaragua and Uruguay, saw an increase in 
tourist arrivals. The most recent data indicate that this 
downturn has, in some cases, shown signs of easing. 
The influenza A(H1N1) pandemic has also damaged 
tourism, as seen clearly in the case of Mexico, where 
tourist arrivals were down 32% and 25%, respectively, 
in May and June 2009.
Figure IV.6 
LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN (27 COUNTRIES):  
YEAR-ON-YEAR VARIATION IN INTERNATIONAL TOURIST  
ARRIVALS, FIRST SEMESTER 2009
 (Percentages)
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Venezuela (Bol. Rep. of)
El Salvador
Source:  Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on 
the basis of figures from the World Tourism Organization. 
The trends cited here are reflected in the services 
trade balance, for which a deficit equivalent to 0.7% of 
GDP —the same as for the previous year— is projected 
for the region as a whole. The worst affected part of the 
region will be the English-speaking Caribbean, which is 
forecast to run a sharply smaller services surplus (down 
from 6.2% of GDP in 2008 to 3.6% in 2009). 
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2.  International prices and terms of trade
The slide in commodity prices in the latter months 
of 2008 came to a halt early in 2009. Beginning in 
the second quarter of 2009, the main aggregate price 
indices began to edge back up month to month. Between 
January and October 2009, prices for food grew by a 
cumulative 9.5%, those for minerals and metals, 35.1%, 
and those for oil by, 57.5%. And, although these three 
indices remained below their 2008 averages at the end 
of 2009, they were still above the average for the 2000s, 
as shown in figure IV.7. The manufacturing price index, 
which is much less volatile than the commodity price 
index, followed a similar pattern, declining after a peak 
in July 2008, and beginning to climb back up again in 
the second quarter of 2009.
Figure IV.7 
LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN: PRICE INDICES OF 
COMMODITIES AND MANUFACTURED GOODS
(2000=100)
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Manufactured goods, average for 2000-2008
Source:  Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), based 
on figures from the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development 
(UNCTAD) and from Netherlands Bureau for Economic Analysis (CBP).
Price volatility in recent years had led to considerable 
variations in Latin America’s terms of trade. For 2009, 
a drop on the order of 6.1% is projected for the region 
as a whole, following a rise of 3.1% in 2008. Terms-of-
trade developments depended on the type of products 
traded by the countries, worsening by a significant 
23.4% for commodity-exporting (particularly oil-
exporting) nations, but improving by 6.4% in the Central 
American countries, most of which are net commodity 
importers. Assuming that prices continue to rise slightly 
for commodities and manufactured goods, terms of 
trade will see an upturn in 2010. For Latin America 
overall the gain is projected at 4.0%, with 4.7% for 
South America, 7.5% for mining countries, 11.0% for 
oil-producing countries and 3.4% for Mexico. Terms of 
trade are expected to slip by 1.6% for Central America 
and to remain unchanged in MERCOSUR. 
Figure IV.8 
LATIN AMERICA (19 COUNTRIES): ESTIMATED VARIATION IN 

































MERCOSUR Chile+Peru Bolivia (Plur. State of)+
Colombia+Ecuador+
Venezuela (Bol. Rep. of)
Central America Mexico
2008 2009 2010
Source:  Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on 
the basis of official figures.
a  Preliminary data. Figures for 2010 are projections. 
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3.  The income and transfers balance
The deficit on the factor income account, which includes 
employee remuneration, profits and accrued interest, 
will decline by approximately US$ 13.214 billion to 
2.3% of GDP, as compared with 2.6% in 2008. This 
reduction may be attributed principally to smaller 
outflows of profits from the region. Brazil, Chile, 
Colombia and Mexico record the largest net outflows 
in absolute terms, though all four saw a significant 
drop in these outflows (down 21.6%, 16.2%, 18.7% and 
17.6%, respectively). The English-speaking Caribbean 
as a whole, on the other hand, registered larger net 
outflows. Higher repatriation of earnings in Trinidad 
and Tobago (up from nearly US$ 900 million in 2008 
to some US$ 1.5 billion in 2009) accounts for the sharp 
deterioration in the subregion’s income balance. 
Current transfers, composed primarily of remittances 
from workers residing abroad, dropped in 2009 in contrast 
to the uptrend in evidence hitherto. Remittances are an 
extremely important source of foreign exchange for a 
number of countries, such as Guyana (24.0% of GDP), 
Honduras (19.7%), Haiti (18.0%), El Salvador (17.2%) 
and Jamaica (15.8%). Figure IV.9 shows the decline in 
remittances beginning in the second half of 2008.
The principal —though not the only— factor in 
the fall in remittances in 2009 was the international 
financial crisis and its impact on the jobs of emigrants 
from the region living in the United States and Europe. 
Inasmuch as various indicators show some improvement 
in the countries hit by the crisis, data from the third 
quarter and partial data from the fourth suggest that 
the downtrend in remittances may be slowing, although 
they are unlikely to regain their pre-2008 strength in 
the short term.
Figure IV.9 
LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN (8 COUNTRIES):  
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Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on 
the basis of official figures.
The recovery in the United States and Spain (the two 
countries with the highest numbers of immigrants from Latin 
America and the Caribbean) is expected to be slow. 
The tightening of immigration policy in the United States 
and in Europe, as well as the natural decline in remittances 
as emigrants become more settled in their new countries of 
residence, also reduce the likelihood that remittances will 
regain former levels in the near future. 
Against this background, the region’s current transfers 
surplus is projected to fall from 1.6% of GDP in 2008 to 1.4% 
in 2009. All the subregions will experience this decline, with 
the two worst affected being the English-speaking Caribbean 
and Central America, in the latter case from the equivalent 
7.3% of GDP in 2008 to 6.7% in 2009.
B. The capital and financial account
The external financial environment faced by the region in 
2009 was marked by the fallout from the global financial 
crisis that broke out in late 2008 and the gradual return 
to normalcy in the international financial markets that 
began early in the second quarter of the year.
As uncertainty rose and spread across world markets in 
the wake of the Lehman Brothers bankruptcy in September 
2008, in the Latin American and Caribbean region, as in the 
emerging countries in general, risk premiums and capital 
outflows spiked and banks found their external credit lines 
Preliminary Overview of the Economies of Latin America and the Caribbean • 2009 67
suspended. Until then the region had enjoyed ready and 
uninterrupted access to international capital markets, but 
now demand for fresh issues of external bonds dried up 
altogether. This combination of factors sapped international 
reserves and pushed up exchange rates.
This bleak state of affairs began to turn around in the first 
quarter of 2009, thanks to programmes to bail out financial 
systems in a number of developed countries, the creation of 
special liquidity lines for Brazil and Mexico by the United 
States, and the introduction of new lines of credit by the 
International Monetary Fund (IMF) and regional multilateral 
credit institutions. Meanwhile, a number of the region’s 
central banks increased or created special credit lines to 
provide banks with domestic- and foreign-currency liquidity 
and many fiscal authorities put in motion countercyclical 
programmes. These efforts helped to boost expectations, and 
financial market agents became more confident that authorities 
in the developed countries would act to stave off any other 
financial-institution bankruptcy that could have systemic 
repercussions. A number of the region’s countries adopted 
fiscal and monetary measures to cushion their economies 
from the real effects of the crisis.
Colombia and Mexico also signed agreements with IMF 
for new, flexible, low-conditionality credit facilities. Costa 
Rica, El Salvador, Guatemala and the Dominican Republic 
sought precautionary standby agreements with the Fund, 
involving no conditionalities unless funds were transferred. 
Other countries in the region, such as Dominica, Grenada, 
Haiti, Nicaragua, and Saint Vincent and the Grenadines 
already had financial support agreements in place as part of 
programmes to reduce poverty or to deal with natural disasters 
and external financial turbulence, and these underwent their 
normal phases of disbursement. The Latin American Reserve 
Fund approved a programme of credits to shore up Ecuador’s 
balance of payments.
This set of factors helped to gradually bring down the 
region’s risk premiums over the course of the year. As figure 
IV.10 shows, premiums nearly tripled at the peak of the crisis, 
but began to decline during the first quarter of 2009. Thus, 
by late 2009, risk premiums for emerging countries and for 
Latin America and the Caribbean were below their average 
levels for the three years preceding the crisis. 
This gradual normalization of foreign financing 
conditions differed markedly from one country to another, 
however. For one group of countries —including Brazil, 
Chile, Colombia, Mexico and Panama— whose risk ratings 
have been relatively low over the last decade, the spike seen 
at the peak of the crisis eased in January 2009 and a steady 
improvement began to take hold in April, with larger drops 
in risk ratings leading to levels that actually fell below pre-
crisis figures (see figure IV.11). The ratings for Uruguay 
and El Salvador also came down sufficiently to place them 
within this group of better-performing countries.
Figure IV.10 
LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN: EMERGING  
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Average EMBIG Latin America for 2003-2007
Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on 
the basis of figures from JP Morgan.
Figure IV.11 
LATIN AMERICA (SELECTED COUNTRIES): CHANGES IN THE 
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Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on 
the basis of figures from JP Morgan.
A second group of countries which have shown higher 
risk premiums over the last decade —Argentina, Belize, 
Jamaica, the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela and 
the Dominican Republic— also saw a surge in ratings. 
Here, however, risk premiums were much slower 
to recede. Of this group, only Argentina, which has 
signalled its intention to reach a new agreement with 
its creditors, and the Dominican Republic regained 
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risk levels comparable to pre-crisis figures by the 
end of the year (see figure IV.12). In the case of the 
other countries, the expectation of continued external 
borrowing needs and increased bond issues have kept 
risk perception high. In Ecuador, where premiums rose 
sharply above those of other countries, the impact of 
the global crisis was aggravated by judicial rulings 
that suspended the servicing of a portion of external 
debt. As it became clear which foreign debts would be 
affected, risk premiums eased somewhat, albeit still 
within very high ranges.
Figure IV.12 
LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN (SELECTED COUNTRIES): 







































































































































































Venezuela (Bol. Rep. of)
Belize
Source:  Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on 
the basis of figures from JP Morgan.
As global uncertainty abated, the region regained 
access to international financial markets. In fact, at the 
end of 2009, none of the new agreements between IMF 
and countries of the region had resulted in disbursements, 
reflecting the return of external borrowing conditions to 
a more normal footing. Around November 2009, a total 
of US$ 61 billion in sovereign and corporate bonds had 
been issued by the region on international markets: more 
than either the total for 2008 (US$ 19 billion) or the 
average for 2006 and 2007 (US$ 42 billion annually). 
The surge in corporate bond issues had a strong hand 
in this high total figure (see figure IV.13).
The lessening of global uncertainty, along with a 
renewed appetite for risk and positive growth expectations 
for the region in 2010, as well as the allocation of almost 
US$ 21 billion in fresh allocations of special drawing 
rights (SDRs) by IMF, helped to maintain financial inflows 
into the region, though at lower levels than in 2008 (see 
figure IV.14).Those same factors contributed to reducing 
outward investment by the region’s residents and keeping 
foreign investment in the region from falling more than it 
did, with the result that net FDI dropped 31%, less than 
had been expected at the start of the crisis. Thus, net 
FDI amounted to 1.6% of GDP, representing a second 
consecutive year of decline. These figures, accompanied 
by a slight current account deficit, resulted in a balance-
of-payments surplus for the region and a build-up of 
US$ 30 billion —equivalent to 0.8% of Latin America’s 
GDP— in international reserves. 
Figure IV.13 
LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN: EMBIG AND  
EXTERNAL BOND ISSUES 































































































































































































































































Sovereign Quasi-sovereign + supranational
Private EMBIG Composite for Latin America (left axis)
Source:  Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on 
the basis of figures from JP Morgan.
Total reserves reached US$ 540 billion, thereby fully 
regaining the record high reached just before the global 
financial crisis broke out. The new SDRs accounted 
for a significant part of this, however. Without these 
allocations, 12 countries would have shown declines in 
their international reserves, not five (as was the case), 
and the reductions would have been larger. The overall 
figure largely reflects a jump of nearly US$ 37 billion 
in Brazil’s reserves, as well as major declines in Mexico 
and the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela. Figure IV.15 
shows the variations in reserves in the different countries 
and the extent to these reflected SDR allocations.
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Figure IV.14 
LATIN AMERICA: STRUCTURE OF THE BALANCE-OF- 
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Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on 
the basis of official figures.
a  A negative variation implies an accumulation of reserves.
Figure IV.15 
LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN: VARIATION IN GROSS 
INTERNATIONAL RESERVES, 2008-2009
(Percentages)
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Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), 
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Argentina
Following six years of robust growth, the Argentine economy experienced a sharp slowdown in 
2009, and the growth rate for the year as a whole is expected to stand at 0.7%. Notwithstanding 
a strong outflow of private capital throughout the year and despite the economic and political 
uncertainties which, at times, impacted on financial markets, macroeconomic policymakers 
were able to control the foreign-exchange market and liquidity levels thanks to the substantial 
trade surplus (resulting from a sharper reduction in imports than in exports) and the availability 
of previously accumulated reserves. Thus, no severe financial tensions were generated and, 
in keeping with international trends, the demand for local securities recovered appreciably 
by the end of the period.
















































































































Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on 
the basis of official figures.
The central bank’s foreign-currency transactions resulted in 
a slight variation in international reserves, and the exchange 
rate against the dollar increased by approximately 10% 
between the end of 2008 and mid-November 2009. This 
represented a significant nominal and real depreciation of 
the Argentine peso in relation to the currencies of some 
of the country’s main trading partners (such as Brazil and 
the European Union), which had gained value against 
the dollar. The fall in tax collections, together with the 
substantial increase in government spending, lowered 
the national public sector primary surplus, while some 
provincial governments experienced financing constraints. 
Both official and private statistics attest to a reduction 
in the rate of inflation, which had a positive impact on 
poverty and indigence rates, although discrepancies in the 
different measurements of price levels and other variables 
cast doubts as to the extent of the actual improvement in 
these social indicators.
 International conditions resulted in a deterioration in 
the terms of trade, although these remained at historically 
high levels. At the same time, agriculture, which had 
been buoyant in the preceding years, was hit by a severe 
drought and by diminished expectations in the sector. The 
decline in domestic and external demand observed since 
the end of 2008 dampened industrial output even though 
the consumption of non-durables (in terms of volumes) 
remained strong. Construction was also down slightly. 
Investment in production equipment for durable goods 
fell significantly, albeit from a high starting position. 
 In response to the economic recession, policymakers 
put in place various instruments. The government bolstered 
public investment and mobilized the resources transferred 
to the public sector (following the reform of the pension 
system in 2008) in order to direct credit towards durable 
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goods production and the construction sector in particular. 
Companies willing to retain their staff were offered 
assistance to enable them to meet their wage obligations. 
Import controls were instituted in order to channel demand 
towards locally produced goods. Income taxes for wage-
earners were lowered, and a moratorium was granted on 
the payment of social security and tax obligations and 
on the declaration of undeclared assets. Towards the end 
of the year, provision was made for unemployed and 
unregistered workers to receive a monthly allowance for 
each of their children. 
 With access to foreign credit subject to tight restrictions, 
the government’s financial policy was geared towards 
enhancing expectations regarding its compliance with its 
debt servicing obligations and regularizing outstanding 
debt owed to the Paris Club and to the bondholders that 
had not taken part in the 2005 restructuring operation. In 
addition, IMF was approached with a view to reinstating 
economic monitoring mechanisms. 
 In the latter part of 2009, there were signs of 
an upturn in activity which could spell an incipient 
recovery. Notwithstanding the remaining uncertainties, 
the improvement in the international and regional 
macroeconomic climate strengthened expectations of a 
rally in external demand and more promising conditions 
on credit markets. There were no strong disturbances 
in the country’s financial or foreign-exchange markets. 
Industrial activity actually picked up, thanks in part to 
the robust growth of the Brazilian economy. Favourable 
weather conditions suggested that crop volumes, in 
particular soya output, would rebound. 
 Fiscal performance in 2009 was influenced by economic 
policy measures and by macroeconomic developments, and 
their effects on tax bases. Revenues from national taxes 
rose slightly as a percentage of GDP, largely on account 
of the higher contributions to social security resulting 
from the unification of the pension system under the 
State pay-as-you-go scheme. Conversely, the proceeds of 
taxes on foreign trade decreased substantially. The drop 
in imports also had an impact on value added tax (VAT), 
but receipts from consumption-based taxes remained 
stable. Public expenditure expanded significantly more 
than GDP, reflecting increases in wages, social security 
benefits and capital expenditures. Transfers to the private 
sector (consisting largely of energy, transport and food 
subsidies) held firm at approximately 4% of GDP. 
 The national government primary surplus is estimated 
to have shrunk by 1.5 percentage points to 1.4% of 
GDP; provincial States, for their part, have recorded a 
primary deficit of close to 0.2% of GDP. In the course 
of the year, large amounts were disbursed in the form of 
capital and interest payments on the public debt, which 
diminished by US$ 5 billion in the first half of the year. 
The yields on public bonds came down from the high 
levels reached at the end of 2008. Nevertheless, access 
by the public sector to international credit markets 
remained limited.
 In 2009, the monetary aggregates expanded more 
slowly, and liquidity ratios therefore showed a moderate 
reduction. Monetary policy was directed towards limiting 
fluctuations in the financial and exchange-rate variables 
through operations involving both external and internal 
assets. The demand for bank deposits fell towards the 
middle of the year but subsequently picked up. Following 
a spike in the latter part of 2008, interest rates declined, 
settling, however, at higher levels than in previous years 
(11% for fixed-term deposits in October). In a small 
financial system, where the preference for liquidity and 
the demand for foreign exchange play an important part, 
credit volumes remained limited. The stock exchange 
rebounded, especially in the second half of the period. 
 Reported data on the variations in real GDP show 
dissimilar trends between the goods-producing sectors 
(which recorded a year-on-year decline of just over 5.5% 
in the first half) and the services sector (which expanded 
by 4 %). In the case of the former, the slide in agricultural 
output led the downturn. The grain harvest dropped from 
over 90 million tons to just over 60 million in 2008-2009, 
the lowest level in the decade. The decline in agriculture 
ARGENTINA: MAIN ECONOMIC INDICATORS
2007 2008 2009 a
Annual percentage growth rates
Gross domestic product 8.7 6.8 0.7
Per capita gross domestic product 7.6 5.7 -0.3
Consumer prices 8.5 7.2 6.5 b
Average real wage c 9.1 8.8 11.6 d
Money (M1) 26.8 11.1 6.6 e
Real effective exchange rate f 1.9 3.1 5.3 g
Terms of trade 3.7 13.3 -4.8
Annual average percentages
Urban unemployment rate 8.5 7.9 8.8 d
National public administration
  overall balance/GDP 0.6 0.7 -0.8
Nominal deposit rate 7.9 11.1 12.1 h
Nominal lending rate 11.1 19.5 21.3 i
Millions of dollars
Exports of goods and services 66 356 82 110 66 373
Imports of goods and services 53 352 67 536 49 079
Current account balance 7 412 7 034 8 816
Capital and financial account balance j 4 188 -10 724 -8 323
Overall balance 11 600 -3 690 493
Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the 




 Twelve-month variation to October 2009.
c
 Manufacturing sector. Registered workers in the private sector.
d Estimate based on data from January to September.
e
 Twelve-month variation to September 2009.
f
 A negative rate indicates an appreciation of the currency in real terms.
g
 Year-on-year average variation, January to October.
h
 Average from January to October, annualized.
i
 Average from January to July, annualized.
j
 Includes errors and omissions.
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was reflected in lower demand for agricultural equipment 
and utility vehicles. The drop in industrial activity was due 
mainly to a downturn in the capital goods and consumer 
durables sectors. Automobile production fell by approximately 
20% year-on-year in the first ten months of 2009, although 
it remained at historically high levels. As the year drew 
to a close, signs of a recovery were evident from a rally 
in domestic demand and the renewed buoyancy of the 
Brazilian market, factors that were also beginning to shape 
the performance of other manufacturing branches.
 In October, the consumer price index (CPI) of Greater 
Buenos Aires was reported to show a 6.5% year-on-year 
increase, while the general wage index (which covers 
public and private, registered and informal workers) rose 
by 16% over the 12 months up to September. The demand 
for labour mirrored the slowdown in economic activity. 
Data for the third quarter revealed a slight decrease in 
year-on-year employment figures, with the jobless rate at 
9.1% (1.3 percentage points higher than a year earlier). 
Employment fell in manufacturing and construction. 
Official figures point to appreciable reductions in the 
poverty and indigence rates (down to approximately 14% 
and 4%, respectively), although other sources indicate no 
improvement or even a rise in these rates.
 The external sector witnessed sharp reductions 
in imports as well as exports. As a result, the already 
considerable trade surplus expanded, mirroring the deficit 
on the capital and financial accounts. In the first three 
quarters of 2009, private financial foreign-exchange 
transactions totalled US$ 13 billion in net outflows, 
with a peak of US$ 5.8 billion in the second quarter 
and a sharp slowdown (to US$ 2.3 billion) in the third. 
Interventions by the central bank, which bought or sold 
foreign exchange as circumstances dictated, enabled it 
to maintain the level of international reserves, which 
stood at approximately US$ 47 billion in mid-November, 
slightly higher than at the end of 2008. This position was 
further enhanced by an allocation of US$ 2.65 billion in 
special drawing rights. The central bank also concluded 
currency swap agreements with its counterpart institutions 
in China and Brazil.
 Export prices plunged 18% in the first ten months of 
the year, offsetting in part the sharp increases recorded 
in 2008. Export volumes fell by 10% during this period. 
Export values were substantially lower than a year earlier, 
particularly in the case of primary products (down 47%, 
reflecting lower prices as well as reduced volumes) and 
fuels (down 30%, despite an increase in volumes) and 
slightly less so in the case of both agricultural or industrial 
manufactures. Imports were down by 33% over the first 10 
months (-7% in prices), with significant decreases being 
recorded in capital, intermediate and consumer goods.
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Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on 
the basis of official figures.
Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela
According to projections, GDP in the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela contracted by 2.3% in 
2009 mainly as a result of the economic impact of lower international oil prices. The country 
continued to have the highest inflation rate in Latin America, as well as a fiscal deficit, and 
access to foreign currency at the official exchange rate became more restricted. 
Public finances deteriorated significantly between 2008 
and 2009, largely because of the drop registered in public 
revenue. This led to an expansion of aggregate demand, 
although the effect was less pronounced than in previous 
years. In the first quarter of 2009, the public sector 
(narrowly defined) had an overall deficit equivalent to 
0.9% of annual GDP. The sector’s revenue declined by the 
equivalent of 3.8% of GDP, year-on-year, while outlays 
(including lending) fell by a mere 1.6%. Projections based 
on available data indicate that the overall deficit of the 
public sector (narrowly defined) will be equivalent to 
about 4.0% of GDP for all of 2009. 
 The worsening fiscal situation was due largely to 
lower petroleum revenue, the elimination of the financial 
transaction tax and declining income tax receipts, especially 
from petroleum. Capital expenditures (including those 
related to the National Development Fund projects) shrank, 
reflecting the reduction in capital transfers and, to a lesser 
extent, cutbacks in the acquisition of fixed assets.
 To bring down the deficit, the government raised the 
value added tax rate from 9% to 12% in March 2009 and 
increased public sector wages by less than inflation. In 
the future, changes may be expected in the accounts of 
the State enterprise sector following the nationalizations 
decreed in 2009, most notably, the nationalization of 
goods manufacturers and service providers involved 
in upstream gas and petroleum activities, in May; of 
the Banco de Venezuela and of steel-sector companies 
involved in iron production, in July; and of two coffee 
roasting plants, in November.
 The public debt balance increased, along with 
the deficit, in 2009. In June, the foreign debt stood at 
US$ 29.894 billion and the domestic debt at 43.950 billion 
bolivares. If the US$ 4.99 billion in international sovereign 
bonds maturing in 2019 and 2024 that were issued on 
28 September 2009 are included, total public debt at 
the official exchange rate of 2.15 bolivares fuertes per 
United States dollar, is equivalent to 14% of GDP. The 
State-owned oil company, Petróleos de Venezuela S.A. 
(PDVSA), also issued debt in 2009. 
 Year-on-year inflation in the Bolivarian Republic of 
Venezuela, as measured by the national consumer price 
index, reached 26.7% in October 2009, while cumulative 
inflation for the first ten months of the year was 20.7%. In 
part, this reflects the impact of the decreased availability of 
hard currency at the official exchange rate of BsF 2.15 per 
United States dollar in 2009, which led the private sector 
to meet its needs for importing goods by purchasing 
dollars on the parallel market, at a significantly higher 
exchange rate. The amount of foreign currency that the 
Foreign Exchange Administration Commission (CADIVI) 
authorized for sale at the official exchange rate decreased 
by 49.9% between the second quarter of 2008 and the 
same period in 2009. The effective real exchange rate 
appreciated by an average of 26% in the first nine months 
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of 2009, mainly as a result of the confluence of high 
inflation and a fixed exchange-rate regime. 
 High inflation was caused not only by the passthrough 
effect of the rising bolivar price of imports but also by 
the strong expansion of monetary aggregates in 2009. 
Broad money (M3) expanded as of the first quarter of 
2009, reaching a 33.4% year-on-year rate in the third 
quarter. Although greater liquidity was accompanied by 
increased term deposits in commercial banks in 2009, 
lending remained flat, reflecting the lack of economic 
growth in the country during the year. 
 In the banking sector, the critical situation in terms of 
finances and assets at Banco Industrial de Venezuela led to 
government intervention in May 2009 (although it continued 
to conduct financial intermediation activities). In November, 
the government also took over Bolívar Banco, Banco 
Confederado, Banco Canarias de Venezuela and Banpro. 
The latter two, which, between them, held the savings of 
750,000 depositors, were subsequently liquidated.
 GDP is estimated to have fallen by 2.3% in 2009. The 
hardest-hit sectors were manufacturing, petroleum and 
commerce. Growth in the communications, construction and 
government services sectors was insufficient to counteract 
the economic slowdown. In terms of overall demand, the 
contractions in private consumption, investment and exports 
were only partially offset by government consumption. In 
the fourth quarter, drought and the inability of supply to 
keep up with demand, led to problems with the electricity 
and water supply.
 According to the Organization of Petroleum Exporting 
Countries (OPEC), petroleum output in the Bolivarian Republic 
of Venezuela fell by 100,000 barrels per day between the 
fourth quarter of 2008 and the third quarter of 2009. The 
drop in production may be due to the fact that investments by 
PDVSA in exploration and development have failed to make 
up for the declining output of the oldest oil wells operated 
by the company. The fact that the Baker Hughes company 
points to a sharp reduction in the number of drilling rigs, 
from 81 in the fourth quarter of 2008 to only 54 in the third 
quarter of 2009, seems to support this explanation.
 As a result of the economic downturn, the unemployment 
rate rose to 8.1% in October 2009 from 7.2% a year 
earlier. Average real wages (in the first three quarters of 
the year) declined, on a year-on-year basis, by 5.5% in 
the private sector and by 8.2% in the public sector. 
 The surplus of the balance-of-payments current 
account plummeted from the equivalent of 13.5% of 
GDP in the first nine months of 2008 to 0.7% in the same 
period in 2009, as falling oil prices slashed the value of 
petroleum exports by 51.7%. Goods imports decreased by 
only 13.6%, however, and the merchandise trade balance 
surplus therefore shrank from 15.9% of GDP terms in 
the first nine months of 2008 to only 2.8%. The current 
account is projected to end 2009 with a surplus. 
 The capital and financial account ran a negative balance 
(2.8% in GDP terms) for the first nine months of 2009. 
In the first quarter of the year, aside from the accounting 
transfer of US$ 12.299 billion of international reserves 
to the National Development Fund, the other main event 
was the increase in the liabilities of the public sector (in 
particular, the US$ 4.0 billion loan from the Bank of China 
to a joint Chinese-Venezuelan fund) and the decline of 
assets of the public sector. The balance between outward 
and inward FDI was negative, with the former exceeding 
the latter by US$ 4.432 billion, or 1.1% of GDP. 
BOLIVARIAN REPUBLIC OF VENEZUELA:  
MAIN ECONOMIC INDICATORS 
2007 2008 2009 a
Annual percentage growth rates
Gross domestic product 8.2 4.8 -2.3
Per capita gross domestic product 6.3 3.0 -3.9
Consumer prices 22.5 31.9 28.9 b
Average real wage 1.2 -4.5 -5.5 c
Money (M1) 24.6 26.5 22.2 b
Real effective exchange rate d -10.5 -18.6 -25.5 e
Terms of trade 9.6 23.4 -28.3
Annual average percentages
Urban unemployment rate 8.4 7.4 8.0 f
Central government
  overall balance/GDP 3.0 -1.2 -5.5
Nominal deposit rate 10.6 16.0 15.7 g
Nominal lending rate 16.7 22.8 21.0 g
Millions of dollars
Exports of goods and services 70 683 97 005 56 746
Imports of goods and services 54 656 59 703 46 344
Current account balance 18 063 37 392 7 986
Capital and financial account balance h -23 805 -28 117 -17 686
Overall balance -5 742 9 275 -9 700
Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the 




 Twelve-month variation to October 2009.
c
 Estimate based on data from January to September.
d
 A negative rate indicates an appreciation of the currency in real terms.
e
 Year-on-year average variation, January to October.
f
 Estimate based on data from January to October.
g
 Average from January to October, annualized.
h
 Includes errors and omissions.
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Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on 
the basis of official figures.
Brazil
In 2009, the Brazilian economy recovered from the effects of the international financial crisis 
of 2008. Despite some initial difficulties, the central bank’s measures to maintain domestic 
liquidity and reduce interest rates together with the stimulus provided by the increase of 
public bank lending, succeeded in increasing credit flows. An expansionary fiscal policy was 
adopted, with tax cuts for specific sectors and higher spending, which widened the budget 
deficit. Private consumer spending also bolstered the recovery. Lastly, the fact that Brazil’s 
macroeconomic conditions and prospects remained attractive encouraged capital inflows in 
the form of both FDI and portfolio investment, which helped to swell international reserves. 
The policy mix adopted helped to fuel the economic upswing and, after projected GDP growth 
of 0.3% in 2009, growth expected to approach pre-crisis levels (5.5%) in 2010. 
The achievement of higher investment rates and the 
levels of the exchange and interest rates represent the 
main macroeconomic challenges for Brazil’s economy. 
In order to boost investment, which had been badly hit 
by the crisis, the government increased capital spending 
and investment in infrastructure and energy, and started 
up an extensive programme of government incentives and 
subsidies for housing construction. In the final months 
of the year, there were hints of a revival in private sector 
investment plans, particularly those funded by public 
sources such as the National Bank for Economic and 
Social Development (BNDES). 
With regard to monetary policy, a number of measures 
were adopted in 2009. The central bank reduced deposit 
requirements and authorized the use of a portion of 
deposits to buy portfolios from smaller banks and to 
provide loans to micro- and small enterprises, among other 
banking instruments. Because of the liquidity problems 
that surfaced during the early months of the crisis, the 
central bank authorized the financing of exports through 
advance exchange contracts, and offered credit lines to 
refinance the foreign debts of Brazilian firms. Several of 
these mechanisms were used, but once credit lines were 
re-established, demand tapered off. 
The central bank reduced the basic interest rate in 
the Special System for Settlement and Custody (SELIC) 
to its lowest level in over 20 years (8.75%, equivalent 
to a real annual rate of less than 5%), given projected 
inflation of 4.0%. This rate, however, remains far above 
that of other countries. As the economic recovery proceeds 
apace, no further cuts in the rate are anticipated for 2009. 
Maintaining the interest rate differential could prompt the 
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revision of investment plans and sharpen the appreciation 
of the Brazilian real. 
In addition to these measures, the government 
decided to use public banks to expand credit. As of 
September 2008, total loans represented 38.7% of GDP, 
and by September 2009 this figure had risen to 45.7%. In 
June 2008, nearly 34% of all loans (12% of GDP) were 
concentrated in public banks, but by September 2009 
this percentage had increased to 41% (18.5% of GDP). 
During this same period, lending by private domestic 
banks, foreign banks and public banks swelled by 7%, 
2.4% and 38.8%, respectively 
With regard to the exchange rate, the real had regained its 
pre-crisis value by October 2009, after a nominal devaluation 
of nearly 50% in the initial weeks of the crisis. This upward 
movement was spurred by developments in the real sector, 
including prospects for future production of new oil fields 
(pre-salt layer) and expectations of increased commodities 
exports. An additional factor was expectations with respect to 
financial variables, such as short-term transactions generated 
by domestic and international interest rate arbitrage. In order 
to mitigate the impact of these expectations, the authorities 
levied a 2% tax on foreign-exchange inflows related to 
the purchase of stock or fixed-yield securities. Taking 
into account the cumulative change in the wholesale price 
index between September 2008 and September 2009, the 
value of the currency rose 9.5% in real terms. According 
to ECLAC data, the real effective exchange rate dropped 
3.4% in the 12 months ending September 2009.
In terms of fiscal policy, one of the principal measures 
adopted was to temporarily (between March and September 
2009) reduce the industrial products tax on automobile 
sales before, in the final quarter of the year, gradually 
raising the rate towards its previous levels. This measure 
was also extended to household electrical appliances and 
construction inputs. Lower income tax rates were introduced 
for middle-income families. The federal government and 
a number of states implemented some additional tax cuts 
and extended payment deadlines for various taxes. 
The lower level of activity, especially in the industrial 
sector, along with the tax reductions, led to a nominal 
drop of 1.9% in federal tax receipts between September 
2008 and October 2009, in comparison with the same 
period over 2007-2008. Meanwhile, federal government 
spending increased by 16.5% (approximately 10% in real 
terms), owing principally to rises in wages, income transfer 
programmes and payments of social welfare benefits. Federal 
government investment rose 12.7%, reaching 20.5 billion 
reais —slightly over 5% of total primary spending.
As a result, the federal government’s primary surplus 
declined. In order to reach the target of 2.5% of GDP 
in 2009 (compared with 3.8% of GDP for 2008), the 
government will have to deduct from its expenditures the 
equivalent of nearly all of its investment. The nominal 
deficit is projected to rise by GDP percentage points, to 
around 4% of GDP. A primary surplus target of 3.3% of 
GDP was set for 2010. 
The final quarter of 2008 saw a pronounced drop 
in GDP, which shrank by around 3% with respect to the 
third quarter. This decline flattened significantly in the 
first quarter of 2009 (0.9% contraction with respect to 
the previous quarter), as the downturn in the industrial 
sector eased (down 4.4% on the fourth quarter of 2008, 
compared with a contraction of 8.1% between the third 
and fourth quarters of that year). In the second quarter of 
2009, GDP saw an upturn (1.0% on the previous quarter), 
on the back of the upswing in manufacturing (which 
gained 2.6% over the first quarter), as firms reduced 
surplus inventories and consumer and business confidence 
indices improved. In the third quarter, growth picked 
up further, inventories reached an acceptable level and 
business confidence indices rose above their pre-crisis 
levels. The third quarter also saw the first increase in 
industrial employment in 2009. 
Agricultural production is estimated to have contracted 
in 2009. Nevertheless, the year’s harvest is expected to be 
the second-largest ever recorded, while it is anticipated 
that the services sector could show an expansion. 
BRAZIL: MAIN ECONOMIC INDICATORS
2007 2008 2009 a
Annual percentage growth rates
Gross domestic product 5.7 5.1 0.6
Per capita gross domestic product 4.6 4.1 -0.3
Consumer prices 4.5 5.9 4.2 b
Average real wage c 1.5 2.1 2.1 d
Money (M1) 32.7 -3.5 10.2 b
Real effective exchange rate e -7.3 -3.9 7.3 f
Terms of trade 2.1 3.6 -5.6
Annual average percentages
Urban unemployment rate 9.3 7.9 8.1 g
Central government
  operating balance/GDP -1.9 -1.3 -2.9
Nominal deposit rate 7.7 7.9 7.0 h
Nominal lending rate 34.5 38.8 41.1 h
Millions of dollars
Exports of goods and services 184 603 228 393 181 499
Imports of goods and services 157 790 220 247 171 399
Current account balance 1 551 -28 192 -18 418
Capital and financial account balance i 85 933 31, 161 55 758
Overall balance 87 484 2 969 37 340
Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the 




 Twelve-month variation to October 2009.
c
 Workers covered by social and labour legislation, private sector.
d
 Estimate based on data from January to September.
e
 A negative rate indicates an appreciation of the currency in real terms.
f
 Year-on-year average variation, January to October.
g
 Estimate based on data from January to October.
h
 Average from January to October, annualized.
i
 Includes errors and omissions.
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On the demand side, the countercyclical response 
has been driven by consumption, both private and 
government. In the first three quarters of 2009, government 
consumption was 4.3% up on the fourth quarter of 2008, 
while household consumption rose 2.7%. Goods and 
services export volumes declined 11.3%, while investment 
fell 7.8%. The volume of imported goods and services 
dropped 13.2%. If these rates of decrease continue for the 
year overall, it is estimated that investment will decline 
to 16% of GDP.
Between December 2008 and January 2009, the 
number of jobs in the formal sector fell by 755,000. The 
unemployment rate increased from 7.6% in September 
2008 to 9% in March 2009. The labour market then saw a 
gradual upturn up to September 2009, with a net increase 
of 300,000 jobs over September 2008. The employment 
impacts of the international financial crisis varied by sector: 
while industry saw a net loss of 280,000 jobs, the number 
of jobs in commerce and services rose by over 570,000. 
The unemployment rate was 7.7% in September 2009, 
comparable to its level in September 2008, with some 
of the reduction due to a lower participation rate (56.8% 
in September 2009, as compared with 57.4% 12 months 
earlier). In August 2009 the wage bill was 3.2% higher 
than a year earlier, while average income increased 1.9% 
in the same period.
Inflation, as measured by the consumer price index, 
declined gradually, from 6.4% in October 2008 (near the 
ceiling of the target band) to 4.2%, below the target range, in 
October 2009, while the wholesale price index fell 4.8%. 
In the first 10 months of 2009, the current account 
deficit rose to US$ 14.8 billion (1.26% of GDP), as 
compared with US$ 28.2 billion in the year-earlier period. 
This reflected the combination of a larger trade surplus 
(US$ 22.6 billion) and a smaller deficit on the income 
account (US$ 40.1 billion). Net interest payments fell 
to US$ 7.5 billion, while net remittances of profits and 
dividends declined to US$ 17.9 billion (as compared to 
US$ 29.3 billion for the same period in 2008). 
The capital and financial account posted a surplus of 
US$ 52.2 billion. FDI fell to US$ 19.2 billion (US$ 34.8 billion 
between January and October of 2008), while portfolio 
investment increased to US$ 39.3 billion (US$ 9.6 billion 
between January and October of 2008), reflecting the interest 
of international capital investors in Brazilian assets. 
Between January and September of 2009, goods exports 
slid by 25.9% from the previous year ( down 12.5% in 
volume and 15% in price), reflecting a drop in commodities 
exports (down 15.3%, with a 4.9% rise in volume and an 
18.7% drop in prices), while exports of manufactured and 
semi-manufactured goods slumped by 32% (down 9.4% 
in volume and 6.7% in price) and 30.8% (down 26.8% in 
volume and 23.3% in price), respectively.
Imports of goods tumbled 31% in the same period, 
owing to drops in imports of intermediate goods (32.3%), 
fuels (52.5%), capital goods (14.4%), consumer durables 
(11.4%) and non-durables (4.0%). In volume terms, only 
durable consumer goods showed an increase (1.9%); all 
the other categories registered falls.
In November 2009, international reserves stood at 
US$ 236 billion (equivalent to approximately 22 months 
of import cover), which represents an increase over the 
figure for the end of 2008 (US$ 194 billion). In September 
2009, total external debt stood at US$ 276 billion, of which 
US$ 169 billion was medium-term debt and US$ 32 billion 
was short-term debt. 
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Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on 
the basis of official figures.
Chile
In 2009 Chile had to deal with the fallout from the international financial crisis that began 
in the United States. Thanks to the capacities built up in previous years, the government was 
able to deploy countercyclical policies which helped to counter external turmoil and gradually 
bring about conditions conducive to a resumption of growth in 2010.
As a result of the turbulence in the global economy between 
the fourth quarter of 2008 and the early months of 2009, 
exports dropped precipitously, in both price and volume 
terms. Expectations for growth, employment and income 
deteriorated and private spending in both investment and 
durable consumer goods fell sharply. Thus, beginning 
in the second half of 2008, GDP growth fell off steeply, 
which resulted in a drop in production and inventories 
and increased unemployment in 2009.
In these conditions the government adopted 
countercyclical policies which, from mid-2009 onwards, 
helped to curb losses and, subsequently, fuel a gradual 
upturn in production, exports and employment. 
GDP will have declined by about 1.8% in 2009. Estimates 
for 2010 put growth at 4.5%, owing to continued demand 
for exports and an upturn in domestic demand as a result of 
improved expectations for Chile and the rest of the world. 
Fiscal policy was directed towards achieving a 
structural balance. However, in 2009, owing to the 
countercyclical measures instituted, together with reduced 
tax revenues in the wake of the economic slowdown and 
falling copper prices, government spending increased 
considerably, as did the effective deficit. 
Part of the countercyclical fiscal policy was a fiscal 
spending plan amounting to some US$ 4 billion, or roughly 
2.8% of GDP, that included various subsidies, employment 
programmes and public investment schemes, as well as 
credit for small and medium enterprises (SMEs), for all 
of which the government drew on resources accumulated 
during previous years. For 2010, public expenditure (total 
for the consolidated central government) is projected to 
rise by 4.3%, which represents an easing of expenditure 
growth. Estimates place the effective deficit for 2009 at 
3.6% of GDP, with a figure of 1.1% of GDP for 2010.
Monetary policy continued to be geared towards a 
target inflation rate of 3% per year on average for the 
medium term. As of January 2009, given the break in 
the inflation pattern of the previous year, as well as the 
liquidity needs triggered by the crisis, the central bank 
began to steeply lower monetary policy rates. Thus, as 
of July 2009, the annual rate was 0.5% —a reduction of 
775 basis points from the high of 8.25% of September 
2008. These cuts in the reference rate were accompanied 
by a series of measures designed to boost liquidity. 
Although the central bank indicated that a low 
monetary policy rate would be maintained for some time, 
it began to withdraw quantitative monetary measures 
towards the end of the year, in response to signs of incipient 
recovery and with a view to the inflation target. 
As a result of these measures, lending rates began to 
come down in mid-2009 and credit conditions improved. 
During the second half of the year the pace of lending picked 
up, although total placements remain below 2008 levels.
As of early 2009, with the gradual return to normalcy 
in accessing international financial markets, along 
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with reduced risk perceptions, the previous trend of 
currency appreciation resumed —a pattern that had been 
interrupted, in late 2008, by the sharp exchange rate rises 
that accompanied the onset of the crisis. In response, the 
monetary authority has limited itself thus far to issuing 
statements, but has not ruled out the possibility of taking 
measures at some point. 
In the first three quarters of 2009, domestic demand 
contracted by between 8% and 9% on an annualized basis. 
Private consumption declined, as a result of worsening 
expectations. Gross fixed investment dropped by 19%; 
accordingly, inventory accumulation has slowed since the 
start of the crisis, and this has persisted during the year. 
The strongest impetus came from government spending, 
which grew by 6% to 8%. Exports, which were badly 
hit at first, rallied towards the end of the year but still 
registered a downturn of between 4% and 6% in annualized 
terms. Amid falling domestic demand, imports of goods 
and services contracted by 20%. In the first 9 months 
of the year, GDP fell by an annualized rate of 1.6% 
compared to 2008. Seasonally adjusted figures, however, 
show the contraction of the four previous consecutive 
quarters being interrupted in the third quarter, with an 
annualized growth rate of 1.1%. 
In terms of the sectoral effects, it is estimated 
that, for the year as a whole, the fishing industry 
experienced the most severe contraction, owing to the 
crisis in the salmon industry caused by the outbreak of 
infectious anaemia in fish stocks. The manufacturing 
and construction industries also contracted sharply as 
a result of slacker domestic demand. By contrast, the 
electricity, gas and water sectors showed the greatest 
expansion, after overcoming energy supply constraints 
that had affected their performance. 
There was a steady increase in the unemployment 
rate, reaching a maximum of 10.8% between June and 
August of 2009. Subsequently, owing to a slight increase 
in job creation and a tapering off of growth in the labour 
supply, the unemployment rate fell back to 9.7% between 
August and October. 
Amid low demand and falling international prices for 
some products, the cumulative 12-month inflation rate to 
October was -1.9% and is estimated to come in at between 
0% and -1% for December. Core inflation was also low or 
nil in 2009. In 2010, inflation is expected to turn moderately 
positive again, in line with central bank policy.
Nominal wages reflected the effects of indexation 
mechanisms and the impact of the crisis on the labour 
market. Thus, the general hourly wage index fell from 
an annualized 9% in 2008 to 6% in 2009. Given the drop 
in inflation, real wages, which had contracted slightly 
in 2008, rose 4% on average in 2009. 
In 2009 the balance-of-payments current account, 
which ran a deficit in 2008, showed a surplus equivalent 
to 1.9% of GDP. This reflected a drop in the overall 
value of imports, with volumes contracting in response to 
slackening domestic demand for durable and capital goods 
and fuel prices down on 2008. The value of exports also 
declined, owing to falling prices, but export volumes were 
less affected. In overall terms, the balance-of-payments 
current account showed a surplus equivalent to 2% of 
GDP. International reserves increased for the second 
consecutive year, partly owing to holdings of Special 
Drawing Rights recently allocated to Chile. The capital 
and financial account reflected the continuity in FDI flows, 
the resumption of corporate bond issues abroad, renewed 
foreign lending to Chilean banks and their continued access, 
thanks to Chile’s low country risk rating, to resources in 
the international financial market. 
CHILE: MAIN ECONOMIC INDICATORS
2007 2008 2009 a
Annual percentage growth rates
Gross domestic product 4.7 3.2 -1.8
Per capita gross domestic product 3.6 2.1 -2.8
Consumer prices 7.8 7.1 -1.9 b
Average real wage c 2.8 -0.2 4.8 d
Money (M1) 18.1 6.8 20.1 e
Real effective exchange rate f 1.6 -0.8 7.0 g
Terms of trade 3.4 -13.0 -2.4
Annual average percentages
Urban unemployment rate 7.1 7.8 9.8 d
Central government 
 overall balance/GDP 8.8 5.3 -3.6
Nominal deposit rate 5.9 7.8 2.7 h
Nominal lending rate 13.6 15.2 13.4 i
Millions of dollars
Exports of goods and services 76 618 77 210 60 829
Imports of goods and services 53 957 69 010 48 719
Current account balance 7 189 -3 440 2 908
Capital and financial account balance j -10 403 9 884 1 047
Overall balance
-3 214 6 444 3 955
Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on 
the basis of official figures. 
a Preliminary estimates.
b Twelve-month variation to October 2009.
c General hourly wage index.
d Estimate based on data from January to October.
e Twelve-month variation to November 2009.
f A negative rate indicates an appreciation of the currency in real terms.
g Year-on-year average variation, January to October.
h Average from January to September, annualized.
i Average from January to October, annualized.
j Includes errors and omissions.
Preliminary Overview of the Economies of Latin America and the Caribbean • 2009 83


















































































































Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on 
the basis of official figures.
Colombia
The Colombian economy is expected to grow by close to 0.3% in 2009. The repercussions of 
the international financial crisis on trade and the loss of confidence among economic agents 
were reflected in a contraction in economic activity in the first half-year. In the second half, 
the trade restrictions imposed by the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela hampered the recovery, 
and exports fell heavily throughout the year. Inflation abated in 2009, permitting a relaxation 
of the monetary policy stance, and is not expected to exceed 3.0% by the end of the year. 
In 2010, the inflation rate should come in between 3.0% and 4.0%. The government’s main 
strategy for countering the crisis has been to bring forward expenditure execution, and this has 
contributed to a degree of buoyancy in some sectors. The economy is expected to pick up in 
2010, with growth of around 2.5%, attributable mainly to an upturn in private consumption. 
In the fiscal sphere, the government applied a countercyclical 
policy aimed at reactivating the economy. This strategy rested 
upon four main pillars: prioritizing public infrastructure 
expenditure, guaranteeing external financing, facilitating 
the domestic financing of production and protecting 
employment. With tax revenue falling sharply (close to 
1.1 percentage points of GDP short of the target), the 
central government deficit projection widened to 4.0% of 
GDP and will be financed for the most part by domestic 
borrowing. The target for the consolidated public-sector 
deficit was adjusted from 1.5% of GDP at the beginning 
of the year to 2.6% of GDP. It should be noted that some 
of the measures applied for dealing with the crisis could 
continue to increase pressure on public spending.
In terms of monetary policy, the lower inflationary 
pressure enabled the central bank to relax its stance and 
help to jumpstart the economy. Between November 
2008 and November 2009, the central bank reduced its 
reference rate by 650 basis points, from 10% to 3.5%. 
Monetary policy transmission was rapidly reflected in 
other market rates, which fell sharply, except for the rate 
for consumer lending, which is perceived as higher-risk. 
Lending overall continued to slow, owing mainly to the 
performance of the consumer loan portfolio and, to a 
lesser extent, to that of the mortgage loan portfolio. In the 
first semester, the commercial portfolio took the lead and 
offset the falls in the other two. Towards the third quarter, 
however, the downtrend was resumed. Paradoxically, in the 
second half of the year, non-performing loans, other than 
housing loans, showed a tendency to diminish. Monetary 
aggregates contracted over the course of the year with 
M3 displaying the most stable behaviour. 
Exchange-rate policy has been influenced by the 
high volatility of the exchange rate. In the first quarter, 
the peso tended to devaluate, but this trend was reversed 
in the second and third quarters. Between April and 
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October, the average nominal rate was down by 19.9%, as 
a result of which the real effective exchange rate reflected 
a 10.2% currency appreciation between December 2008 
and October 2009. Amid concern at this development 
and in an effort to generate greater demand for dollars 
to pay for imports and push up the exchange rate, the 
government opted not to monetize dollars received from 
external borrowing and lower to zero the tariff on raw 
materials produced abroad. 
In the first half of 2009, GDP growth slowed by 0.5% 
compared with the same period of 2008. The manufacturing, 
commerce and transport sectors, which had led growth 
in previous years, were hit hardest by the crisis. The 
agricultural sector has also experienced a downturn. 
However, the rally in the prices of some primary goods, 
together with the impetus given to public infrastructure 
works, revitalized the mining and construction sectors, 
which grew by 10.6% and 7.7%, respectively. Financial 
institutions grew by 4.6% during the same period. On 
the demand side, consumption and investment, which for 
several years had been the engines of economic growth 
in Colombia, weakened by 0.3% and 5.5%, respectively. 
In both cases, the sharpest contraction occurred in the 
private component. However, this was offset by the major 
infrastructure projects launched in the country as part of 
the government’s countercyclical strategy. The confidence 
index showed a recovery starting in May, but deteriorated 
once again in September and October. 
Inflationary pressures, which had been a major concern 
for the economic authorities in the two preceding years, 
abated completely in 2009, so that the inflation rate is 
expected to dip below 3.0% by the end of the year, its 
lowest point in almost 50 years. Up to October, year-on-
year inflation stood at 2.7% (2.0% from December 2008 
to October 2009) following a reduction in international 
prices for food and fuels, a slight increase in demand, 
the appreciation in the peso and a downward trend in 
costs. The El Niño phenomenon threatens to spark fresh 
inflationary pressures in the first half of 2010. The Bank 
of the Republic is confident, however, that these pressures 
will be only temporary and has set the inflationary target 
for that year at between 2.0% and 4.0%.
In the labour market, unemployment has risen, although 
less than expected. This is due in part to the government’s 
countercyclical policy for boosting infrastructure works. 
The national unemployment rate increased from 11.3% 
in 2008 to 11.8% in the 12 months from October 2008 to 
September 2009, while urban unemployment rose from 
11.5% to 12.6%. The higher unemployment is due to the fact 
that labour supply is growing faster than the employment 
rate. The increase in supply is attributable to the additional 
worker effect characteristic of crises in Colombia, in which 
other family members seek to join the workforce to make 
up for the income losses. Amid recession, the increase 
in the employment rate occurs mainly in independent 
informal activities. The difficult labour situation has once 
again brought to the fore the structural characteristics of 
this market, including the high costs of parafiscal measures 
and the weakness of institutions. 
Faltering world demand, exchange-rate appreciation 
and the trade restrictions imposed by the Bolivarian 
Republic of Venezuela have significantly depressed the 
external sector. Lower sales of oil and oil derivatives, 
ready-made clothing, metals and manufactures in the 
course of the year resulted in a fall in the value of total 
exports. In terms of destinations, the steepest decline was 
recorded in sales to the United States. The contraction in 
imports in the first nine months of the year was due mainly 
to lower purchases of vehicles and autoparts, appliances 
and electrical recording or video-recording equipment 
and cast iron and steel. Remittances fell significantly in 
2009, while foreign direct investment contracted slightly. 
Flagging investment in the petroleum sector was offset by 
investment flows towards the mining sector. The current 
account deficit is expected to stand at approximately 3.0% 
of GDP, close to the 2008 level.
COLOMBIA: MAIN ECONOMIC INDICATORS
2007 2008 2009 a
Annual percentage growth rates
Gross domestic product 7.5 2.4 0.3
Per capita gross domestic product 6.0 0.9 -1.1
Consumer prices 5.7 7.7 2.7 b
Average real wage c -0.4 -1.9 0.8 d
Money (M1) 11.9 8.2 11.4 e
Real effective exchange rate f -12.4 -3.1 8.5 g
Terms of trade 8.0 11.0 -14.5
Annual average percentages
Urban unemployment rate h 11.4 11.5 13.0 i
National central government
  overall balance/GDP -2.7 -2.3 -3.7
Nominal deposit rate 8.0 9.7 6.3 j
Nominal lending rate 15.4 17.2 13.6 k
Millions of dollars
Exports of goods and services 34 213 42 669 35 187  
Imports of goods and services 37 416 44 744 37 537
Current account balance -5 819 -6 857 -6 247
Capital and financial account balance l 10 490 9 412 7 396
Overall balance 4 672 2 555 1 149
Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the 
basis of official figures. 
a
  Preliminary estimates.
b
  Twelve-month variation to October 2009.
c
  Manufacturing-sector workers.
d
  Estimate based on data from January to September.
e
  Twelve-month variation to September 2009.
f
  A negative rate indicates an appreciation of the currency in real terms.
g
  Year-on-year average variation, January to October.
h
  Includes hidden unemployment.
i
  Estimate based on data from January to October.
j
  Average from January to November, annualized.
k
  Average from January to October, annualized.
l
  Includes errors and omissions.
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Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on 
the basis of official figures.
Ecuador
According to projections, GDP in Ecuador will contract by 0.4% in 2009 —mainly as a result 
of lower petroleum prices— in contrast with 6.5% growth in 2008. Despite signs of economic 
recovery in the second half of the year, the fiscal accounts showed a deficit, the balance-of-
payments current account balance deteriorated and unemployment rose in 2009. ECLAC 
expects moderate growth —of close to 3%— in 2010, provided oil prices remain stable and 
sufficient financing is provided for public-investment projects. 
The overall deficit of the non-financial public sector 
(NFPS) is expected to be about 3.8% by the end of 2009, 
up from 1.5% in 2008. Although non-petroleum revenue 
rose in 2009 on the back of higher tax receipts, petroleum 
revenue has dropped significantly, mainly because of falling 
prices. Despite significantly lower interest payments, 
NFPS current expenditures remained nearly unchanged 
from 2008. Spurred by gross fixed capital formation by the 
central government and non-financial public enterprises, 
capital expenditures rose a nominal 9.8%, year-on-year, 
in the first half of 2009. These expenditures have grown 
more slowly in the second half of the year, however, so 
will end 2009 with only a small positive nominal variation 
with respect to 2008. 
 A tax reform bill that was sent to the National Assembly 
in August 2009 proposed to charge value-added tax (VAT) 
on services imports, modify the formula for calculating the 
special consumption tax (ICE), impose a minimum corporate 
income tax rate, tax dividends, raise the foreign exchange 
outflow tax and introduce tax benefits for the tourism sector. 
These changes are currently under consideration. 
 Following the buyback of 91% of outstanding 2012 and 
2030 Global Bonds at 35% of their par value, the external 
public debt decreased from 18.5% of GDP in 2008 to 13.4% 
in 2009. The outstanding balance on domestic public debt 
should stand at close to 5.0% of GDP by the end of 2009 
—slightly lower than the average balance in 2008. 
 After the food price shock in 2008, inflation trended 
downward until September 2009, when it stood at an annual 
rate of 3.3%. Since then, it has gradually increased and 
projections indicate that it will end 2009 at a year-on-year 
rate of 4.0%. Ecuador started the year with a real effective 
appreciation, mainly because most of the country’s trading 
partners experienced currency devaluation against the United 
States dollar. This trend was reversed in the second quarter 
of the year, however, with a period of real depreciation 
during the remainder of 2009. 
 After repeatedly lowering the ceiling for interest rates in 
2008, the government froze these limits in 2009. Consequently, 
interest rates remained nearly unchanged during the year (at 
about 9.2% for the corporate productive sector and 11.2% 
for small and medium-sized enterprises). Nevertheless, 
the ceiling on interest rates for consumer credit was raised 
slightly to discourage imports. The average deposit rate is 
projected to be 5.4% in 2009, slightly positive in real terms. 
Although total assets held by open private banks remained 
steady in 2009, the proportion of assets held abroad decreased 
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slightly over the year owing to pressure from the government 
to repatriate capital held abroad. Non-performing loans as 
a share of the private sector’s total outstanding portfolio 
inched up steadily in 2009. 
 Freely available international reserves plummeted from 
US$ 6.477 billion in September 2008 to US$ 2.594 billion 
in May 2009, as a result of higher spending, lower 
petroleum revenue and the buyback of bonds. Nevertheless, 
a US$ 480 million loan from the Latin American Reserve 
Fund, the receipt of a US$ 1 billion early payment on 
a petroleum sale to PetroChina, a one-time allocation 
of US$ 400 million in Special Drawing Rights by the 
International Monetary Fund, higher petroleum prices 
and other factors helped reverse this trend, and the 
amount of freely available international reserves rose to 
US$ 4.605 billion in October.
 Private consumption contracted in 2009, while private 
investment fell sharply. Whereas activity in manufacturing 
and commerce declined in 2009, continued activity in the 
construction sector and the public administration prevented 
a greater slide in aggregate demand. In the petroleum 
sector, the aggregate value of petroleum continued to 
drop as a proportion of output in the Ecuadorian economy 
in 2009. Crude oil production is expected to be 3.6% 
lower in 2009 than in 2008, as the 6.7% boost in output 
by the State-owned company, PETROECUADOR, was 
insufficient to offset a fall of the approximately 15% in 
private-sector production. Changes in the distribution of 
petroleum revenue, which have discouraged private-sector 
production, and uncertainty over concession contracts 
have limited private investment in the sector. 
 In October 2009, the government unveiled a stimulus 
plan to counter the impact of the international financial 
crisis, with US$ 2.555 billion to be used to finance 
housing, municipal works, microlending and infrastructure 
investment. The plan, which will continue into 2010, is 
being financed with the central bank’s operating profits and 
the repatriation of international reserves held abroad. 
 Nationwide urban employment rose gradually from 
mid-2008, reaching 9.1% in September 2009, and will 
likely climb even higher by year end. The underemployment 
rate was also high, and stood at 51.7% in September 2009. 
The real minimum wage is projected to be 3.7% higher 
in 2009 than in 2008. 
 In the external sector, the value of goods exports fell 
by 31% in 2009, with respect to 2008. The 46% decline 
in the value of petroleum exports is the main reason for 
this decline, and is, in turn, explained by the drop in both 
volume (7%) and, especially, price (42%). The value of 
non-petroleum exports also declined, albeit less sharply 
(5%). If not for the strong performance of banana, cocoa 
and fish exports, the overall drop would have been even 
steeper. In January 2009, temporary import restrictions 
were introduced, as a safeguard to prevent a deterioration 
of the current account, given that Ecuador cannot use 
foreign-exchange policy to control the current-account 
deficit. Import restrictions, along with slumping domestic 
demand, led to a 20% year-on-year decrease in the 
value of total imports in 2009. Imports of petroleum and 
intermediate and consumer goods contracted sharply, while 
those of capital goods, generally exempt from protection 
measures, fell less sharply. The country’s terms of trade 
are expected to have deteriorated by 16% by the end of 
2009. Consequently, a trade deficit equivalent to 2.1% 
of GDP is expected —the first deficit in seven years. 
 Unemployment in the United States and Spain, the 
main destinations for Ecuadorian emigrants, caused 
remittances to shrink by some 12% in 2009. Although 
remittance levels should begin to rise and the debit on 
the income account will be lower, this reversal will be 
insufficient to offset the trade deficit; hence, the current 
account will also run a deficit (of 2.8%) in 2009. 
 FDI, which had already fallen to very low levels in 
2008 (1.8% of GDP), is projected to decrease further in 
2009. FDI flows into the agriculture and fishing sectors 
should rise, while those going to other sectors —in 
particular, transport and communication, mining and 
business services— are likely to decline.
ECUADOR: MAIN ECONOMIC INDICATORS 
2007 2008 2009 a
 Annual percentage growth rates
Gross domestic product 2.5 6.5 -0.4
Per capita gross domestic product 1.4 5.4 -1.4
Consumer prices 3.3 8.8 3.5 b
Real minimun wage 3.9 8.5 3.7 
Money (M1) 19.4 c 27.6 0.6 d
Real effective exchange rate e 4.2 0.9 -7.5 f
Terms of trade 2.8 9.7 -16.1
Annual average percentages
Unemployment rate g 7.4 6.9 8.6 h
Central government
  overall balance/GDP 2.1 -1.5 -3.8
Nominal deposit rate 5.3 5.5 5.4  i
Nominal lending rate 10.1 9.8 9.2 i
Millions of dollars
Exports of goods and services 16 070 20 460 14 585 
Imports of goods and services 15 619 20 730 17 395
Current account balance 1 650 1 120 -1 603
Capital and financial account balance j -264 -172 1 725
Overall balance 1 387 948 122
Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the 




 Twelve-month variation to October 2009.
c
  Eleven-month variation to December 2007.
d
 Twelve-month variation to September 2009.
e
 A negative rate indicates an appreciation of the currency in real terms.
f
 Year-on-year average variation, January to October.
g
 Includes hidden unemployment.
h
 Estimate based on data from January to September.
i
 Average from January to October, annualized.
j
 Includes errors and omissions.













































































PARAGUAY: GDP AND INFLATION
Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on 
the basis of official figures.
Paraguay
The GDP of Paraguay is estimated to have fallen by 3.5% in 2009 as the country experienced 
one of the sharpest economic slowdowns in Latin America. This contraction was mainly 
the result of the severe drought that caused major losses in agriculture, the country’s most 
important economic sector. In response to this situation and in order to mitigate the effects of 
the international financial crisis, the government increased public spending over the course of 
the year, and the country is consequently expected to record a small fiscal deficit of between 
0.7% and 1.2% of GDP. Inflation was lower than in 2008, and, up to November 2009, the 
12-month variation in the consumer price index (CPI) was 2.0%. However, with prices for 
agricultural products rising, the CPI is expected to be slightly higher by year-end. In the 
external sector, the trade deficit is projected to narrow, and the current account deficit should 
therefore also diminish. A recovery has been forecast for both the agricultural and the external 
sectors in 2010, and the economy is expected to grow again at around 3.0%.
For the first time since 2003, the fiscal balance will be 
negative in 2009, posting an estimated deficit of between 
0.7% and 1.2% of GDP. In order to tackle the international 
financial crisis and the drought, the government adopted 
an expansionary fiscal policy with investments in road 
infrastructure works and other labour-intensive projects. 
Despite the unfavourable economic situation, total tax 
receipts up to October showed a 6.9% increase over the 
figure for the same period in 2008. This increase was due 
mainly to the government’s effort to boost non-tax revenues 
(which rose by 20.3%) in view of the negative expectations 
regarding income from taxes on goods and services and 
foreign trade in particular, which in fact declined by 3.7% 
and 10.4%, respectively. From January to October 2009, 
total compulsory expenditure rose by 24% as a result of 
the higher budget execution. Capital expenditure, which 
accounts for 20% of total expenditure, soared by 65.2%, 
with investment in physical infrastructure expanding by 
71.9%. Public treasury bond auctions were held in May 
and October 2009, and bids were accepted for 185 billion 
guaraníes and 389 billion guaraníes, respectively. In addition, 
the government managed to secure US$ 300 million in 
financing from multilateral organizations for its economic 
recovery programme. In October, the external public 
debt had risen by 6.0% to stand at US$ 2.256 billion or 
15.3% of GDP. 
 With inflation expected to trend downwards, the 
central bank lowered the interest rates on monetary 
regulation instruments in 2009 to encourage their net 
redemption. The amount of outstanding instruments 
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PARAGUAY: MAIN ECONOMIC INDICATORS 
2007 2008 2009 a
Annual percentage growth rates
Gross domestic product 6.8 5.8 -3.5
Per capita gross domestic product 4.8 3.9 -5.2
Consumer prices 6.0 7.5 2.8 b
Average real wage 2.4 -0.7 4.3 c
Money (M1) 46.1 7.5 7.5 d
Real effective exchange rate e -10.4 -12.3 9.9 f
Terms of trade 4.8 7.3 -4.4
Annual average percentages
Urban unemployment rate 7.2 7.4 ...
Central administration 
  overall balance/GDP 1.0 2.6 -0.7
Nominal deposit rate 5.9 6.2 3.3 g
Nominal lending rate 14.6 14.6 16.2 g
Millions of dollars
Exports of goods and services 6 542 8 893 6 473  
Imports of goods and services 6 554 9 543 6 853
Current account balance 200 -471 -205
Capital and financial account balance h 523 850 1,035
Overall balance 723 379 830
Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the 




 Twelve-month variation to October 2009.
c
 Figure for June.
d
 Twelve-month variation to September 2009.
e
 A negative rate indicates an appreciation of the currency in real terms.
f
 Year-on-year average variation, January to October.
g
 Average from January to September, annualized.
h
 Includes errors and omissions.
in the market thus diminished by 35.5% year-on-year, 
while the weighted average of their yield up to October 
2009 was 2.1%, down from 6.1% in the same period of 
2008. This process was interrupted, however, in August 
and September in response to a spike in inflation. The 
central bank also applied other measures to inject liquidity 
into the economy and counteract the negative impacts 
of the international financial crisis; it reduced national- 
and foreign-currency legal reserve requirements, and in 
March it established a line of credit to provide liquidity 
to local financial institutions. The guaraní continued to 
lose value against the United States dollar, largely as a 
result of the poor performance of the external sector and 
the overall positive movement in the dollar since the start 
of the crisis. By October, the average nominal exchange 
rate had fallen by 16.2%. However, the guaraní proved to 
be more stable in relation to the Argentine peso and the 
Brazilian real, appreciating by 1.6% against the former and 
depreciating by only 1.8% against the latter. As a result, 
the real effective exchange rate reflected a depreciation 
of 9.9%. The volume of central-bank intervention in 
the exchange-rate market was significant in 2008, but 
diminished in 2009. By October 2009, such transactions 
amounted to a net purchase of US$ 101.6 million. Net 
international reserves meanwhile totalled US$ 3.594 billion 
in October, or 24.4% of GDP, compared with 16.2% of 
GDP for 2008, strengthening the country’s position to 
withstand possible external financial upsets. 
 Following six years of continuous growth, GDP is 
expected to contract by 3.5% in 2009. Per capita GDP 
fell by 5.2% in comparison with 2008, when it increased 
to a record US$ 1,556. In the second quarter of 2009, 
agriculture —the mainstay of the Paraguayan economy— 
recorded the sharpest decline (21.8% year-on-year). This 
was due in part to weaker external demand, but mostly to 
the severe drought that ravaged the country. According to 
estimates of the Ministry of Agriculture and Livestock, 
cotton production slumped by 61%, soya by 39% and 
sesame by 23%. Excluding the agricultural sector, the 
decline in GDP would be barely 0.1%. Other sectors 
which have also sustained losses were manufacturing 
and mining (down 7.8%) and construction (down 6.4%). 
The electricity and water sector and the services sector 
were the most resilient, recording growth of 4.9% and 
2.7%, respectively. In terms of expenditure, much of the 
fall in GDP was attributable to the decline in domestic 
demand. Gross fixed capital formation shrank by 17.0%, 
but was partly offset by the 8.5% growth in government 
consumption. The year-on-year variation in the consumer 
price index in November was 2.0%, well below the rate 
of 8.8% recorded in the previous year. Core inflation, an 
indicator which excludes the most volatile products in the 
basket (fruits and vegetables), showed a 0.1% variation 
year-on-year, while core inflation X1, which excludes 
regulated services and fuels as well as fruits and vegetables, 
rose by 0.9%. Fruit and vegetable prices started to shoot 
up in May 2009 and by October had soared by 39.6%, 
as a result of the drought and the losses sustained by the 
agricultural sector. 
 The external sector performed poorly in 2009. The 
volume of agricultural exports shrank as a result of the 
drought. Export values also decreased owing to the fall 
in commodity prices in 2008. By September 2009, the 
terms of trade had worsened by 19.4% year-on-year. 
External demand contracted, since demand was down 
also in Paraguay’s main trading partners (MERCOSUR 
countries). Up to October, earnings from merchandise 
exports declined by 29.9% compared with the same 
period in 2009. This was counterbalanced, however, by 
a 29.7% drop in imports, and the trade deficit therefore 
narrowed by 29.5%. The international financial crisis also 
had an impact on remittances. Foreign exchange inflows 
under this heading increased by just 0.4% (in cumulative 
terms up to September), compared with a 6.6% rise from 
January to September 2008. A small current account 
deficit of close to 1.4% of GDP is predicted for the end 
of the year, compared with 2.8% in 2008. 
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PERU: GDP, INFLATION AND UNEMPLOYMENT
Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on 
the basis of official figures.
Peru
In 2009, Peru experienced a sharp slowdown in economic activity in the wake of the international 
financial crisis. GDP growth fell from 9.8% in 2008 to 0.8% in 2009, owing mainly to a 
steep drop in external demand, which in turn led to a decline in industrial production, heavy 
inventory adjustments and significantly less private investment because of lower demand and 
uncertainty of the outcome of the international economic crisis that held sway in late 2008 
and throughout 2009. 
Economic activity began to recover in the third quarter 
of 2009, bolstered by the completion of inventory 
adjustments, the implementation of a fiscal stimulus 
package, expansionary monetary policy and the improving 
expectations of economic agents. This economic recovery 
is expected to continue into 2010, with GDP growth 
projected to be between 4.5% and 5%.
As a result of the abrupt slowdown in GDP at the end 
of 2008, the government announced a major economic 
stimulus package, with some measures aimed at expanding 
and accelerating public investment and others targeting 
specific sectors. However, execution of public investment 
has fallen short of expectations. Through October 2009, 
only about half of the public investments that were 
budgeted had been executed. 
As for the central government’s fiscal receipts, for 
the period January-September 2009, current revenues 
decreased by 17.7% compared with the same period in 
2008, because of a downturn in takings from both income 
tax and non-tax sources. Non-financial expenditures rose 
by 6.2% reflecting an increase in capital expenditures 
(70%). For the year as a whole, economic authorities 
estimate the general government’s deficit to be about 
2.4%, with a non-financial public sector (NFPS) deficit 
of the same proportion.
To cover financing needs for 2009 and 2010, the 
government issued two global bonds; the first, in March 2009 
for US$1 billion with a 10-year maturity, and the second, 
in July, for US$1 billion with a 16-year maturity. 
In response to the international financial crisis, the 
authorities took steps to ensure liquidity in the local 
financial system, both in national currency and in dollars, 
in order to stabilize both the money and currency markets. 
Next, they began to lower the benchmark interest rate; 
between January and August 2009 the rate came down 
from 6.5% to 1.25%, and has since remained unchanged. 
Consequently, the average local-currency lending rate 
decreased from 17.2% in December 2008 to 15.1% in 
October 2009. The average foreign-currency lending rate 
decreased from 10.1% to 8.9% over the same period.
However, despite the economic situation, lending 
by the financial system to the private sector continued to 
grow slowly throughout 2009. Between December 2008 
and October 2009, lending in national currency expanded 
by around 21%, with an increase in mortgage lending in 
new soles. Lending in dollars remained, through October 
2009, at levels similar to those of December 2008. As a 
result, total lending rose by 6.6% for the period (11.6% 
with respect to October 2008). With local-currency lending 
rising faster than foreign-currency lending, the dollarization 
ratio dropped from 52% in December 2008 to 46% in 
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October 2009. The percentage of non-performing loans 
rose from 1.3% to 1.6% between December 2008 and 
October 2009, with the greatest increase in the portfolio 
of loans to micro-enterprises.
Between December 2008 and October 2009, the new 
sol appreciated in nominal terms by 7.8% against the 
dollar, whereas the real bilateral exchange appreciated 
less (5.3%). The real effective exchange rate depreciated 
by 0.5% over the same period. 
As for trade policy, in February 2009 the free trade 
agreement with the United States entered into force, 
as did the economic complementarity agreement with 
Chile in March. A free trade agreement was also signed 
with China. 
During the first three quarters of 2009, GDP grew by 
0.1% compared with the year-earlier period. This result 
reflected the contractions in non-primary manufacturing 
(-9.1%), fishing (-7%) and commerce (-1.2%). The 
construction sector, by contrast, was the fastest-growing, 
with 3% growth for the period. 
By type of expenditure —and compared with the result 
for 2008, when domestic demand surged by 12.3%— domestic 
demand shrank by 3.9% in January-September 2009 because 
of a drop in gross fixed investment (-9.9%). This was due, to 
slacker private investment (-14.9%), despite a rise in public 
investment (21.6%). Aggressive inventory adjustments led 
to a 22.2% slump in gross domestic investment. Private 
consumption continued to edge up (2.4%), but did not rise 
fast enough to offset declining investments. Goods and 
services export volumes dipped by 3.1%, whereas goods 
and services import volumes slid by 20.3%.
Throughout 2009, the inflation rate, as measured by 
the Lima consumer price index, declined significantly, 
reaching a cumulative 0.04% for the first 10 months of 
the year (0.7% over 12 months), owing to the drop in 
international fuel and food prices, which lowered the 
prices of transport, domestic fuels and electricity. 
As for labour indicators, the average unemployment 
rate for the first 10 months of 2009 was 8.4%, similar to 
that of 2008. Urban employment in companies with more 
than 10 employees rose by 1.9% for the period January-
August 2009, as compared with the same period in 2008. 
The average employment rate for the first 10 months of 
2009 was 62.3%, and average job-related income was 
up on the fourth quarter of 2008. Throughout 2009, the 
situation gradually improved as compared with the first 
quarter. To invigorate household demand, in 2009 workers 
in the formal economy were temporarily allowed to use 
time-in-service compensation funds and withholdings 
for twice-yearly bonuses paid to formal wage earners 
were waived. 
Exports of goods slumped by 25.9% during the first 
three quarters of 2009 (-22.6% in prices and -4.3% in 
volume), and goods imports declined by 30.8% (-10.3% in 
prices and -22.9% in volume) in the same period, leading 
to a trade surplus of US$ 3.58 billion. In the first three 
quarters of 2009, the average terms of trade fell by 9.5% 
compared with the average for 2008. Net international 
reserves stood at US$ 32.92 billion in October 2009, 
compared with US$ 31.196 billion in December 2008.
PERU: MAIN ECONOMIC INDICATORS 
2007 2008 2009 a
Annual percentage growth rates
Gross domestic product 8.9 9.8 0.8
Per capita gross domestic product 7.6 8.5 -0.3
Consumer prices 3.9 6.6 0.7 b
Average real wage -1.8 2.2 0.3 c
Money (M1) 30.7 16.5 10.0 b
Real effective exchange rate d 0.2 -3.7 -2.3 e
Terms of trade 3.6 -13.3 -10.8
Annual average percentages
Urban unemployment rate 8.4 8.4 8.3 f
Central government
  overall balance/GDP 1.8 2.2 -1.4
Nominal deposit rate 3.5 3.3 3.0 g
Nominal lending rate 16.5 16.7 16.3 g
Millions of dollars
Exports of goods and services 31 041 35 166 28 353
Imports of goods and services 23 942 34 005 25 480
Current account balance 1 220 -4 180 -1 224
Capital and financial account balance h 8 368 7 292 3 676
Overall balance 9 588 3 112 2 452
Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on 




 Twelve-month variation to October 2009.
c
 Figure for June.
d
 A negative rate indicates an appreciation of the currency in real terms.
e
 Year-on-year average variation, January to October.
f
 Estimate based on data from January to October.
g
 Average from January to October, annualized.
h
 Includes errors and omissions.
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PLURINATIONAL STATE OF BOLIVIA: GDP AND INFLATION
Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on 
the basis of official figures.
Plurinational State of Bolivia
The GDP of the Plurinational State of Bolivia will expand by 3.5% in 2009, which means the 
growth rate will be 3.2 percentage points lower than in 2008. The urban unemployment rate 
meanwhile will be 6.8%, 0.1 percentage points higher than in 2008, and inflation will end the 
year at about 1%, 11 percentage points below the rate recorded in 2008. Both the balance-of-
payments current account and the non-financial public sector accounts will close with surpluses, 
albeit leaner ones than in 2008, mainly thanks to the drop in average hydrocarbon prices during 
the year. In 2009, the political landscape was dominated by two electoral events: the January 
2009 referendum approving the nation’s new political constitution; and the presidential and 
parliamentary elections in December 2009. The new congress is set to debate modifications to 
a number of laws with a view to adapting legislation to the new constitutional framework. 
In keeping with lower inflationary expectations, in the 
fourth quarter of 2008, the central bank switched policy 
from issuing bonds in open market operations to redeeming 
bonds. As a result, between October 2008 and October 
2009 the central bank reduced its balance of outstanding 
government securities by US$ 621.8 million (27.9%). 
To further expand liquidity, the central bank lowered its 
repo rate by 10 percentage points from 13% in December 
2008 to 3% in October 2009. This liquidity growth was 
consistent with expansions in total net domestic credit 
and net domestic credit to the non-financial public sector 
and with a moderate reduction in net foreign reserves. 
During the first half of the year these goals were met with 
ease, especially as regards net internal credit to the non-
financial public sector whose reduction came as a result 
of the accumulation of deposits the sector holds with the 
central bank. The bank also lowered its benchmark rates, 
which translated into significantly lower bank lending and 
deposit rates. From December 2008 to September 2009, 
bank lending rates dropped from 10.1% to 7.6% and bank 
deposit rates, from 3.2% to 0.5%. Additionally, in order to 
stimulate growth in the local currency portfolio, the central 
bank approved two changes to the reserve requirement. 
In January, the additional reserve requirement for foreign 
currency deposits was raised from 7.5% to 30%, and in 
August the reserve requirement for deposits in local currency 
was lowered, reflecting the growth in these deposits. 
 According to available official information, the non-
financial public sector had a surplus of approximately 
2.8% of GDP in August 2009. In comparison with August 
2008, real expenditures were up by 3.5% and revenues 
were down by 5.3%, mainly because of weaker inflows 
of customs duties and internal revenue (down by 26.6% 
and 16.6%, respectively) and because of the 9.5% drop in 
revenue from the special hydrocarbons tax. The fall-off in 
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customs revenue was mostly tied to the slump in imports, 
and the decline in hydrocarbon tax revenues reflected the 
sluggishness in that sector. As regards fiscal spending in 
2009, in light of the redefined role of the State, the public 
sector announced a major investment programme valued 
at US$ 1.852 billion, a small percentage of which was in 
execution by September. In the area of social spending, a 
new benefit called the “Juana Azurduy” grant was instituted, 
and coverage of the “Juancito Pinto” grant was extended to 
include students through the eighth grade. The non-financial 
public sector is expected to close 2009 with a slight surplus, 
showing a positive balance for public enterprises and a 
negative balance for the national treasury. The national 
treasury stepped up its local-currency bond issues by 39.3% 
between October 2008 and October 2009, in an amount 
equivalent to 49.3% of the cut-back in the central bank’s 
open market operations. The financial system has been 
the main buyer of these bonds. The move was the result 
of a policy decision to improve debt quality, given the low 
interest rates, and to offer longer maturities; the action also 
stemmed from the national treasury’s need to compensate 
for shrinking revenue. As a result, domestic public debt of 
the non-financial public sector increased by 11.4%, while 
external public debt expanded by 11%, which in turn swelled 
multilateral debt by 9.8% and bilateral debt by 14.5%.
 In the first half of 2009, the GDP of the Plurinational 
State of Bolivia posted year-on-year growth of 3.2%. The 
sector that grew the most was metallic and non-metallic 
minerals, at 14.4%, which mainly had to do with the San 
Cristóbal mine having operated above capacity for part 
of the first semester. Although this sector registered the 
highest growth, its level of activity was actually down in 
comparison with the same period in 2008, when it grew 
63%. The crude oil and natural gas sector contracted by 
13.1% because of Brazil’s lower demand for gas. On the 
demand side, GDP growth was driven by gross fixed capital 
formation and final consumption by public administration, 
which were up 4.5% and 4.4% and accounted for 0.72 and 
0.45 percentage points of GDP growth, respectively. 
ECLAC estimates that the economy of the Plurinational 
State of Bolivia will grow by about 3.5% in 2009.
 Cumulative inflation was at 0.2% through October 
2009, or 0.8% in year-on-year terms. These were some 
of the lowest rates in Latin America and were 11 and 
13 percentage points lower, respectively, than the rates 
recorded for the same periods in 2008. This was the 
result of the drop in food prices brought about by the 
fall in international commodity prices and the increase 
in domestic supply generated by favourable weather. 
 In the first half of 2009, the economy of the 
Plurinational State of Bolivia had a surplus of about 
US$ 388.3 million in its current account, which was 
63.3% less than the US$ 670 million posted in the same 
period in 2008. Exports were down by US$ 853 million 
(27.3%) because of the decline in hydrocarbon prices in 
international markets and because of Brazil’s lower demand 
for gas. Remittances by workers fell by 7.4% and were 
US$ 39.4 million lower than in the first half of 2008. Real 
exchange rates through October 2009 depreciated by 12.6% 
in year-on-year terms. The capital and financial account 
posted a deficit of US$ 170.2 million which, including 
errors and omissions, reached US$ 255.7 million. This 
balance was largely the result of the US$ 255.1 million 
negative balance on portfolio investment accounts. On 
the other hand, during the first half of 2009, the net 
international reserves held by the central bank increased 
by US$ 233.6 million (3%), and by October 2009 they 
had reached US$ 859 million, in other words, grown by 
11.4%, which represented an increase of US$ 1.062 billion 
(14.1%) in year-on-year terms.
PLURINATIONAL STATE OF BOLIVIA:  
MAIN ECONOMIC INDICATORS 
2007 2008 2009 a
Annual percentage growth rates
Gross domestic product 4.6 6.1 3.5
Per capita gross domestic product 2.7 4.3 1.7
Consumer prices 11.7 11.8 0.8 b
Average real wage -1.3 -1.5 8.2
Money (M1) 58.1 23.2 10.5 b
Real effective exchange rate c -1.1 -10.2 -12.6 d
Terms of trade 1.6 1.3 -2.2
Annual average percentages
Urban unemployment rate 7.7 6.7 6.8
General government
  overall balance/GDP 2.3 -0.0 -3.2
Nominal deposit rate e 2.4 3.6 1.7 f
Nominal lending rate e 8.2 8.9 8.6 f
Millions of dollars
Exports of goods and services 4 958 6 947 5 504
Imports of goods and services 4 143 5 680 5 064
Current account balance 1 591 2 015 1 063
Capital and financial account balance g 361 359 -332
Overall balance 1 952 2 374 731
Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the 




 Twelve-month variation to October 2009.
c
 A negative rate indicates an appreciation of the currency in real terms.
d
 Year-on-year average variation, January to October.
e
 Annual average of monthly rates in dollars.
f
 Average from January to October, annualized.
g
 Includes errors and omissions.


















































































































URUGUAY: GDP, INFLATION AND UNEMPLOYMENT
Uruguay
Uruguay’s economy is estimated to have grown by approximately 1% in 2009, primarily due 
to an increase in private consumption, government consumption and public investment. Private 
investment, however, declined sharply. Annual inflation is estimated to reach 6% at the end 
of the year. Meanwhile, growth of 4.5% is being projected for 2010.
 
The non-financial public sector is expected to end the year 
with a deficit of 2.6% of GDP. For the rolling year ending 
September 2009, the sector posted a primary surplus of 
0.4% of GDP, which, combined with debt interest payments 
(2.6% of GDP), resulted in a fiscal deficit of 2.2% of GDP. 
For that period, real income from the non-financial public 
sector rose 8%, on account of an increase of 17% in earnings 
from the Banco de Previsión Social (the bank dealing with 
social security funds), a rise of 3.3% in central government 
revenues and a 75% increase in earnings transfers to the 
treasury from public enterprises. 
During the same period, primary outlays from the 
non-financial public sector grew by 13.7% in real terms, 
owing to an increase of 9.5% in current expenditures 
and of 49% in public investment. In terms of current 
expenditures, September saw a rise of 12.8% in transfers, 
while pensions grew 7.9% and wages increased 12.3%. 
The gross-debt-to-GDP ratio of the non-financial public 
sector as of mid-2009 was about 52%. 
Country risk averaged approximately 253 basis 
points in October, representing a significant drop from 
the average of 608 registered the previous year, and the 
341 basis points recorded in June 2009. 
Monetary policy remained focused on ensuring 
price stability. The Central Bank of Uruguay decided to 
maintain this contractionary policy. Thus, in March 2009 
the Bank set the monetary policy rate at 8%, after having 
kept it at about 10% since the end of 2008. This decision 
was based on the fact that although inflation had hovered 
between 3% and 7%, it was trending downward within 
a national and international context considered by the 
authorities to pose inflationary risks. 
Towards the end of the second quarter, gross credit 
in domestic currency increased by 24% in nominal terms 
(16.3% in real terms) for the rolling year, while gross credit 
in foreign currency fluctuated within an annual range of 
4.2%. After a decline in loans to the private sector in the 
first quarter of the year, there was a resurgence of loan 
activity in the second quarter. Despite the international 
crisis, default rates have remained at historically low 
levels (about 1%), with a gradual decrease in defaults in 
the business sector and a gradual rise in defaults on loans 
denominated in domestic currency made to households. 
In June 2009 the default rate was about 2.7%. 
In that same month, deposits in foreign currency 
increased by 21.9%, while those in domestic currency grew 
by 8.2%. The average interest rate on fixed-term deposits 
in dollars (the deposit interest rate) fell 55 basis points 
compared to the same month one year earlier, settling at 
0.56%. The lending rate in United States dollars for loans 
to the non-financial sector was 6.04%.
The nominal exchange rate continued to float. After 
depreciating steeply in the second half of 2008 —a period 
during which the international financial crisis worsened— 
the local currency remained stable in relation to the dollar 
for the first half of 2009, and the subsequently sharp 
appreciation failed to entirely reverse the earlier decline. 
By the end of the year, the Uruguayan peso is expected to 
have appreciated by about 11% with respect to the dollar. 
Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on 
the basis of official figures.
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The real effective exchange rate, in turn, fell by 5.6% in 
the 12 months up to October.
In sectoral terms, the GDP growth seen in the first half of 
2009 (1.5% compared to the same period in 2008) was led by 
the transportation, communications, services and construction 
sectors, while the industrial sector, primary activities and 
the sector supplying electricity, gas and water contracted. 
With respect to demand, the first half of the year saw an 
increase in government final consumption (5.5%), private 
consumption (0.7%) and exports (1.4%), and a reduction in 
gross capital formation (-28.3%, due primarily to adjustments 
in inventories) and in imports (-15.5%). Gross fixed capital 
formation declined by 4.6% for the period in question as the 
result of a drop in private investment, which was offset only 
partly by the increase in public investment. 
With inflation at 6.5% for the 12 months ending in 
October, the year is expected to close with an increase in 
consumer prices that is within the range set by the central 
bank. The fall in the international price of commodities, 
attributable to the effects of the crisis, and the drop in the 
nominal exchange rate in the second half of the year helped 
stem the rise in domestic prices. The domestic producer 
price index (used to estimate wholesale inflation) rose 
by 8.6% in the first 10 months of 2009. 
The employment rate continued to climb, though with 
fluctuations, throughout the year owing to the uncertainty 
caused by the international financial crisis. It reached 
a national level of 58.3% in the first 9 months of 2009 
—1.1 percentage points higher than that recorded in the 
same period of 2008. The activity rate increased one point, 
to 63.1%. Correspondingly, unemployment declined by 
0.3 percentage points in the same period, to an average of 
7.6%. The average wage index rose by 7.7% in real terms, 
on average, between January and September, compared 
to the same period one year earlier, with similar increases 
in the private and public sectors. In January-October, 
the national minimum wage was raised by 12% in real 
terms compared to one year earlier, to the equivalent of 
US$ 210 per month. 
The sharp drop in imports of goods and services, 
together with the moderate increase in exports, produced a 
net positive trade balance in value terms in the first semester 
that persisted during the remainder of the year. Exports 
of goods rose in volume terms, driven by the increase in 
sales of agricultural and agribusiness products. Exports 
of services declined owing to the impact of the crisis 
on external demand and despite the fact that there was 
an increase in the export of tourist services to countries 
within the region.
The trade account surplus resulted in the balance on 
the current account being 0.1% of GDP in the first half 
of the year. This balance, however, is expected to turn 
negative (-0.5% of GDP) by the end of the year. Thus, 
during the first semester, the financial account had net 
revenues of US$ 397 million. As a result of the balance-
of-payments surplus, reserve assets in the period up to 
October exceeded US$ 8 billion —US$ 2 billion more 
than the previous year.
URUGUAY: MAIN ECONOMIC INDICATORS 
2007 2008 2009 a
Annual percentage growth rates
Gross domestic product 7.6 8.9 1.2
Per capita gross domestic product 7.3 8.6 0.9
Consumer prices 8.5 9.2 6.5 b
Average real wage 4.7 3.6 7.3 c
Money (M1) 31.8 17.3 7.8 d
Real effective exchange rate e -1.0 -8.7 -0.2 f
Terms of trade 0.2 6.0 7.1
Annual average percentages
Urban unemployment rate 9.6 7.9 7.7 c
Central government
  overall balance/GDP -1.6 -1.0 -2.1
Nominal deposit rate 2.3 3.2 4.1 g
Nominal lending rate 10.0 13.1 16.9 g
Millions of dollars
Exports of goods and services 6 850 9 258 8 385
Imports of goods and services 6 722 10 069 8 171
Current account balance - 80 -1 119 - 152
Capital and financial account balance h 1 091 3 352 1 755
Overall balance 1 010 2 233 1 603
Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the 




 Twelve-month variation to October 2009.
c
 Estimate based on data from January to October.
d
 Twelve-month variation to August 2009.
e
 A negative rate indicates an appreciation of the currency in real terms.
f
 Year-on-year average variation, January to October.
g
 Average from January to October, annualized.
h
 Includes errors and omissions.
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COSTA RICA: GDP AND INFLATION
Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on 
the basis of official figures.
Costa Rica
In 2009, Costa Rica’s economy suffered the effects of the global economic slowdown and, 
particularly, the recession in the United States. The main channels of transmission were falling 
external demand and tourist arrivals, as well as weakening flows of foreign direct investment 
(FDI). As a result, GDP is expected to shrink by about 1.2%, after having grown by 2.6% in 2008. 
Gross domestic investment and exports declined significantly, though this was partially offset 
by a moderate increase in consumption. The open unemployment rate rose to 7.8% nationwide. 
Inflation decreased significantly and is expected to end the year at about 4.5%. The balance-of-
payments current account deficit decreased considerably, from 9.2% of GDP in 2008 to 3.3% in 
2009, whereas the fiscal deficit rose sharply to 3.8% of GDP. 
According to ECLAC estimates, GDP will grow by 3.5% 
in 2010, driven by recovering external demand. Inflation 
will remain at about 5%, whereas the current account 
deficit will be similar to that of 2009. The fiscal deficit, 
as a percentage of GDP, is also expected to be similar 
to the previous year’s figure. In this context, the new 
government, which will take office in 2010, is expected 
to engage in fiscal reform efforts.
 The balance of the central government deteriorated 
significantly, which led to several budget adjustments 
during the year. The administration also sought temporary 
authorization from the Legislative Assembly to finance 
current expenditures by borrowing. Fiscal receipts dropped 
by 9.5% in real terms, because of the downturn in economic 
activity and in imports. As a result, income taxes and 
foreign trade suffered the greatest contractions. 
 In contrast, central government spending increased 
by 15.6% in real terms. Current expenditures grew the 
most, as a result of a higher wage bill and countercyclical 
policies, which included extending social security coverage 
to workers laid off from their jobs, subsidizing food and 
transport and raising pensions. The fiscal deficit was 
financed mainly through the issuance of domestic debt 
purchased by institutional investors, which posted an 
annualized growth rate of 28%. External debt came down 
from 33% of GDP in 2008 to 30% in 2009, as a result 
of capital payments. Lines of credit with multilateral 
organizations were hardly used. 
 In 2009, monetary and exchange-rate policy continued 
to be directed towards price stability and migration towards 
a flexible exchange-rate scheme. The central bank found 
less need to adjust the exchange-rate band than it had 
in 2008, mainly because there was less turbulence and 
pressure in the currency market. Since the end of August, 
the exchange rate has eased back from the upper limit of 
the band, thanks to a lower current account deficit. In mid-
November, the nominal exchange rate was 565 colones 
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per dollar, which represents a depreciation of about 
3% compared with the rate at the start of the year. This 
movement has caused a slight depreciation in the real 
bilateral exchange rate with the United States, following 
three years of movement in the opposite direction.
 The central bank adopted a tight monetary policy 
aimed at countering potential inflationary pressures, 
despite the pullback in economic activity. Until the end 
of November, the monetary-policy rate had been reduced 
once, and by only a single percentage point (from 10% 
to 9%). The financial system’s average nominal lending 
rate closed the year at 24.6%, which translates into a real 
rate of 17.8%. The average nominal deposit rate ended the 
year at 10.7%, returning the real rate to positive territory 
(3.8%) after its negative figures of 2008. Foreign-currency 
deposits grew by 25%, which reflects the increasing 
dollarization of the economy.
 During 2009, several rounds of talks were held with 
a view to a free trade agreement with China. Negotiations 
on the proposed association agreement between Central 
America and the European Union had to be suspended, 
pending resolution of the crisis in Honduras. In order to 
comply with commitments undertaken in the framework 
of the World Trade Organization (WTO), the government 
sent a bill to the Legislative Assembly to modify the law 
on free zones.
 The economic downturn was sharper in the first 
half of 2009 and, since April, the decline in the monthly 
index of economic activity has eased. The plunge in gross 
domestic investment (-24.1%) reflected the contraction in 
construction and machinery purchases and heavy inventory 
drawdowns. Consumption grew by 1.8% (4.3% in 2008), 
despite deteriorating economic conditions, driven by rising 
real wages, increased public spending on remuneration and 
procurement of goods and services, and the strengthening 
of social programmes. By sector, manufacturing (-4.9%) 
and commerce, restaurants and hotels (-4.4%) felt the 
effect of slumping external demand, whereas agriculture 
and livestock (-4.7%) were also hurt by adverse weather 
events and pests.
 Inflation, as measured by the consumer price index, 
dropped significantly in 2009. The year-on-year rate in 
December is expected to come in at 4.5% (compared with 
13.9% in 2008). This decrease is attributable primarily 
to the economic slowdown and lower international food 
and fuel prices. Also, the new exchange-rate scheme has 
helped keep currency fluctuations from being passed 
through to domestic prices. The nationwide unemployment 
rate rose sharply (by 2.9 percentage points), following 
three years of decline. Real wages in the formal sector 
increased because of the drop in inflation.
 The current account deficit narrowed significantly, 
mainly as a result of goods imports (which were down by 
around 20%). In the case of durable and capital goods, 
the fall in imports was due to the contraction of economic 
activity and, in the case of fuels and lubricants, to lower 
international prices as well. Exports also contracted, 
but at a lesser rate of some 7%. In the first half of 2009, 
exports from free zones fell sharply, but towards the end 
of the year the pace of the decline had slowed.
 Exports of services decreased by about 9%, because 
of reduced revenues from transport and tourism. Exports 
of business services are thought to have continued to rise, 
however, thanks to the arrival of new businesses seeking to 
lower costs. FDI flows totalled US$ 1.4 billion, compared 
with US$ 2 billion in 2008, as investment in construction and 
tourism fell. Though the financial account surplus shrank, 
it still exceeded the current account deficit in absolute 
terms, which led to an accumulation of reserves.
COSTA RICA: MAIN ECONOMIC INDICATORS
2007 2008 2009 a
Annual percentage growth rates
Gross domestic product 7.8 2.6 -1.2
Per capita gross domestic product 6.3 1.2 -2.5
Consumer prices 10.8 13.9 4.0 b
Average real wage c 1.4 -2.0 9.4 d
Money (M1) 22.6 1.5 0.6 e
Real effective exchange rate f




Urban unemployment rate 4.8 4.8 7.6 
Central government
  overall balance/GDP 0.6 0.2 -3.8
Nominal deposit rate 7.1 5.4 8.7 h
Nominal lending rate 17.3 16.7 21.7 h
Millions of dollars
12 852 13 660 12 631
Imports of goods and services 14 103 16 444 13 271
Current account balance
-1 646 -2 732 -1 195
Capital and financial account balance i 2 794 2 384 1 462
Overall balance 1 148 -348 267
Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the 




 Twelve-month variation to October 2009.
c
 Average wages reported by workers covered by social security.
d
 Estimate based on data from January to September.
e
 Twelve-month variation to November 2009.
f
 A negative rate indicates an appreciation of the currency in real terms.
g
 Year-on-year average variation, January to October.
h
 Average from January to November, annualized.
i
 Includes errors and omissions.
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EL SALVADOR: GROWTH AND INFLATION
Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on 
the basis of official figures.
El Salvador 
The international financial crisis had a devastating effect on external demand in El Salvador, 
as well as on remittances and FDI. Uncertainty surrounding the legislative and presidential 
elections held at the beginning of 2009 impacted consumption and investment. Given the 
general slowdown in economic activity, ECLAC estimates that GDP decreased by 2.5% in 
2009, with per capita GDP falling by 3%. The flooding at the end of the year had a minimal 
effect on economic activity.
Although 12-month inflation was negative up to October 
2009, inflation for the year as a whole is expected to come 
in at around 0.5%. Given the worsening situation of public 
finances, a deficit of 5.5% of GDP is projected for the non-
financial public sector (including pensions), 2.4 percentage 
points higher than in 2008. Owing to the sharp decline in 
imports, the current account deficit is expected to reach 
approximately 2% of GDP, down from 7.6% in 2008. For 
2010, ECLAC is projecting a moderate recovery, with both 
GDP growth and inflation at 2%, a current account deficit 
of 3% of GDP and a non-financial public sector deficit 
(including pensions) of 4.5% of GDP.
 In regard to public finances, the government faced 
a difficult situation. While income tax receipts grew by 
2.5%, value added tax (VAT) receipts declined by 14.7% 
owing to the economic slowdown. As a result, the central 
government’s current revenues fell by 12%. On the 
expenditures side, wage payments rose by 10%, while 
investment fell by nearly 5% after having increased by 
nearly 30% in 2008. A deficit of 5.5% is projected for the 
non-financial public sector, including the broader public 
sector and pensions.
 In light of this situation, the government had to 
renegotiate the terms of its foreign-loan agreements, and 
throughout the year treasury bills were used intensively 
to cover current expenditures. At the end of September 
the government announced that it intended to sign a new 
precautionary loan agreement with the International 
Monetary Fund for US$ 800 million, with a term of 
3 years. This would replace the agreement signed by the 
previous government in January 2009. 
 The total debt of the non-financial public sector in 
2009, including pensions, is estimated to swell by an 
amount equivalent to five percentage points of GDP to reach 
45% of GDP. It is then expected to continue increasing 
and to peak at 50% of GDP in 2011. Thus, in mid-2009, 
both Standard and Poor’s and Fitch Ratings lowered their 
ratings for El Salvador’s sovereign debt. Nevertheless, 
at the end of November, the country issued bonds in the 
international market for close to US$ 800 million, which 
will be used to pay down short-term debt.
 Greater risk aversion on the part of Salvadoran 
commercial banks meant that loans to the private sector 
decreased by 5% in real terms. Banks took advantage of 
available liquidity to almost halve their external debt, as 
well as to improve the time profile of their risks.
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 Economic growth slowed in practically all sectors, 
with the exception of government services. The slump in 
manufacturing and trade, triggered by the sharp drop in 
foreign and domestic demand, had the largest impact on 
overall growth. Although economic activity was low and 
growth remained negative, the slowdown moderated during 
the second half of 2009. At the beginning of November, 
the central part of the country was hit by floods caused by 
hurricane Ida. Though some municipalities suffered severe 
damage, the overall impact was mild. As a result, the decline 
in GDP in 2009 is projected by ECLAC to be 2.5%.
 As far as spending is concerned, gross domestic 
investment dropped by 14.5% owing to the tighter credit 
conditions described earlier and the significant reduction in 
FDI flows. At the same time, private consumption fell by 
approximately 10% on account of the reduction in remittances 
and the worsening situation in the job market.
 Up to August, the number of workers contributing 
to the Salvadoran Institute of Social Security declined 
by nearly 20,000 (6.7%). The worst-hit sector was 
construction, where nearly 30% of jobs were lost. Given 
the low levels of inflation, real minimum wages increased 
by around 9% in 2009 compared with 2008, when they 
rose by barely 0.2%. 
 Beginning in the third quarter of 2008, the drop in 
international prices for commodities led to a pronounced 
slowdown in the food and beverages and transportation 
components of the consumer price index. Consequently, 
inflation plummeted, with prices falling by 1.6% in the 
12 months leading up to October and by 0.7% in relation 
to December 2008. Prices are expected to rise again in the 
final months of the year in comparison with those seen 
at the end of 2008. Thus, in December, the 12-month 
inflation rate is expected to be around 0.5%.
 Exports of goods decreased by approximately 15%. 
Two thirds of the decline is attributable to the fall-off in 
exports from the maquila industry and the remaining third 
to declines in non-traditional exports, with traditional 
exports remaining at a level similar to that of 2008. As a 
result of the severe contraction in domestic demand, as 
well the approximately 50% drop in the oil bill, imports 
of goods are estimated to have fallen by about 25%. In 
terms of volumes imported, the main reductions were in 
imports of durable consumer goods and capital goods. 
Thus, for the year overall, the deficit of the balance of 
goods and services is expected to shrink by more than 
US$ 1.7 billion to US$ 3.325 billion (14.9% of GDP).
 In contrast, the income account deficit is expected to 
widen slightly. Remittances, which represent 16% of GDP, 
declined by around US$ 400 million. Thus, the current 
account deficit is estimated to have contracted from more 
than US$ 1.2 billion to US$ 418 million (2% of GDP). 
FDI inflows to El Salvador in 2009 are estimated to have 
dropped by approximately US$ 700 million, while total 
remittances have amounted to barely US$ 88 million over 
the course of the year.
 For 2010, a moderate revival is projected for both 
foreign and domestic demand, meaning that once again 
net exports will be in the negative range. Although the 
flow of remittances is expected to increase, this will not be 
sufficient to prevent a slight increase in the current account 
deficit, which is estimated to reach 3% of GDP.
EL SALVADOR: MAIN ECONOMIC INDICATORS 
2007 2008 2009 a
Annual percentage growth rates
Gross domestic product 4.7 2.5 -2.5
Per capita gross domestic product 4.2 2.1 -3.0
Consumer prices 4.9 5.5 -1.6 b
Real minimun wage 2.5 0.2 9.3
Money (M1) 16.5 1.6 1.7 c
Real effective exchange rate d 1.2 1.0 -4.5 e
Terms of trade -0.9 -2.8 7.9
Annual average percentages
Urban unemployment rate 5.8 5.5 ...
Central government 
  overall balance/GDP -0.2 -0.6 -2.3
Nominal deposit rate 4.7 4.2 4.7 f
Nominal lending rate 7.8 7.9 9.4  f
Millions of dollars
Exports of goods and services 5 169 5 652 5 334
Imports of goods and services 9 564 10 629 8 659
Current account balance -1 221 -1 682 -524
Capital and financial account balance g 1 502 2 016 644
Overall balance 280 334 120
Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the 




 Twelve-month variation to October 2009.
c
 Twelve-month variation to September 2009.
d
 A negative rate indicates an appreciation of the currency in real terms.
e
 Year-on-year average variation, January to October.
f
 Average from January to October, annualized.
g
 Includes errors and omissions.
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GUATEMALA: MONTHLY INDEX OF ECONOMIC  
ACTIVITY (MIEA) AND INFLATION
Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on 
the basis of official figures.
Guatemala
In 2009, the Guatemalan authorities faced major challenges in their efforts to offset the impact 
of the international financial crisis and, in particular, the recession in the United States, on 
the country’s economy. The crisis was transmitted through slumps in exports, remittances, 
foreign direct investment (FDI) and tourism. According to estimates, the Guatemalan economy 
contracted by 1% in 2009, as compared with 4% growth in 2008. The inflation rate fell from 
9.4% to 2% and the fiscal deficit was 3.4% of GDP. Although the trade deficit reached 11% of 
GDP, the inflow of remittances, albeit at a reduced rate, kept the balance-of-payments current 
account deficit at 2.2% of GDP.
According to forecasts economic growth of 2% in 2010 
with inflation at around 3%, due to the economic revival 
occurring in the United States and increased foreign capital 
inflows. Authorities are projecting the central government 
deficit at approximately 3.4% of GDP.
 The fiscal deficit in 2009, as a proportion of GDP, 
is estimated to have doubled compared with 2008. In 
May 2009, given the downturn in economic activity 
and the real reduction in tax revenues of around 2.6% 
of GDP, the budget was adjusted to reduce the resulting 
gap (approximately 4 billion quetzales over the amount 
budgeted). In addition, the National Congress authorized 
an increase in the issuance of domestic currency bonds 
for a total of 3 billion quetzales, and approved a World 
Bank loan of US$ 350 million (41.5% to be disbursed 
in 2009 and the remainder in 2010) and another loan of 
US$ 38 million from the Inter-American Development 
Bank (IDB). Thus, it is estimated that the public debt will 
be 22% of GDP, compared with 20% of GDP in 2008.
 Total real government revenues were down by 
9.4% compared with 2008, while total expenditures 
grew by 5.5%, primarily as a result of increased current 
expenditures (10.5%), with capital expenditures dropping 
4.6% in real terms. The tax burden was 9.9% of GDP, 
1.5 percentage points lower than in 2008, settling well 
below the regional average and below the figure stipulated 
in the Peace Accords.
 One year after the submission of a proposal for fiscal 
modernization and expanded tax collections (amounting to 
just over 1% of GDP), negotiations between the executive 
branch, the Congress and business leaders broke down. 
Although this initiative was withdrawn on 27 August 2009, 
it is vital that the country reach a fiscal agreement and that 
efforts to improve tax administration proceed, in order to 
stem tax evasion and smuggling and boost revenues. 
 In January 2009, an ambitious plan was announced 
to deal with the crisis, and the National Emergency and 
Economic Recovery Programme was implemented to 
increase countercyclical public spending, provide social 
protection to vulnerable segments of the population, make 
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the budget fiscally sustainable and promote competitiveness. 
However, the results of this countercyclical policy were 
compromised by lack of funding. As a result, only marginal 
progress was made on reduction of poverty, inequality 
and insecurity, and this was compounded by a serious 
food crisis caused by drought in the country. Given this 
situation, the government was forced to intervene, and 
declared a “state of public calamity” in September 2009. 
International assistance was also sought and has been 
coming in gradually.
 Between January and November of 2009, the main 
monetary policy interest rate dropped by 275 basis points. A 
year-end rate of around 4.5% (2.5% in real terms) is therefore 
being projected. In February 2009, the Monetary Board 
changed the rule on exchange-rate intervention in order to 
afford the Bank of Guatemala greater discretion to counteract 
volatility. The Board also authorized the central bank to 
supply liquidity to the financial system up to a maximum 
of US$ 290 million through 31 May 2009. In addition, the 
band of fluctuation for the daily moving average within the 
flexible exchange-rate system was expanded from 0.50% 
to 0.75%. Up to November 2009, the Bank of Guatemala 
intervened in the currency market on 20 occasions. It is 
estimated that the bilateral nominal exchange rate with 
respect to the United States dollar depreciated 7% (3% in 
real terms). At the same time, international reserves reached 
levels similar to those of 2008, equivalent to four months’ 
imports of goods and services.
 Real monetary aggregates increased slightly in 2009 
(by between 3% and 4%) in response to the significant 
slowdown in economic activity. Real interest rates on 
loans and deposits averaged 11.1% and 2.9%, respectively, 
compared with the low rates recorded in 2008 (1.7% and 
-5.6%, respectively). Loans to the private sector increased 
in real terms by 4.6%, while loans to the public sector 
fell 19.9%. The main banking indicators, above all those 
relating to non-performing loans, deteriorated slightly. 
Accordingly, there was a rise in the number of individuals 
and businesses renegotiating their liabilities with banks 
in order to avoid default.
 With the 1% drop in GDP, 20 years of continued 
expansion came to an end. Construction experienced the 
greatest contraction (-9.1%), followed by mining, which fell 
by 2.6%. Services, agriculture and manufacturing, on the 
other hand, remained flat. In terms of demand, gross fixed 
investment fell 14%, while domestic investment declined 
32% as a result of the significant drop in inventories. 
Private investment saw a 15% reduction, while public 
investment fell by 10%. Total consumption grew by 
barely 1.5%. In 2009, results of surveys on economic and 
employment prospects, as well as consumer confidence 
indices, were negative. By 2010, however, a moderate 
recovery is expected.
 Inflation slowed in 2009, reaching barely 2%, owing 
to the drop in economic activity and reduced prices for 
fuel, food and non-alcoholic beverages. In early 2009, the 
minimum wage rose 10.6% for farm workers and 7.2% for 
non-farm workers, except in the maquila industry, leading 
to positive real-wage figures. The unemployment rate for 
2009 is expected to be around 7%, compared with 5.5% 
in 2008. Up to October 2009, job applications increased 
by approximately 50% compared with the same period 
in 2008.
 In 2009, as a result of the global economic crisis, 
exports of goods fell by 8.5% as compared with 2008, due 
to the decline in non-traditional exports (-14%). In terms 
of traditional products, exports of cardamom, bananas and 
sugar rose, while earnings from coffee exports fell 4.4% 
mostly as a result of reductions in export volumes. Imports 
of goods dropped by 16.7%, primarily due to reductions 
in imports of intermediate goods (-16%), consumer goods 
(-17.6%) and capital goods (-18.2%). By the end of the 
year, revenue from family remittances will have declined 
by 11%. At the same time, foreign-exchange earnings from 
tourism decreased by approximately 10% as a result of the 
outbreak of influenza A (H1N1), a worsening of security 
problems and the effects of the global economic recession. 
Revenue from FDI inflows were equivalent to 2% of GDP, 
despite a 9.5% decline compared with 2008. 
GUATEMALA: MAIN ECONOMIC INDICATORS 
2007 2008 2009 a
Annual percentage growth rates
Gross domestic product 6.3 4.0 -1.0
Per capita gross domestic product 3.7 1.5 -3.4
Consumer prices 8.7 9.4 -0.7 b
Average real wage -1.7 -10.2 4.8
Money (M1) 14.1 3.4 7.4 b
Real effective exchange rate c -0.8 -5.4 1.9 d
Terms of trade -1.9 -2.7 7.9
Annual average percentages
Central administration 
  overall balance/GDP -1.4 -1.6 -3.4
Nominal deposit rate 4.9 5.2 5.6 e
Nominal lending rate 12.8 13.4 13.9 e
Millions of dollars
Exports of goods and services 8 714 9 637 8 894
Imports of goods and services 14 511 15 581 13 219
Current account balance -1 786 -1 863 -628
Capital and financial account balance f 2 002 2 195 514
Overall balance 216 333 -114
Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the 




 Twelve-month variation to October 2009.
c
 A negative rate indicates an appreciation of the currency in real terms.
d
 Year-on-year average variation, January to October.
e
 Average from January to October, annualized.
f
 Includes errors and omissions.
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Honduras
In 2009 the Honduran economy experienced its first recession since 1999. GDP is estimated 
to have contracted by 3%, with a 5% decline in per capita GDP, owing to effects of the 
international financial crisis and the political crisis in the country. Inflation fell significantly, 
closing the year at 3.5%. The slowdown in economic activity led to a sharp reduction in the 
current account deficit, which dropped from 14% in 2008 to 7.9% in 2009. By contrast, the 
central government deficit expanded from the equivalent of 2.4% of GDP, to 4.5% of GDP.
The impact of the international crisis was transmitted to 
the Honduran economy through external demand, FDI, 
remittances and tourism revenues, which all contracted. These 
effects were magnified by the domestic political crisis that 
followed the removal from office of President Zelaya in June. 
The rupture of democratic order for first time in 30 years 
produced deep polarization within Honduran society. The 
international community, meanwhile, imposed restrictions 
on external financing and international cooperation.
 The new government due to take office in January 
2010 will face an extraordinarily difficult situation. 
The country is now profoundly divided politically and 
its economic growth is being severely limited by the 
aftermath of the events of 2009, combined with more 
deep-rooted structural factors. The latter include a high 
level of inequality, a poverty rate of over 60%, scant 
opportunities for formal employment for the vast majority, 
and even undernutrition, particularly among children. 
Macroeconomic policy faces additional challenges posed 
by, on the one hand, the complicated footing of public 
finances and, on the other, a real exchange rate that is 
around 20% overvalued, in comparison with the average 
for the last 20 years. At this juncture, broad consensus 
—at present, a seemingly difficult proposition— is needed 
to overcome these problems. 
 As a consequence of the crisis, fiscal revenues fell 
by approximately 13% in real terms, while revenues 
from foreign trade taxes plunged by 25% as a result of 
the major contraction in imports. Direct taxes slipped by 
13%, with sales taxes the category least affected. Grants 
were down by 10%.
 Overall public spending decreased slightly, by around 
2% in real terms. Current expenditures grew by 2%, owing 
largely to wage increases (4%). The adjustment variable 
was capital spending, which contracted by more than 
15%. Public finances are being weighed down —and 
could even find their sustainability threatened, if current 
patterns continue— by certain expenditures, such as 
benefits mandated by union by-laws, which are in need 
of overhaul. The former government had implemented 
a number of positive measures, which remain in force, 
such as free school enrolment and snacks during school 
hours, but no financing sources had yet been identified. 
 As a result of the drop in revenues and the inability 
to access external financing, floating debt and domestic 
indebtedness increased. Domestic debt grew by nearly 
80%, from 3.5% of GDP in 2008 to 5.9% in 2009. External 
debt continued to decline as a proportion of GDP, owing 
to the country’s participation in various debt forgiveness 
initiatives for highly indebted poor countries and limited 
access to new financing.
 Monetary policy passed through two distinct stages 
during the year. In the first semester it was expansionary, 
aimed at bolstering economic activity against the effects 
of the international financial crisis. The monetary policy 
rate was reduced, from 7.75% in December 2008 to 3.5% 
in June 2009. The reserve requirement was lowered to 
0% and the open market operations that had been used 
to absorb excess liquidity were suspended. 
 As of July, the focus has been on shoring up net 
international reserves and ensuring exchange rate stability. 
The monetary policy rate increased to 4.5%, the reserve 
requirement rose to 6% and the mandatory investments of 
financial institutions in government bonds, rose from 9% 
to 12%. These measures slowed the decline in reserves 
and secured the funds to finance the fiscal gap. The 
nominal interest rate on deposits rose from 6.0% to 7.2%, 
with nominal lending rates increasing from 17.4%, on 
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average, between January and September 2008, to 19.6% 
in the same period of 2009. Due to the sharp slowdown 
in inflation, real interest rates rose significantly. In the 
financial system, indicators for non-performing, overdue 
and other troubled loans deteriorated, but did not reach 
alarming levels.
 The excess liquidity seen during the first part of the 
year was drawn into covering the fiscal deficit through 
the sale of government bonds, and went into purchases of 
dollars that drained international reserves, which declined 
11% between December 2008 and September 2009. The 
nominal exchange rate remained unchanged, signalling 
a slight real appreciation with respect to the dollar.
 Economic activity contracted by around 3% after 
having expanded 4% in 2008 —a contraction that would 
have been even greater but for the creation of a fund 
controlled by the Honduran Bank for Production and 
Housing (BANHPROVI). The fund’s loan portfolio 
grew by approximately 80% in 2009. Gross domestic 
investment slumped 29%. Consumption shrank slightly 
(by 2.1%), with the private component declining by 5% 
and the public by 2.5%.
 The sectors worst affected by the crisis were construction 
and manufacturing, which contracted by 6.0% and 5%, 
respectively. The agricultural sector —highly important, 
particularly as a source of employment— contracted by 
more than 3%, in spite of some positive factors such as very 
good harvests for a number of grain crops. By contrast, the 
services sector performed well, with the highest growth 
rates in public administration and defence.
 The consumer price index showed the effects of the 
economic slowdown combined with falling international 
prices for food and petroleum. The year-on-year rate to 
December fell from 10.8% in 2008 to 3.5% in 2009. Urban 
unemployment rose from 4.1% in 2008 to 4.9% in May 2009. 
In January 2009 there was an increase (unprecedented in the 
country’s recent past) in the minimum wage —by as much 
as 96%, depending on the kind of activity— which made 
up some of the lag in wages from prior years and helped 
sustain consumption among the lower-income population.
 The current account deficit declined by a significant 
6 percentage points of GDP owing to the contraction in 
imports of goods and services (19% and 17%, respectively). 
Exports of goods and services saw a less severe drop 
(12% and 15%, respectively). Traditional exports were 
the hardest hit, declining by 17.4%, followed by maquila 
exports, which were down by 12.1%. Imports of capital 
goods suffered a sharp 28.1% drop as a result of the 
economic slowdown, while most of the decline in the 
value of commodity and intermediate goods imports 
(25.4%) was due to the drop in international prices. After 
12 consecutive years of deterioration, terms of trade 
improved, thanks to steep falls in international food and 
petroleum prices. Family remittances, one of the pillars 
of consumption and exchange-rate stability, slipped by 
11%, while FDI flows fell by nearly 40%.
HONDURAS: MAIN ECONOMIC INDICATORS 
2007 2008 2009 a
Annual balance growth rates
Gross domestic product 6.3 4.0 -3.0
Per capita gross domestic product 4.2 1.9 -4.9
Consumer prices 8.9 10.8 2.7 b
Real minimun wage 2.8 0.2 70.3 
Money (M1) 16.3 1.8 2.1 c
Real effective exchange rate d -0.3 -3.5 -8.7 e
Terms of trade -1.9 -6.1 9.2
Annual average percentages
Urban unemployment rate 4.0 4.1 4.9 f
Central government
  overall balance/GDP -2.9 -2.3 -4.2
Nominal deposit rate 7.8 9.5 10.9 g
Nominal lending rate 16.6 17.9 19.6 g
Millions of dollars
Exports of goods and services 6 344 6 956 6 117
Imports of goods and services 9 594 11 603 9 204
Current account balance -1 225 -1 977 -1 129
Capital and financial account balance h 1 063 1 912 374
Overall balance -162 -65 -755
Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on 




 Twelve-month variation to October 2009.
c
 Twelve-month variation to September 2009.
d
 A negative rate indicates an appreciation of the currency in real terms.
e
 Year-on-year average variation, January to October.
f
 Figure for May.
g
 Average from January to October, annualized.
h
 Includes errors and omissions.








































































































MEXICO: GDP, INFLATION AND UNEMPLOYMENT
Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on 
the basis of official figures.
Mexico
The Mexican economy shrank by 6.7% in 2009, owing to across-the-board weakness in 
aggregate demand caused by the global recession. The economic slump led to a reduction in 
the wage bill and credit, which, in turn, triggered a fall in consumption. As the year moved 
forward, the recessive trends deepened and investment contracted —according to estimates, by 
more than 10%. The main channels of transmission of the global crisis have been dwindling 
global trade, alongside, to a lesser extent, declining foreign investment, tourism and remittances 
from workers abroad. 
Decreasing economic activity led to a reduction in public 
revenue. However, total public spending —which was 
mainly focused on meeting social needs— is projected 
to have declined by a smaller proportion than has public 
revenue. The low tax burden made it difficult to implement 
large-scale fiscal measures to address the crisis. Moreover, 
by preferring the nominal stability of the economy over 
real stability, the authorities did not take advantage of the 
healthy public debt position in order to obtain loans with 
which to implement a countercyclical policy that would 
have provided a stronger boost to aggregate demand.
 Annual inflation is projected to come in at 4% in 2009 
as a result of falling prices for raw materials and energy, 
sluggish demand and the easing of pressure on the exchange 
rate. Public-sector borrowing requirements are estimated 
at 3.0% of GDP (up from 2.1% in 2008). In light of weak 
external demand, especially from the United States, and the 
consequent decline in imports due to lower consumption, 
the trade balance and balance-of-payments current account 
deficits are expected to be lower than in 2008. 
 The Mexican economy should enter a period of 
recovery in 2010 (with 3.5% growth), spearheaded by the 
expected upturn in the United States economy. However, 
not until 2011 is the economy expected to return to the 
level of activity seen in 2008. Inflation is projected to 
rise to 5%, partly because of the increase in value added 
tax (VAT) and the other taxes slated to be introduced in 
2010 in a context of moderately higher consumption. 
 Real public-sector revenue fell by 8.7% between 
January and September 2009 because of the decline 
both in oil revenue and in non-oil tax receipts (down 
24.4% and 12.8%, respectively). The drop in oil revenue 
stemmed from falling prices on world markets, production 
levels and exports. Tax receipts fell as collections of 
VAT dropped by 19.5%, income tax by 12.0% and the 
flat-rate business tax (IETU) by 7.5%. In response to the 
revenue shortfall, the authorities cut projected spending 
by the equivalent of 0.9% of GDP for the year. However, 
social programmes were left untouched by the budget 
cuts. The rest of the budget shortfall was offset with an 
operating surplus of Banco de México (for 95 billion 
pesos) and with oil price hedges and other non-recurring 
revenue (totalling 247.9 billion pesos). 
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 Real public-sector budget spending rose by 4.2% 
from January to September 2009 as a result of a 36.8% 
increase in capital spending and a 1.0% drop in current 
expenditures. For the year overall, real spending is expected 
to rise slightly. Together with declining revenue, this should 
lead to an increase in the traditionally calculated deficit, 
from 0.1% of GDP in 2008 to 2.1% according to official 
estimates in 2009. The balance of the external public 
debt in September was 9.6% of GDP, compared with 
21.1% for domestic debt. Starting in 2009, both figures 
include debt on Projects with a Deferred Impact on Public 
Expenditure Recording (PIDIREGAS), which raised the 
debt-to-GDP ratio from 21% to 31%. In late November 
2009, the government secured a one-year credit line of 
approximately US$ 1.504 billion with the World Bank to 
mitigate the impact of the financial crisis and improve the 
conditions for growth to resume in the medium term. 
 In 2010, new taxes will be introduced while others will be 
raised. A new 3% tax will be charged on telecommunications; 
temporarily the maximum individual and corporate income 
tax rate will rise from 28% to 30%; VAT will increase 
from 15% to 16%; and the tax on gaming and lotteries 
will jump from 20% to 30%. Levies on tobacco, beer and 
other alcoholic beverages will also go up. 
 The benchmark interest rate was lowered as a 
consequence of the global recession, falling international 
prices for raw materials and the freeze on certain domestic 
energy prices. In the first seven months of 2009, the central 
bank lowered the benchmark rate by 375 basis points, to 
a slightly negative real rate of 4.5%. The average market 
deposit rate was also negative in real terms, while lending 
rates remained relatively high. The benchmark rate remained 
stable from August to October 2009, and from January to 
September the monetary base expanded by 9.1% in real 
terms. The M1 and M2 monetary aggregates grew by 
8.2%, while M3 and M4 increased by more than 6%. 
 Until September, commercial bank lending to the private 
sector had fallen by 4.9%, in real terms, while consumer 
lending had plummeted by 21.7%. The rate of growth of 
lending to non-financial companies and self-employed 
individuals slowed to only 3.9%, from 17.6% in 2008. 
 After appreciating in real terms from 2005 to August 
2008, the peso depreciated abruptly (16% in real terms) 
in October 2008 and continued falling until March 2009. 
It stabilized in subsequent months. The real value of the 
peso declined by an average of 19% in the first 10 months 
of the 2009, on a year-on-year basis. Banco de México 
intervened in the exchange market throughout the year. 
In response to speculative pressure, in February the 
central bank injected dollars into the currency market 
and the following month it began holding daily auctions 
for US$ 100 million. The central bank also left open the 
possibility of conducting special sales of hard currency if 
market conditions necessitated doing so. In April, a one-
year, US$ 47 billion contingent line of financing from 
the International Monetary Fund (IMF) was announced. 
Although the credit has not been used, it has helped relieve 
pressure on the peso. 
 In May, the gradual easing of pressure in the foreign-
exchange market led the authorities to reduce the amount of 
the daily auction from US$ 100 million to US$ 50 million. 
In addition, the amount of the daily auction offered in the 
event of a peso slide of more than 2% from one business 
day to the next was reduced from US$ 300 million to 
US$ 250 million, although the possibility of conducting 
special sales of foreign currency remained. In October, the 
US$ 50 million daily auctions were suspended. Fluctuations 
in the country’s international reserves reflected conditions 
in the currency market. Up to July, the country’s reserves 
generally trended downwards; from August they recovered 
and reached nearly US$ 82 billion, that is, to US$ 1 billion 
below their level at the beginning of the year. 
 The Mexican economy entered into recession in the 
last quarter of 2008. The global crisis exposed its structural 
deficiencies and its vulnerability to external shocks as well 
as the weakness and lack of resilience of its productive base 
and the limited manoeuvring room there was for public 
policy to counteract the effects of those shocks. 
MEXICO: MAIN ECONOMIC INDICATORS
2007 2008 2009 a
Annual percentage growth rates
Gross domestic product 3.4 1.3 -6.7
Per capita gross domestic product 2.3 0.3 -7.7
Consumer prices 3.8 6.5 4.5 b
Average real wage c 1.0 2.2 0.6 d
Money (M1) 11.7 9.0 12.7 b
Real effective exchange rate e 1.1 2.2 17.6 f
Terms of trade 0.9 0.8 -1.1
Annual average percentages
Urban unemployment rate 4.8 4.9 6.8 g
Public sector 
  overall balance/GDP 0.0 -0.1 -2.1
Nominal deposit interest rate 6.0 6.7 5.3 h
Nominal lending interest rate 7.6 8.7 7.6 i
Millions of dollars
Exports of goods and services 289 365 309 383 243 056
Imports of goods and services 305 743 333 723 256 668
Current account balance -8 335 -15 806 -6 074
Capital and financial account balance j 18 621 23 244 -1 422
Overall balance 10 286 7 438 -7 496
Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on 








 Estimate based on data from January to September.
e
 A negative rate indicates an appreciation of the currency in real terms.
f
 Year-on-year average variation, January to October.
g
 Estimate based on data from January to October.
h
 Average from January to October, annualized.
i
 Average from January to September, annualized.
j
 Includes errors and omissions.
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 In the first half of the year, economic activity decreased 
by 9.2%. In the third quarter, it contracted by 6.2%, and for 
the year overall, the projected decline is 6.7%. Accordingly, 
the economy is expected to turn the corner in the fourth 
quarter as a prelude to a recovery in 2010. Activity declined 
sharply in the commerce and construction sectors, while 
in September industrial output fell for the fourteenth 
consecutive month. 
 In terms of spending, private consumption and 
investment are estimated to have decreased by 6.5% 
and 11%, respectively. Exports fell by 23% in the first 
semester, while imports were down 25%. 
 The A (H1N1) influenza epidemic dealt a severe 
blow to the economy: tourism flows dwindled, and 
drastic measures were taken to cope with the epidemic 
(suspension of activities, principally in Mexico City). 
ECLAC estimates that the impact was equivalent to a loss 
of about 0.7% of GDP. Sectors associated with tourism 
(commerce, restaurants and hotels) were the hardest hit.
 The automobile industry was the most affected within 
the manufacturing sector due to its strong ties to the United 
States economy. The automobile industry’s contribution 
to total GDP (3.3%) and total exports (24%), as well as 
its linkages with 33 branches of production (including 
30 in manufacturing), was a key factor in the country’s 
economic slowdown. Automobile output fell by 35% 
and auto exports by 33%, in real terms, between January 
and October 2009. If these figures hold true for the year 
overall, 1.1 percentage points of the overall decline in 
GDP will be the direct consequence of the automobile 
industry slump alone —without taking into account the 
concomitant multiplier effects. 
 The fall in output also took a toll on the labour 
market. The open unemployment rate continued to trend 
upward, rising from 3.9% in September 2007 to 4.3% a 
year later and to 6.4% in September 2009. Given that 
the informal sector absorbed 28% of the economically 
active population, more than one third of the workforce 
was either unemployed or underemployed. 
 The number of workers registered at the Mexican 
Social Security Institute (IMSS) decreased by nearly 
500,000, or 3.4%, between October 2008 and October 
2009. The sectors that shed the largest number of jobs 
were manufacturing (-7.0%), construction (-9.5%) and 
transportation (-4.3%). 
 Exports were the main channel of transmission of the 
international financial crisis. Given that exports account 
for a high proportion of GDP (35%), the repercussions of 
lower exports spread quickly and forcefully. The value of 
total exports fell by 28.7% between January and September 
while that of imports dropped by 29.6%. Imports of 
consumer goods contracted the most (36.8%), followed by 
capital goods and intermediate goods, owing to the sharp 
drop in exports and the reduction in private consumption. 
In addition, the dwindling volume of petroleum exports 
and falling international prices slashed oil revenue by 
53% in the same period. The trade deficit decreased by 
just over US$ 4.6 billion from January to September 
2009 compared with the same period the previous year, 
to US$ 4.329 billion (0.51% of GDP). Excluding oil, the 
trade deficit exceeded US$ 25 billion (3% of GDP) in the 
same period.
 The financial crisis in the United States had a 
considerable impact on remittances to Mexico. Between 
January and October 2009, the accumulated value of 
remittances was US$ 18.127 billion, which represented a 
16.1% year-on-year decrease. FDI continued to slide, and 
the estimated value of FDI inflows —between US$ 13 and 
US$ 15 billion in 2009— is between 33% and 42% lower 
than in 2008. 











































































NICARAGUA: GDP AND INFLATION
Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on 
the basis of official figures.
Nicaragua
According to ECLAC estimates, the Nicaraguan economy posted 1.5% negative GDP growth in 
2009 after 15 years of uninterrupted expansion and compared with 3.2% positive growth in 2008. 
External demand, which has driven growth in recent years, fell by 2.5%. Gross internal investment 
plummeted, whereas consumption grew slightly. Inflation is expected to be significantly lower 
and end the year at about 2.5%. The current account deficit shrank to 15% of GDP, compared 
with 23.8% in 2008. In contrast, the fiscal deficit, including donations, expanded to 3.5% of GDP, 
from 1.2% in 2008.
In August 2009, the Ministry of Finance introduced a fiscal 
reform bill in order to tackle the slide in fiscal revenues triggered 
by the economic slowdown and the decline in donations 
from abroad. The bill’s main objectives are to make the tax 
system more equitable, to generalize the levying of taxes and 
to modernize and simplify tax payment procedures.
 According to ECLAC estimates, the economy will grow 
by 2% in 2010, driven by a resurgence in external demand. 
Inflation will remain near 5%, and the balance-of-payments 
current account deficit will be similar to what it was in 2009. 
Pressure on public financing will ease slightly, thanks to 
growth in economic activity and the fiscal reform.
 For 2009, total revenue of the central government is 
expected to drop by 4.1%, in real terms. Import tax receipts 
have been the hardest hit and fell by 15.9% because of 
the slump in purchases of durable consumer and capital 
goods. The 3.3% reduction in indirect taxes reflects both 
sluggish economic activity and fuel tax credits claimed 
against value added tax. Total expenditures by the central 
government are estimated to have risen by 6% in real terms. 
Current expenditures increased by 8.4% owing to higher 
wages and direct transfers, whereas capital expenditures 
decreased by 0.6% because of a lack of funds and delays 
in the execution of projects. In January, the government 
introduced a package of measures to counteract the impact 
of the economic crisis. These measures include initiatives 
that address financial stability, public investment, support 
of production and private investment, and job creation.
 However, shrinking revenues have made it difficult 
to implement some of these counter-cyclical measures. 
In fact, during 2009, the public budget had to be adjusted 
downwards three times.
 In this context, the central Government’s fiscal deficit 
grew considerably and was financed mostly through loans 
from multilateral organizations. Public external debt is 
thus expected to reach 58.7% of GDP by the end of 2009, 
compared with 55.2% in 2008.
 In 2009, monetary policy continued to make use 
of pre-announced mini-devaluations in order to rein in 
inflationary expectations. The annualized devaluation rate 
held steady at 5%, closing out the year with the official 
exchange rate at 20.8 córdobas per dollar. The real bilateral 
exchange rate (with the United States) depreciated slightly, 
ending a three-year spell of appreciation. The nominal 
interest rate for deposits in national currency was 5.5% 
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in September, compared with 6.3% for the same month 
in 2008. The nominal lending rate for loans in national 
currency was 14.2% in September, compared with 
12.7% for the same month in 2008. Real interest rates, 
which were negative throughout 2008, were positive in 
2009 because of lower inflation, which exacerbated the 
credit crunch in the private sector. International reserves 
are expected to increase by US$ 250 million, primarily 
because of the Special Drawing Rights disbursement from 
the International Monetary Fund (IMF), and to close the 
year at US$ 1.29 billion. 
 As far as trade policy is concerned, in 2009, the first 
meetings were held to negotiate a free trade agreement 
with Chile. Meanwhile, negotiations on an association 
agreement between Central America and the European 
Union were suspended after seven rounds of talks, pending 
resolution of the crisis in Honduras. 
 The Nicaraguan economy felt the toll of the international 
financial crisis and, particularly, of the recession in the 
United States in 2009. The primary transmission channels 
were weaker external demand, a decrease in the flow of 
remittances and shrinking foreign direct investment (FDI). 
The economic downturn was more acute during the first 
half of the year; the decline of the monthly economic 
activity indicator slowed in the second semester. The 
15.6% plunge in gross internal investment was attributable 
to the shrinking of credit and FDI and to contraction in 
the construction sector, against a backdrop of recessive 
trends and uncertainty sparked by factors unrelated to 
the economy. Private consumption was up slightly (by 
1.9%) because of the increase in real wages and public 
grant transfer programmes. The hardest-hit sectors were 
manufacturing, which shrank by 1.5%, construction (by 
3.4%) and commerce, restaurants and hotels (by 1.8%).
 Inflation, as measured by the consumer price index, 
was down significantly and is expected to end the year 
at 2.5%, from 13.8% in 2008. This drop is attributable 
to lower international prices of food and fuels and the 
slowdown in economic activity. Negative monthly 
inflation rates were recorded in three months (April, 
July and August). Low inflation played a major role in 
the marked increase in real wages.
 The current account deficit shrank as a result of the 
sharp drop in goods imports (down by 18.5%). The oil bill 
was down 36%, mainly because of lower international prices, 
whereas the 42% fall in imports of durable consumer goods 
and the 19.3% decline in capital goods were attributable 
primarily to reduced economic activity.
 Goods exports were down by 9.4%. Reduced external 
demand had a huge negative impact on exports from free 
trade zones, which shrank by 7.2%. Traditional exports were 
down by 11.2%, a result that was compounded by weather 
issues, such as altered rainfall patterns due to El Niño, and 
by the timing of the low-point in the two-year coffee cycle. 
The international crisis also choked FDI flows, which are 
expected to reach US$ 420 million in 2009, compared with 
US$ 626 million in 2008. Remittances from family members 
were down by 5.7%. As is often the case, remittances proved 
to be more resilient than other foreign currency flows (such 
as exports and FDI) when the countries in which they are 
generated face economic downturns.
NICARAGUA: MAIN ECONOMIC INDICATORS
2007 2008 2009 a
Annual percentage growth rates
Gross domestic product 3.2 3.2 -1.5
Per capita gross domestic product 1.8 1.9 -2.8
Consumer prices 16.2 12.7 -0.1 b
Average real wage -1.8 -3.8 7.7 c
Money (M1) 23.6 2.8 1.9 b
Real effective exchange rate d 3.6 -4.9 -1.4 e
Terms of trade -1.0 -4.4 10.5
Annual average percentages
Urban unemployment rate 6.9 8.0 ...
Central government 
  overall balance/GDP 0.4 -1.2 -3.5
Nominal deposit rate 6.1 6.6 6.1 f
Nominal lending rate 13.0 13.2 14.1 f
Millions of dollars
Exports of goods and services 2 709 2 937 2 826 
Imports of goods and services 4 649 5 357 4 460
Current account balance -1 001 -1 513 -818
Capital and financial account balance g 1 093 1 499 1 024
Overall balance 92 -14 207
Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on 




 Twelve-month variation to October 2009.
c
 Estimate based on data from January to September.
d
 A negative rate indicates an appreciation of the currency in real terms.
e
 Year-on-year average variation, January to October.
f
 Average from January to September, annualized.
g
 Includes errors and omissions.










































































PANAMA: GDP AND INFLATION
Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on 
the basis of official figures.
Panama
In 2009, Panama’s economy slowed sharply and grew only 2.5%, compared to the 9% average 
annual rate registered over the previous five years. This performance reflected the fact that, 
though some domestic market sectors performed well, they were unable to offset the contraction 
in activities related to the external sector. Inflation, as measured by the consumer price index, 
came down and is estimated to end up at 2% year-on-year for December (it was 6.8% in 2008). 
Also, for the first time in three years the fiscal balance is expected to be in deficit (by 1.8% 
of GDP). The balance-of-payments current account deficit is expected to shrink to 9.2% of 
GDP because of the significant decrease in the trade deficit. In November 2009, Standard & 
Poor’s upgraded Panama’s long-term sovereign rating from stable to positive, stating that the 
country could shortly attain investment grade. 
In 2010, GDP is expected to grow 4.5%, helped along by an 
upswing in world trade and the execution of infrastructure 
projects begun some time back, including the construction 
of the third set of locks in the Panama Canal and widening 
of the coastal beltway. Growth could be even greater if 
some of the large investments announced by President 
Martinelli come to fruition, such as the construction of a 
subway in the capital, another international airport in the 
southern part of the country and social housing. Inflation 
is expected to remain low. Estimates point to a smaller 
fiscal deficit (1.4% of GDP), thanks to the economic 
upturn and to implementation of new fiscal reforms, some 
of which were approved in September 2009.
 A new fiscal and social responsibility law, which caps 
the fiscal deficit at 1% of GDP, went into effect in January 
2009. In June, the government obtained authorization to 
raise the ceiling to 2.5%. In 2009, following three years of 
surpluses, the non-financial public sector (NFPS) posted a 
deficit. During the first half of 2009 this deficit was 0.8% 
of GDP and is expected to climb an additional percentage 
point by year’s end, owing to the countercyclical fiscal 
policy deployed. For the period January to August 2009, 
the central government revenues fell off by 7.9%. Non-
tax revenue slid by 35%, while tax income was up 11%. 
Expenditures increased 15%. Panama placed a bond issue 
on the international market for US$ 323 million in March 
and another, for US$ 1 billion, in November.
 President Martinelli, who took office in July 2009, 
underscored that one of the goals of his administration 
is to modernize infrastructure projects and institute fiscal 
reform. In September, the Chamber passed a bill that, in 
addition to eliminating several exemptions and raising some 
taxes, for the first time will begin to consider activities of 
the Colón Free Zone (FTZ) as taxable transactions, subject 
to income tax. The next phase of the reform, expected to 
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be introduced in 2010, will seek to replace the current 
income tax with a single-rate tax.
 Because of the international financial crisis, the 
country’s banking system —foreign-owned and local 
banks alike— adopted a more precautionary stance. As the 
preference for liquidity increased, lending to most sectors 
began to fall from February 2009 onwards. In response, 
in March the government introduced a financial stimulus 
programme valued at 1.1 billion balboas, with resources 
from the Inter-American Development Bank (IDB), 
the Andean Development Corporation (CAF) and the 
National Bank of Panama, to encourage banks to resume 
local lending. By June, the programme had narrowed to 
600 million balboas, as IDB funding was excluded. The 
Panama Banking Association has expressed disagreement 
with the requirements for access to the stimulus fund since 
it was first set up. Since then, the programme resources 
have been practically unused and, though bank deposits 
have increased, lending continues to be sluggish. In 
September 2009, the nominal balance of bank lending 
to the private sector was 1.4% higher than 12 months 
earlier and only 0.5% higher than that of private banks, 
principally reflecting the 30% decline in new loans. 
 In 2009, the six-month deposit rate reversed the 
downward trend begun in 2008 and, by September, reached 
3.06%, which was 240 basis points above the London 
Inter-Bank Offered Rate (LIBOR). This contrasted the 
previous year in which the six-month deposit rate remained 
below LIBOR. Lending rates hovered close to their 2008 
closing levels. In September, the rate for credit cards was 
15.37% and for personal loans, 11.69%. In real terms 
this meant an increase in rates, given the lower inflation. 
An overly precautionary stance does reduce risks to the 
banking system, but it also restricts the countercyclical 
scope of some aspects of economic policy.
 In the second half of 2008 it became evident that 
Panama’s economy was slowing down. Nevertheless, 
between January and June 2009, real GDP growth was 2.4% 
up on the year-earlier period, driven primarily by growth 
in construction, transport, storage and communications. 
Growth in mining and construction reflected mainly 
works already under way, since new construction fell off 
significantly. Building work seems to have shifted away 
from multifamily luxury skyscrapers in the capital and 
towards lower-cost single family homes in the provinces. 
Expansion in the telecommunications sector was mainly 
the result of growth in cellular telephony. Manufacturing 
grew slightly, while agriculture, livestock and forestry 
declined, owing to adverse weather effects related to El 
Niño. Commerce also contracted. The monthly economic 
activity index showed an annualized decline of more than 
3% between July and August. The global recession acted 
as a drag on activity in the Panama Canal. The number of 
transits through the canal is estimated to have dropped by 
2.4% in 2009, with cargo volume down 3.4%. Revenue 
was up, however, thanks to a toll hike, which translated 
into some improvement in the canal’s cargo services and 
logistical support. 
 Inflation, as measured by the consumer price index, 
was down in 2009 because of lower prices for energy 
products and some foods. Year-on-year, the inflation 
rate dropped from 6.8% in December 2008 to 0.7% in 
October 2009, with a cumulative rate of 1.7% for January 
to October. The prices of electricity, gas and water (-10%) 
and transport (-1.9%) came down significantly. Furniture 
and household appliances posted the highest price increases 
(3.8%). Food and beverage inflation dropped off even 
more sharply, from 15.1% in December 2008 to 2.7% in 
October 2009. Estimates are that by the end of December 
2009, inflation for the year will be about 2%.
 Despite a shortage of data on the evolution of average 
wages, slowing inflation lessened erosion of real minimum 
wages, with nominal minimum pay remaining stable 
through November. The Minimum Wage Commission 
was formed in August 2009 and is expected to review 
wages in 2010. In August 2009 the unemployment rate 
was 6.6%, one percentage point higher than a year earlier. 
Unemployment rose faster in urban areas (7.9%) than in 
rural areas (3.9%), compared with 2008 when it was at 
6.5% and 3.7%, respectively.
PANAMA: MAIN ECONOMIC INDICATORS
2007 2008 2009 a
Annual growth rates
Gross domestic product 12.1 10.7 2.5
Per capita gross domestic product 10.2 8.9 0.9
Consumer prices 6.4 6.8 0.7 b
Average real wage 1.3 -0.6 ...
Real effective exchange rate c 1.4 -1.8 -5.8 d
Terms of trade -1.0 -4.5 4.2
Annual average percentages
Urban unemployment rate e 7.8 6.5 7.9
Central government
  overall balance/GDP 1.2 0.3 -1.8
Nominal deposit rate f 4.8 3.5 3.5 g
Nominal lending rate h 8.3 8.2 8.3 g
Millions of dollars
Exports of goods and services 14 263 16 153 16 209
Imports of goods and services 14 627 17 604 16 715
Current account balance -1 422 -2 792 -1 974
Capital and financial account balance i 2 044 3 377 2 124
Overall balance  622  584  150
Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on 




 Twelve-month variation to October 2009.
c
 A negative rate indicates an appreciation of the currency in real terms.
d
 Year-on-year average variation, January to October 2009.
e
 Includes hidden unemployment.
f
 Six-month deposits. 
g
 Average from January to September, annualized.
h
 On one-year loans for commercial activities.  
i
 Includes errors and omissions.
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 Between January and August 2009, the trade deficit 
was reduced by 52% because of a reduction in the goods 
trade deficit (39%) and an expansion in services trade 
surplus (4.8%). Imports of goods fell off by 8.9%, whereas 
exports climbed 5.8%, driven by activities in the Colón Free 
Zone (12.2%). Imports of services were down 18.8%, with 
exports up 2.4% due to higher receipts from tourism (1.5%) 
and Panama Canal transit tolls (8.2%). In September 2009, 
Canada and Panama signed a free trade agreement aiming 
to expand trade between the two countries. In 2008, the 
value of imports from Canada was 128 million balboas; 
exports to Canada amounted to a mere 3.4 million balboas. 
Also, during the first half of 2009, foreign direct investment 
was down 39% compared with the previous year.
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Bahamas
The recession in the Bahamian economy deepened in 2009 with growth estimated to contract 
by 3.9%, as the recession in its major market, the United States, led to a sharp fall in tourism 
and foreign direct investment and to less dynamic offshore financial services. The government 
implemented a series of fiscal stimulus measures to counter the downturn in demand and bolster 
economic activity. With reduced private-sector demand, monetary developments were marked 
by a slowdown in credit and a build-up in liquidity. The current account deficit decreased 
reflecting the weakness in import demand and lower fuel prices. Services exports fell owing 
mainly to the decline in tourism receipts. An upturn is expected in 2010 (2%), as growth 
returns following a recovery in the United States; inflation will then be fuelled by increased 
demand and higher commodity prices and the fiscal deficit will remain stable.
Economic policy in 2009 sought to provide an effective 
response to the recession in major markets and its 
repercussions on growth and employment in the Bahamas. The 
government’s stimulus programme has involved fast-tracking 
infrastructure projects and providing unemployment benefits 
to cushion the fall-out in terms of unemployment. 
 Shrinking revenues (-6.1%) and growth in expenditure 
(4.5%) led to an increase in the fiscal deficit from 2.0% 
of GDP in fiscal year 2007/08 to 3.0% of GDP in fiscal 
year 2008/09.1 Tax receipts were undermined by domestic 
recessionary conditions, which reduced the take from both 
domestic and border taxes. Taxes on international trade 
and transactions fell by 13% owing to reduced imports, 
and a 15% contraction in the proceeds of the departure 
tax. On the other hand, total expenditure increased by 
4.5%, boosted by higher current spending and outlays on 
the capital formation component of capital expenditure. 
Growth in current spending resulted from a 4.2% increase in 
outlays on wages and salaries, aimed partly at maintaining 
consumption during the downturn. Capital expenditure 
contracted by 6.7% owing partly to reduced acquisition 
of assets. Nevertheless, expenditure on capital formation, 
an important part of capital spending, rose by 8.8% and 
was associated with government building projects and 
1
 In the Bahamas, the fiscal year runs from 1 July to 30 June.
road works undertaken in order to stimulate activity. The 
deficit was financed through domestic borrowing and 
external loans and public-sector debt climbed to nearly 
50% of GDP, well above the medium-term objective of 
30% to 35% of GDP. Domestic debt accounted for 86% 
of the total. A fiscal deficit of 3.3% of GDP is projected 
for fiscal year 2009/10 with demand remaining weak 
at least into the early months of 2010 and some fiscal 
stimulus being maintained to spur growth.
 Monetary policy continued to target the build-up of 
reserves in order to maintain the pegged exchange rate, 
which has been a source of stability. The Bahamas received 
US$ 186.8 million in special drawing rights (SDRs) 
from IMF under the general allocation programme to 
help countries affected by the crisis. The central bank’s 
benchmark discount rate and prime lending rate remained 
unchanged and therefore did nothing to facilitate economic 
recovery. Dampened consumer confidence and business 
uncertainty led to a deceleration in credit growth to 5.9% 
year-on-year in June 2009 compared with 8.4% in June 
2008. The bulk of the credit allocated went to personal loans 
with little directed at stimulating productive activity. Credit 
quality worsened with consumer loan delinquencies rising 
by 7.2% to 33% during the second quarter of the year.
 Real output dropped by 3.9% in 2009, deepening the 
decline in 2008 (-1.7%). In the wake of the recession, the 
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mainstay of the economy —tourism— which accounts 
for around 50% of GDP, was badly weakened by the 
slump in demand from the United States. Real value 
added in tourism contracted during the year as growth 
in the cruise component was largely counterbalanced by 
a decline in the heavy-spending stay-over segment. The 
hosting of the Miss Universe event in August provided 
only a temporary boost to the tourism sector. The other 
key sector, financial services, also experienced a fall-off 
in activity. Construction slowed as the global financial 
crisis stifled foreign investment in the sector. 
 Inflationary pressures moderated to 3.5% (September-
September) with the slowdown in demand and the slackening 
of international prices of commodities, especially fuel. Of 
particular concern is the rise in unemployment, notably in 
tourism, from 12.1% in 2008 to 14.2% in May of 2009, 
the highest level in recent decades. A recovery in activity 
in 2010 is expected to lead to improved labour demand 
and lower unemployment.
 A sharp fall in merchandise imports (more than 20%) 
more than compensated for the reduction in the services 
and income surpluses, leading to a marked narrowing of 
the current account deficit from 13.3% of GDP in the 
first half of 2008 to 8.6% in the first half of 2009. Imports 
plummeted owing to stalled private-sector demand and lower 
prices for some commodities; fuel imports, in particular, 
plunged by some 40% following a sharp fall in both price 
and volumes. The services surplus declined by around 
5% as tourism receipts were down by around 6%. Foreign 
direct investment contracted, partly reflecting reduced land 
purchases. As a result, the capital and financial account 
surplus shrank by 5.1% and international reserves amounted 
to US$ 651 million, covering 12 weeks of imports.
BAHAMAS: MAIN ECONOMIC INDICATORS
2007 2008 2009 a
Annual percentage growth rates
Gross domestic product 0.7 -1.7 -3.9
Per capita gross domestic product -0.5 -2.9 -5.0
Consumer prices 2.4 4.8 0.8 b
Money (M1) 3.4 -1.7 -3.4 b
Annual average percentages
Unemployment rate c 7.9 8.7 12.4
Central government 
  overall balance/GDP d -2.4 -2.0 -3.0
Nominal deposit rate e 3.7 3.9 3.8 f
Nominal lending rate g 10.6 11.0 10.6 f
Millions of dollars
Exports of goods and services 3 401 3 499 703 h
Imports of goods and services 4 536 4 559 2 468 h
Current account balance -1 315 -1 118 -544
Capital and financial account balance i 1 269 1 228 919
Overall balance -46 109 375
Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on 




 Twelve-month variation to September 2009.
c




 Deposit rate, weighted average.
f
 Average from January to September, annualized.
g
 Lending and overdraft rate, weighted average.
h
 In 2009, refers to goods only.
i
 Includes errors and omissions.
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Barbados
The slowdown in the Barbados economy, which began in 2008, intensified with an estimated 
contraction of 3.6%, as the tourism, international business, and non-trade sectors declined 
significantly in the first half of 2009. The slide in international prices for commodities resulted 
in reduced inflation rates, lower total import values, and, consequently, an improved external 
current account. However, the sluggish pace of credit growth, the widening fiscal deficit 
and continuing pressure to sustain fiscal stimulation and debt levels suggest that the rate of 
recovery of the Barbados economy will be slow in 2010.
In terms of public finance, the accumulated fiscal deficit 
increased during the first half of 2009 to 5.7% of GDP, 
representing a worsening of the fiscal position from the 
end of 2008, when the deficit was equivalent to 3.5% of 
GDP. By mid 2009, total revenues declined by 1.2%, 
following an 11% reduction in indirect taxes, due to the 
economic slowdown. At the same time, current and capital 
expenditure increased by 10% and 2.8% respectively, over 
the previous year, as the government implemented fiscal 
stimulus measures in response to the global economic 
crisis. The increased deficit was financed by domestic 
borrowings. Central government debt thus increased from 
88% of GDP at the end of 2008 to over 100% in June 2009, 
while non-financial public-sector debt reached 110% of 
GDP that month. Domestic debt stood at 71% of total 
central government debt in June 2009.
Although an expansionary monetary policy was 
applied, credit to the non-financial institutions was 
sluggish with only 0.3% growth in the first half of 2009, 
compared with 2.7% in the corresponding half of 2008. 
Deposit growth also slowed to 1.0% relative to 6% in 
the same period in 2008, while the liquid assets ratio 
increased from 9.0% in 2008 to 10.4% in June 2009. 
In August, the Central Bank of Barbados lowered the 
benchmark deposit rate to 2.5%, which represents a 
further reduction from the 2008 level of 4.5%. Minor 
adjustments were also made to the prime lending rate, 
which ranged between 8.15% and 9.20% at the end of 
July, 2009, compared with 9.0% - 9.8% one year earlier. 
The three-month treasury bill rate also fell from 4.81% at 
the end of 2008 to 3.56% by September 2009. Although 
these actions were considered successful, the prevailing 
international climate weakened domestic loan demand, 
which in turn tempered the impact of reduced interest 
rates on domestic credit. 
The global economic downturn also moderated 
inflationary trends in Barbados since the last quarter 
of 2008. From 8.9% in June 2008, inflation fell to 
1.8% in June 2009. Unemployment also increased from 
8.6% in June 2008 to 9.9% in June 2009 with female 
unemployment being slightly higher at 10.1%. The 
higher unemployment figure is attributable to job losses 
in tourism, construction, quarrying, transportation and 
communication and general services.
The two key sectors, tourism and international 
business and finance, declined significantly, as stay-over 
arrivals fell by 10.4%, while the registration of new 
international businesses fell by 37% during the first half 
of the calendar year. Further real-sector declines were 
observed for construction (-18.4%), and mining and 
quarrying (-35.6%) in that period. Marginal declines 
were also observed for the non-traded sectors, where 
wholesale and retail activity and transportation, storage 
and communications both contracted by 2.8%. At the same 
time, however, the agricultural sector grew slightly, led 
by non-sugar agriculture and fishing with 1.5%, while 
the sugar industry showed 1.2% growth. In sum, the 
economy is expected to contract by 3.6% in 2009.
Another outcome of the global economic contraction 
was an improvement in the current account situation 
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(from a deficit of 10% of GDP in 2008 to a projected 
deficit of approximately 5% in 2009), as imports fell 
by 27.9% between January and June 2009. Exports also 
declined by 17%, while travel credits from services fell 
by 10%. The capital and financial account surplus also 
suffered a 20% reduction when compared with the first 
three quarters of 2008, because of a substantial decline in 
private capital inflows. However, significant public sector 
borrowings on the regional market bolstered long-term 
capital inflows. Net international reserves were further 
boosted by a government bond issue in the third quarter 
of 2009, and additional special drawing rights issued by 
the International Monetary Fund.
The overall outlook for the Barbados economy remains 
weak, with real GDP growth projected to contract by 
3.6% in 2009 and modest recovery of 2% forecast for 
2010. This is based on the performance expected in the 
tourism sector, which is not likely to rebound until the 
global economy regains significant growth momentum. 
The capital and financial account is also unlikely to 
recover over the short term, and could face increasing 
pressure as the government grapples with mounting public 
debt. Lastly, the need to sustain fiscal stimulation with 
stagnating government revenues suggests a worsening 
of the fiscal deficit for 2009/2010.
BARBADOS: MAIN ECONOMIC INDICATORS
2007 2008 2009 a
Annual percentage growth rates
Gross domestic product 3.4 0.2 -3.6
Per capita gross domestic product 3.0 0.2 -4.0
Consumer prices 4.7 7.3 1.4 b
Money (M1) 20.5 -3.4 -4.6 c
Annual average percentages
Open unemployment rate d 7.4 8.1 10.0 e
Non-financial public-sector
  overall balance/GDP f -1.8 -5.9 -3.2
Nominal deposit rate g 5.5 4.9 3.6 h
Nominal lending rate i 10.4 9.7 8.8 h
Millions of dollars
Exports of goods and services 2 117 2 050 380 j
Imports of goods and services 2 344 2 429 1 303 j
Current account balance -182 -363 -187
Capital and financial account balance k 461 142 ...
Overall balance 278 -221 ...
Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the 




 Twelve-month variation to July 2009.
c
 Twelve-month variation to August 2009.
d
 Includes hidden unemployment.
e




 Interest rate on savings.
h
 Average from January to August, annualized.
i
 Prime lending rate.  
j
 In 2009, refers to goods only.
k
 Includes errors and omissions.
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Belize
The year 2009 saw a reversal of the robust growth achieved in 2008 (3.8%) with the economy 
expected to contract by 0.5% owing mainly to declines in agriculture and tourism. Falling 
international prices led to a fall in year-on-year inflation to -3.5% in August, compared with 
a positive rate of 4.4% in November 2008. Fiscal policy remained strained given the level of 
public-sector indebtedness; however, the government was able to achieve a primary and overall 
surplus in the first quarter of fiscal year 2009/2010.1 Monetary policy focused on maintaining 
the stability of the peg. Reflecting slackening domestic demand, the current account deficit 
narrowed to around 4% of GDP in June 2009. Economic performance is expected to recover 
in 2010 with growth forecast to reach 2%. 
1
  In Belize, the fiscal year runs from 1 April to 31 March.
The economic downturn and the fall-out on the employment 
situation were such that some fiscal stimulus was needed to 
cushion the impact, but high public debt limited the scope 
for countercyclical measures. The government brought 
forward spending on roads and other infrastructure projects. 
Moreover, it nationalized the major telecommunications 
provider, Belize Telemedia Limited, amid concern over 
the agreement negotiated with the previous administration. 
The intention, however, is that the corporation should 
soon return to private hands. 
 Government revenues fell in the first quarter of fiscal 
year 2009/2010, but, at the same time, the authorities 
curbed expenditure, thus achieving an overall fiscal surplus 
of 1.2% of GDP, and a primary surplus of 1.6% of GDP 
(up from an overall surplus 0.3% of GDP in fiscal year 
2008/2009). This surplus enabled the government to pay 
off a commercial bank loan. Nevertheless, public-sector 
debt edged up from 82.7% of GDP at the end of 2008 
to 86.8% of GDP in September 2009, thanks mainly to 
loans from the Inter-American Development Bank and 
the Caribbean Development Bank. Belize also benefited 
from a US$ 13.9 million tranche under the IMF emergency 
assistance for natural disasters. Lower international interest 
rates facilitated a reduction in debt service payments. 
However, sharp falls in tax and non-tax receipts and a 
marginal decline in expenditure are expected to result in 
a smaller surplus at the end of the current fiscal year.
 Monetary policy was neutral and did not provide the 
impetus for credit expansion. The central bank maintained 
its reserve requirement and widened interest spreads despite 
the weak demand for credit. Sluggish demand slowed 
broad money growth by 5.0% in the first half of 2009 to 
roughly half of the level recorded in the corresponding 
period of 2008. Commercial banks repaid foreign debt 
obligations, thus succeeding in improving their net foreign 
asset position. Therefore, growth in credit to the private 
sector was weak (1.4%), providing very little stimulus to 
the economy. The central bank eliminated the fixed rate 
on treasury bills during the year to allow banks to bid 
competitively, as part of a monetary policy reform.
 Real output is expected to contract by 0.5% in 
2009 as the pass-through effects of the global downturn 
constrained domestic activity, especially in the tradable 
sectors. Agriculture, the main productive sector, declined 
by 10.9% in the first half of the year as a result of falling 
output of citrus and bananas. Tourism, the third-ranking 
productive activity, contracted by 10% mainly as a result 
of the decline in stay-over visitors (down by 5.2% for the 
first eight months of the year), as demand from the United 
States market softened. Manufacturing was vibrant thanks 
to a 40.8% increase in petroleum production, boosted by 
the addition of two new wells.
 Inflation fell to -3.5% (year-on-year in August) owing 
to a sharp decline in fuel prices and food prices. With the 
recession reducing employment in the construction and 
other sectors, it was only to be expected that unemployment 
would increase in 2009.
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 A sharp contraction in merchandise imports (-21% 
in the first half of 2009), which more than offset the 18% 
fall in goods exports, tourism and remittances, resulted 
in a narrowing of the current account deficit from 8% of 
GDP in the first half of 2008 to 4% of GDP in the first 
half of 2009. Imports plummeted following the winding 
down of large investment projects, a significant drop in oil 
prices and a contraction in imports into the Commercial 
Free Zone, due to weaker demand. Over the first eight 
months of 2009, petroleum exports plunged by almost 60% 
following the steep fall in oil prices and in spite of higher 
export volumes. Uncertainty due to the global crisis has 
led to a slowdown in foreign direct investment in the oil 
sector and tourism and a reduction in loan repayments by 
domestic commercial banks. This has resulted in a 59% 
decline in the financial and capital account surplus. The 
reserves position swelled by US$ 10.6 million to stand at 
US$ 177.1 million (a sum bolstered by the one-off special 
drawing rights allocation received in August). Thus, the 
country’s reserves represent 3.3 months of import cover.
 The outlook for the economy suggests a slow recovery 
of 2% in 2010 in line with an upturn in the situation of its 
major trading partners. The current account is expected to 
worsen, however, as imports are likely to pick up with a 
stronger economy.
BELIZE: MAIN ECONOMIC INDICATORS
2007 2008 2009 a
Annual percentage growth rates
Gross domestic product 1.2 3.8 -0.5
Per capita gross domestic product -1.2 1.7 -2.4
Consumer prices 4.1 4.4 -3.5 b
Money (M1) 14.0 0.3 -1.6 c
Annual average percentages
Unemployment rate d 8.5 8.2 ...
Central government 
  overall balance/GDP e  0.0 0.3 1.2
Nominal deposit rate f 5.9 6.2 6.3 g
Nominal lending rate h 14.3 14.2 14.1 g
Millions of dollars
Exports of goods and services 880 853 396 i
Imports of goods and services 806 958 616 i
Current account balance -52 -150 -80
Capital and financial account balance j 75 208 130
Overall balance 23 58 50
Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on 




 Twelve-month variation to September 2009.
c
 Twelve-month variation to October 2009.
d




 Deposit rate, weighted average.
g
 Figure for March.
h
 Lending rate, weighted average.
i
 In 2009, refers to goods only.
j
 Includes errors and omissions.
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Cuba
The global economic crisis has had a profound effect on Cuba’s economy in 2009. The official 
growth target set for 2009 was reduced, first from 6% to 2.5%, then to 1.7%. The economy 
expanded by only 0.8% in the first half of the year. ECLAC estimates that growth through 
year-end will be 1%, much lower than in 2008, when it was 4.1%. Once again, the balance 
of payments posted a deficit equivalent to several percentage points of GDP which, given the 
scant possibilities of external borrowing, represented the main hindrance to growth. Inflation 
was negative, at -3.3%, while unemployment remained similar to its 2008 rate, at 1.6%. The 
fiscal deficit narrowed slightly from 6.9% of GDP in 2008 to 5% in 2009.
The Cuban economy encountered turbulence coming from 
three major external channels. First, the food bill rose 
because of higher prices and the loss of crops damaged by 
hurricanes that pummelled the country in 2008. Though 
international food prices dropped in 2009, they are still 
60% higher than they were in 2000. Second, the value 
of exports fell significantly. The international price of 
nickel, Cuba’s leading export, was down about 40% 
in 2009 following a similar decline in 2008. Third, the 
conditions for external financing tightened, as did access 
to credit from suppliers. Debt to suppliers is estimated to 
be between US$ 600 million and US$ 1 billion.
 Fiscal revenues decreased as a result of the crisis. 
Meanwhile, expenditures increased, especially in the first 
half of 2009, as a result of damage from the hurricanes 
that struck in 2008, causing losses worth 20% of GDP. In 
response, the government tightened its policy stance and 
in April conducted a thoroughgoing revision of budget 
expenditures and revenues, in order to identify additional 
savings and implement a leaner budget. 
 Other measures were taken, such as the rationing of 
electricity, which further stunted economic growth because 
it encompassed both the people and businesses. In July, the 
government implemented a second round of budget cuts, 
which meant a new and even more stringent electricity-
rationing plan and a reduction in the food products delivered 
to families. In both rounds of budget cuts the government 
sought to avoid negative impacts on investments that drive 
exports or promote import substitution.
 In 2009, the government continued to restructure 
the Cabinet and State apparatus, seeking to streamline 
bureaucracy and make it more efficient, avoid duplication 
and reduce the number of State institutions. Furthermore, 
a new agency, the Comptroller General of the Republic, 
was created to oversee the proper functioning of all of 
Cuba’s political, administrative and economic institutions. 
Subsidies and bonuses (including those for culture, sports 
and food) are under review so as to narrow their focus and 
lower costs to the State. Also under review is the list of 
products included on the ration card Cubans receive each 
month. Lastly, during the second half of the year, workplace 
lunches began to be replaced by a small wage increase.
 In 2009, Cuba had difficulty not only in borrowing new 
money, but also in servicing its existing debt. Therefore, 
the government has tried to renegotiate the external debt, 
postpone payments and seek extensions from creditors. 
The financial situation improved somewhat, thanks to a 
loan of approximately US$ 600 million from the People’s 
Republic of China.
 Monetary and exchange-rate policy was aimed at 
maintaining domestic equilibrium in the context of severe 
external disequilibrium. This goal was met, insofar as 
inflation was very low and the exchange rate remained 
steady. A new system for controlling foreign-currency 
expenditures was announced, to be administered in a 
decentralized fashion through ministries, rather than through 
the Currency Approval Committee. In the second half of 
2009, the central bank authorized payment of arrears to 
about 600 of Cuba’s supplier accounts, but only those 
that agreed to keep doing business with the country.
 After almost 50 years, Costa Rica and El Salvador re-
established diplomatic ties with Cuba, leaving the United 
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States as the only country in the hemisphere that still does 
not have diplomatic relations with the country. However, the 
Government of the United States softened some measures 
of its economic embargo that had been toughened by the 
previous administration. Restrictions were eased for travel 
by Cuban-Americans to the island and for sending family 
remittances and some items for personal use. 
 Government consumption increased 3.4% and was the 
main driver of the positive growth rate. On the other hand, 
gross investment plunged by almost 25%. Exports were up 
7.7%, while imports were down by 9.7%. By sector, goods 
declined by 3.6% and services registered positive growth.
 Agriculture was the only sector whose growth figures 
matched those of initial estimates by authorities, up 7% 
during the first half of the year. Short-cycle crops posted 
positive, and in some cases, high output growth, whereas 
longer-cycle crops, such as bananas, oranges, lemons, and 
pineapples —which are Cuba’s main exports— declined. 
Additionally, over 100,000 people were given rights to 
use some of the State’s land, which should lead to higher 
agricultural production in 2010.
 Growth in manufacturing fell owing to a drop in imports 
of inputs. The production of nickel, which generates as 
much foreign-currency revenue as tourism, also declined. 
Construction was down because of a shortage of workers 
and the suspension of most investment projects, but this 
was partially offset by reconstruction projects in hurricane-
damaged areas. On the other hand, communications 
performed well because restrictions were lifted on cellular 
telephone purchases. The public sector’s renovated fleet 
of vehicles spurred growth in the transport sector. 
 The number of tourists was up slightly, though 
revenues dropped because of lower average spending by 
tourists. Government services continued to grow, though 
at a slower rate than in prior years. 
 The government announced an increase in the monthly 
wages of Cuba’s 545,000 teachers and education employees, 
to begin in September. This increase of between 93 and 
166 pesos (or between US$ 4 and US$ 7.20) will cost 
the government 820 million pesos (or US$ 35.4 million) 
annually. Inflation was negative in markets that use domestic 
currency (the Cuban peso), while the unemployment rate 
remained low.
 Imports fell by more than one third, owing to slacker 
economic activity and the policy of doing away with 
non-essential imports. The contraction in exports was 
somewhat smaller and largely reflected the drop in value 
of nickel and citrus fruit exports. The rise in international 
sugar prices did not benefit the country because of its low 
production levels. For the second year in a row, the terms 
of trade suffered a significant deterioration.
CUBA: MAIN ECONOMIC INDICATORS
2007 2008 2009 a
Annual percentage growth rates
Gross domestic product 7.3 4.1 1.0
Per capita gross domestic product 7.2 4.1 1.0
Consumer prices b 10.6 -0.1 -1.7 c
Average real wage -0.9 -1.8 ...
Money (M1) 3.9 9.9 ...
Real effective exchange rate d 2.5 9.4 ...
Terms of trade 5.2 ... ...
Annual average percentages
Urban unemployment rate 1.8 1.6 ...
Central government 
  overall balance/GDP -3.2 -6.7 …
Nominal lending interest rate e 9.1 9.0 ...
Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the 






 Twelve-month variation to October 2009.
d
 A negative rate indicates an appreciation of the currency in real terms.
e
 Average of minimum and maximum rates on loans to enterprises.













































































DOMINICAN REPUBLIC: GDP AND INFLATION
Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on 
the basis of official figures.
Dominican Republic
Despite the recession in the United States and the credit difficulties that characterized the 
year, the Dominican economy managed to grow in 2009, at about 2.5%. Although this growth 
was significantly lower than the 8.4% average rate recorded in 2004-2008, it still represented 
a 1.1% increase in per capita GDP. Annualized inflation was about 6%, slightly higher than 
in 2008. Estimates put the deficits of the central government and current account at 3% and 
5.2% of GDP, respectively. ECLAC projects growth to exceed 3% in 2010 and inflation and 
the current account deficit to be similar to those of 2009. The central government’s deficit, 
meanwhile, is expected to decrease to 2.5%.
Throughout 2009, public policy decisions were driven 
by the unfolding international financial crisis. The 
government’s crisis response plan, announced at the 
start of the year, included, as pertains to fiscal policy, tax 
exemptions for the agricultural sector, incentives for the 
construction of low-cost housing, support for small- and 
medium-sized enterprises and the expansion of public 
investment, which experienced significant delays because 
of major problems securing financing. Monetary policy 
adopted an expansionist stance. As for social policy, the 
government announced that a number of programmes 
aimed at protecting the most vulnerable sectors would 
be broadened.
 The slowdown in economic activity significantly 
reduced government revenues. During the first half of 
2009, current income fell by 14% in real terms. Although 
during the same period current spending declined slightly 
(by 5.6%), capital expenditures were hit the hardest, 
shrinking by 30% in real terms.
 In light of the difficulties in obtaining external financing, 
for much of the year the government turned to the local 
market, a move that changed the composition of public 
debt and led to a slight deterioration in the short-term 
debt profile. In November 2009, the government signed 
a stand-by agreement with the International Monetary 
Fund (IMF) for US$ 1.7 billion.
 The consolidated public sector deficit rose from 
3.2% of GDP in 2008 to 4.5% in 2009. According to the 
targets agreed to with IMF, public debt would increase 
to 35% of GDP in 2009 and up to 40% by 2011, before 
gradually returning to 2009 levels towards 2014. The 
main elements of the fiscal consolidation strategy that 
the government negotiated with IMF are: reducing 
current expenditures on wages and salaries, restructuring 
of subsidies (particularly those that go to the electrical 
power industry) and a number of administrative measures 
to reduce tax evasion and improve the efficiency of tax 
collection. There are no plans for a tax increase. 
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 In order to inject liquidity into the financial system 
and to ease credit for both the productive sector and the 
housing market, during the first half of 2009, the reserve 
requirement for the banking sector and interest rates on 
central bank bonds were lowered. Debt repurchases were 
also approved as a short-term liquidity solution.
 Between January and August, the central bank lowered 
its benchmark rate from 9.5% to 4%. However, given 
the low inflation rate in 2009, real bank lending rates 
remained high, at an average of 18% through October 
2009, compared with 7.5% for the same period in 2008. 
Consequently, in real terms, lending to the private sector 
was negative, a trend that only turned around in the fourth 
quarter of 2009. Annual growth of lending to the private 
sector is expected to remain modest compared with lending 
to the public sector, which grew by almost 19%.
 The central bank participated actively in the foreign-
exchange market throughout the year, which allowed the 
Dominican peso to hold steady and depreciate by only 3%. 
For 2010, given the low international reserves and the low 
benchmark interest rate, not much leeway is expected for 
monetary policy. However, no major inflationary pressures 
are anticipated in a scenario of slow global recovery and, 
therefore, no changes are expected in monetary policy.
 Through the third quarter of 2009, cumulative GDP 
growth was 2.1%. The performance of agriculture, 
communications, banking and housing rentals offset 
downturns in the manufacturing and services sectors.
 Regarding expenditures, government consumption 
decreased significantly, whereas private consumption fell 
off only slightly. Some of this is attributable to the 2% drop 
in remittances from abroad and worsening conditions in the 
labour market. The broad unemployment rate during the 
first half of 2009 was 14.9% and is expected to be higher 
in the second half, which will have negative repercussions 
on social indicators. Gross capital formation declined by 
almost 20% during the first semester of 2009, heavily hit by 
the uncertainty stemming from the international crisis and 
by the high real interest rates that have prevailed all year.
 Since the last quarter of 2008, year-on-year inflation has 
slowed markedly, even turning negative in the third quarter 
of 2009. This decline is the result of lower international 
prices for food and fuels. Although year-on-year inflation 
in October was 4.6%, it is expected to rise by December 
as the low rates recorded in the closing months of 2008 are 
no longer factored into the twelve-trailing-month rate.
 During the period January-September 2009, the value of 
imports fell off by more than 30% owing to the significant 
drop in oil prices and to weaker domestic demand. It is 
important to point out that, during this period, imports of 
durable consumer goods and capital goods decreased by 
35% and 26%, respectively. The drop in imports offset the 
22.6% decline in exports, which was largely attributable 
to the suspension of iron nickel exports and a 15% drop 
in exports from free trade zones. The balance of services, 
for the first time, registered a decline in nominal tourism 
revenue, due to a 2% cumulative drop in the number of 
tourists visiting the country in 2009. For the year as a 
whole, it is anticipated that the current account deficit 
will narrow slightly, to an estimated 5.2% of GDP.
 After reaching a record high of US$ 2.885 billion in 
2008, foreign direct investment is expected to be about 
US$ 2 billion in 2009. The sectors that benefited most 
were mining, real estate and telecommunications.
DOMINICAN REPUBLIC: MAIN ECONOMIC INDICATORS
2007 2008 2009 a
Annual percentage growth rates
Gross domestic product 8.5 5.3 2.5
Per capita gross domestic product 6.9 3.8 1.1
Consumer prices 8.9 4.5 -0.3 b
Real minimun wage 4.7 -6.4 7.0 
Money (M1) 26.9 -7.4 -0.9 c
Terms of trade 3.3 -4.5 2.2
Annual average percentages
Urban unemployment rate d 15.6 14.1 14.9 e
Central government 
  overall balance/GDP 0.1 -3.2 -3.0
Nominal deposit rate f 7.0 10.3 8.8 g
Nominal lending rate h 11.7 16.0 14.0 g
Millions of dollars
Exports of goods and services 11 927 11 860 9 968
Imports of goods and services 15 343 17 914 13 941
Current account balance -2 096 -4 437 -2 353
Capital and financial account balance i 2 716 4 117 2 230
Overall balance 620 -320 -123
Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the 




 Twelve-month variation to October 2009.
c
 January-September 2009 variation.
d
 Includes hidden unemployment.
e
 Figure for April.
f
 Ninety-day certificates of deposit.
g
 Average from January to September, annualized.
h
 Prime rate. 
i
 Includes errors and omissions.
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Guyana
The economy of Guyana grew more slowly than expected in the first half of the year owing to a 
sharp contraction in its main economic sector —agriculture— and to a decline in mining, while 
construction, services and manufacturing expanded. Growth is therefore likely to reach only 
around 0.9% in 2009. The current account deficit is expected to narrow, reflecting declining 
imports due to lower prices of fuels and imported commodities. The urban inflation index 
stood at 1.3% for the first half of the year and should be no more than 2% at the end of the 
year. The outlook for 2010, based on the assumption that commodity prices will be favourable 
and that world demand will strengthen, is for a 3% expansion of the economy and for a rise 
in inflation in line with increasing fuel prices. In addition, the current account deficit should 
improve as remittances and exports recover.
The government’s overall deficit is expected to narrow from 
7.9% of GDP in 2008 to 6.5% in 2009, thanks to increasing 
revenues and declines in capital expenditure, while the 
current surplus increased by 50% in the first half of the 
year compared with the same period in 2008. This was 
due to an increase in current revenue (15%), attributable to 
higher collections of major taxes, especially excise duties 
(up by 54%), and income taxes from businesses and the 
self-employed, which rose by 4% and 5 % respectively. 
The deficit was financed by domestic loan receipts and 
external borrowing, thus the stock of public and public-
guaranteed debt increased from 103.7% of GDP at the end 
of 2008 to 115% of GDP at the end of June 2009 despite 
some debt alleviation under the Heavily Indebted Poor 
Countries (HIPC) Debt Initiative. At the end of June, the 
external debt stood at 78% of GDP, while domestic debt 
stood at 37.2% of GDP.
 In 2009 broad money expanded by 2.2% following 
a 10.4% increase in the banking system’s net foreign 
assets and a 11.4% decline in net domestic credit. Private 
sector credit growth was flat, although commercial 
bank interest rates dipped marginally. This slowdown 
in private sector lending is attributed to slacker demand 
for external trade financing.
 In terms of financial market developments, the 
Government of Guyana in September received US$ 15 million 
from the Caribbean Community (CARICOM) Petroleum 
Fund, to enable it to deal with the collapse of the Colonial 
Life Insurance Company Guyana (CLICO Guyana). The 
emergency fund was used to pay CLICO Guyana policyholders 
since the company had been declared insolvent.
 Growth in 2009 is likely to be much lower than 
the earlier projection of 4% presented in the budget in 
February. The economy grew less than expected in the 
first half of the year as a result of a 7.2% contraction in the 
agriculture sector, which accounts for approximately 20% 
of GDP. Adverse weather conditions and industrial unrest 
led to a 19.7% slump in sugar production compared with 
the end of June 2008 and rice production was also weak 
(down by 6.7%). Mining contracted, reflecting sluggish 
demand for bauxite and alumina on international markets, 
while quarrying also diminished. Conversely, services, 
which contribute significantly to GDP, recorded positive 
growth, as did construction and manufacturing.
 Inflation for the period January-June 2009 stood at 
1.3% compared with 5.8% in the corresponding period 
of 2008. As a result, inflation is expected to be below 
2% in 2009. This decline is due to lower food and fuel 
prices on the world market. 
 Data for the first half of the year point to a narrowing 
of the current account deficit from 16.9% of GDP in 2008 
to 10% in 2009, reflecting a reduction in the import bill due 
to lower fuel prices and a softening of domestic demand. 
Export earnings also fell compared with the same period 
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in 2008 owing to weaker commodity prices and slower 
export growth. Workers’ remittances, another major source 
of foreign exchange, dropped by 10 % since June 2008 
to stand at 19% of GDP in June 2009. The capital and 
financial account surplus rose, despite smaller flows of 
FDI. Overall, the balance of payments posted a surplus 
and gross reserves expanded to US$ 405.1 million or 
3.6 months’ imports of goods and services.
 The outlook for 2010 is positive with growth 
prospects (3%) barring any significant fall in sugar and 
rice prices. In addition, bauxite exports should rally on 
the back of stronger global demand and thus contribute 
to an improvement in the current account balance.
GUYANA: MAIN ECONOMIC INDICATORS
2007 2008 2009 a
Annual percentage growth rates
Gross domestic product 5.3 3.1 0.9
Per capita gross domestic product 5.3 3.2 1.0
Consumer prices 14.1 6.4 1.3 b
Money (M1) 12.8 12.5 3.2 c
Annual average percentages
Central government
  overall balance/GDP -7.5 -7.9 -6.5
Nominal deposit rate d 3.2 3.1 2.8 e
Nominal lending rate f 14.1 13.9 14.0 e
Millons of dollars
Exports of goods and services  698  798  650
Imports of goods and services 1 063 1 300 1 000
Current account balance -189 -299 -195
Capital and financial account balance g 188 306 428
Overall balance -1 7 233
Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the 
basis of official figures. 
a
  Preliminary estimates.
b
 January-June 2009 variation.
c
 Twelve-month variation to September 2008.
d
 Small savings rate.
e




 Includes errors and omissions.
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Haiti 1
Despite the global recession, the Haitian economy is estimated to have grown by 2% in 2009, 
owing in part to an upturn in the agricultural sector and a 14% reduction in the deficit of the 
balance-of-payments current account. Another positive development was fall in the inflation rate. 
The year-on-year price variation (-4.7% as at September 2009) and the annual average inflation 
rate (3.4%) were significantly lower than in 2008 (19.8% and 14.4%, respectively). 
1
 This study refers to fiscal year 2009 (October 2008 to September 
2009); however, in some cases, in order to facilitate comparison 
with other regional data, the reported statistics correspond to the 
calendar year. 
The fiscal deficit —1.7% of GDP— was financed from 
limited external funding. Nevertheless, having reached 
completion point under the Heavily Indebted Poor Countries 
(HIPC) debt relief programme in June 2009, Haiti had 
approximately US$ 900 million of its debt forgiven and 
its debt service will be reduced by nearly US$ 48 million 
annually. The country’s foreign-debt-to-GDP ratio dropped 
from 31% in 2008 to 19% in 2009. 
Despite the crisis in the United States, remittances 
rose slightly, to US$ 1.281 billion, which helped to sustain 
consumption. Public sector investments were lower than 
initially forecast, despite higher-than-expected growth in 
the agricultural and infrastructure sectors. 
To lessen the impact of natural disasters in 2008 
(the cost of which was equivalent to 15% of GDP), the 
government adopted a special spending policy, which 
started to be rolled out at the beginning of fiscal year 
2009. Nevertheless, the results indicate that the budget 
continues to be considerably under-executed in several 
key economic sectors. 
In 2009, the socio-economic setting in Haiti was 
marked by, among other things, legislative elections in 
April and June and a protracted standoff among different 
sectors of the executive and legislative branches and 
other social stakeholders on the proposal to raise the 
daily minimum wage from 70 to 200 gourdes (US$ 2 to 
US$ 5). In the end, it was set at US$ 4. 
In late October 2009, with the removal from office of 
the prime minister —following a vote of no confidence 
by Congress— it appeared that a new political crisis 
might break out. Nevertheless, unlike in 2008, when the 
vacuum in government lasted nearly five months, this 
time the new prime minister and his cabinet were ratified 
in just two weeks. The general policy criteria of the new 
authorities do not appear to herald major changes, and 
certain initiatives still under negotiation are expected to 
materialize, in particular, the extension for three more 
years of the Poverty Reduction and Growth Facility with 
the International Monetary Fund (IMF). 
The primary and overall fiscal deficits (0.8% and 1.7% of 
GDP, respectively) were slightly up on 2008. Fiscal revenue 
(12.3% of GDP) remained relatively close to the targets 
agreed with IMF for 2009. Despite the lower import bill, 
real revenue grew by 14.6% thanks to growth in revenue 
from tariff collections (9.6%) and the implementation of 
stricter measures to control tax evasion. Indirect taxation 
collected by way of value added tax (VAT) rose by 7.3%, 
compared with a 49% increase in revenue from fees and 
permits. The impact of higher rates, especially for electric 
power (which doubled in price in July), and other payments 
and fees will likely be felt in fiscal year 2010. 
Organically financed public sector investment 
expenditures decreased by 70%. Nevertheless, public 
investment programme outlays on infrastructure, agricultural 
projects, equipment purchases and other items were enough 
to push up public investment in April and end 2009 with 
a net increase over 2008. 
Transfers to the electricity sector (composed of public 
and private cogeneration enterprises) stood at close to 
US$ 100 million, because of the purchase of hydrocarbons 
and payments for cogeneration services. These items 
accounted for nearly 40% of the central government’s 
operating expenses. 
In accordance with terms set forth in the programme 
agreed upon with IMF, the fiscal deficit (1.7% of GDP) 
was partially defrayed by the monetary authorities, who 
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sterilized the increased liquidity in the economy through 
net hard currency sales amounting to US$ 66 million. 
It is estimated that GDP will grow by 2% in 2010, 
driven by more expansionary public spending aimed at 
stimulating the economy, as well as the electoral calendar 
—with legislative elections scheduled for the beginning 
of the year and the presidential election for year-end. 
The monetary base expanded by 14%. From May 2009 
onwards, the central bank began lowering its benchmark 
rate (from 7% to 3.9% overall), which represented a 
loosening of its monetary policy stance. Bank interest rates 
also fell, although less sharply. In the last two quarters real 
deposit rates increased for the first time in three years, by 
2% and 5%, respectively, as a consequence of deflation. 
Meanwhile, lending rates rose to more than 20%, which 
explains why the upturn in private credit was a modest 
6.1% even though overall lending was up by 16.6% on 
the back of the 33.9% rise in the public component. 
The gourde depreciated 6.3% in nominal terms. In real 
terms, however, the depreciation was only 2.5%, owing 
to the central bank’s multiple interventions sustained by 
international reserves, which stood at to US$ 314 million 
—up US$ 19 million from the close of 2008. Demand for 
foreign currency for payment of external suppliers and for 
debt servicing was lower than in 2008. Nevertheless, the 
reduction in remittances and foreign assistance inflows 
may also have had a hand in the change of direction in 
the real exchange rate. 
GDP growth gained strength in 2009 (2%), thanks 
mainly to the strong performance of agriculture and growth 
in several other sectors, including the maquila industry, 
electric power (with a sharp rise in generation as three 
new thermal power plants came on stream), construction 
and commerce.
In 2009, the average annual inflation rate, at 3.4%, 
was far below the 14.4% rate recorded in 2008, due to 
the sharp fall in international food and hydrocarbon 
prices. Year-on-year variations at the end of the fiscal 
year (September 2009), both of the general index, which 
declined by 4.9%, and of the food index, which was down 
9.9%, reflect this deflation. 
For fiscal year 2010, the new daily minimum wage was 
set at 150 gourdes (approximately US$ 4). Fluctuations 
in employment levels were associated with temporary 
hirings (for public works and sanitation) in the framework 
of the emergency programme approved in the wake of 
the disasters in 2008. 
The current account deficit narrowed from 4.6% of 
GDP in 2008 to 1.0% in 2009. Exports increased by 12%, 
mainly because of a 16% jump in those of the maquila 
sector, while imports fell by 8%. Import volumes rose for 
some products, however, especially hydrocarbons (12%). 
The terms of trade improved significantly, in part owing 
to the higher value of exports but especially thanks to 
a considerably smaller import bill. The capital account 
showed extraordinary inflows stemming from the debt 
forgiveness programme, while FDI flows rose by 24% 
from 2008, to US$ 37 million, and could rise even further 
if certain recent initiatives materialize. 
HAITI: MAIN ECONOMIC INDICATORS
2007 2008 2009 a
Annual percentage growth rates
Gross domestic product 3.4 1.3 2.0
Per capita gross domestic product 1.7 -0.4 0.3
Consumer prices 10.0 10.1 -3.5 b
Real minimun wage -7.8 -12.9 28.0
Money (M1) 12.7 17.9 15.1 c
Terms of trade -2.8 -28.1 30.8
Annual average percentages
Central government 
  overall balance/GDP d -1.6 -1.2 -1.7
Nominal deposit rate e 5.2 2.4 1.7 f
Nominal lending rate g 31.2 23.3 21.7  f
Millions of dollars
Exports of goods and services  779  833  896
Imports of goods and services 2 292 2 891 2 764
Current account balance  7 - 277 - 68
Capital and financial account balance h  148  374  64
Overall balance  154  98 - 4
Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on 




 Twelve-month variation to October 2009.
c




 Average of minimum and maximum rates on time deposits.
f
 Average from January to October, annualized.
g
 Average of minimum and maximum lending rates.
h
 Includes errors and omissions.




































































































JAMAICA: GDP, INFLATION AND UNEMPLOYMENT
Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on 
the basis of official figures.
Jamaica
The world economic crisis has seriously exacerbated Jamaica’s already dire economic situation 
and the government is in negotiation with the International Monetary Fund (IMF) for an 
agreement in the amount of US$ 1.2 billion, or 10% of the country’s GDP. Underlying these 
difficulties are chronic fiscal deficits, the high public debt-to-GDP ratio (110% in 2008) and 
difficulties in financing the 2009/2010 budget. Furthermore, reduced foreign-exchange inflows 
from remittances and exports of services and downward pressure on the currency have led 
international rating agencies to downgrade the country’s sovereign rating. The economy is 
expected to contract by 3% in 2009 with a slow recovery in 2010, when growth is projected 
to reach 1%. 
In September, the government presented a supplementary 
budget for fiscal year 2009/2010,1 in which it revised the 
fiscal deficit from 5.5% to 8.7% of GDP to take into account 
a 1.9% decline in revenue and grants between April and 
September 2009 compared with the same period in 2008 and 
a 29% rise in recurrent expenditure over the same period. 
This expanding deficit also reflected an increase of 115% 
in domestic loan receipts. With revenue expected to fall 
further, the fiscal deficit will probably widen more to about 
12% of GDP in fiscal year 2009/2010. The adjustments 
needed to address the fiscal deficit will force the government 
to reduce primary expenditure, and this is likely to push 
up the unemployment rate, which had already risen from 
10.6% at the end of 2008 to 11.3% in July 2009.
 Between January and September, the public debt stock 
increased by 2.6 % to J$1.16 billion, of which 55% was 
external debt. The debt service ratio had been rising from 
13.5% in fiscal year 2007/2008 to 14.6% in fiscal year 
2008/2009. Relatively weak import demand by mid-year, 
together with the receipt of US$330.8 million in special 
drawing rights from the IMF, helped to maintain stability 
in the exchange rate. 
 The Bank of Jamaica employed a less restrictive monetary 
policy stance in the September quarter as inflation declined 
and thus interest rates on its securities were generally 
reduced. For instance, the Bank cut its 80-day repurchase 
agreement (repo) rate by 17% in mid-September. Despite 
1
  In Jamaica the fiscal year runs from 1 April to 31 March.
the gradual reduction in lending rates, however, private 
sector credit also declined by 0.7 %, reflecting a continuing 
fall in private consumer spending and investment.
 The foreign-exchange market was relatively stable 
during the third quarter after a period of volatility between 
September 2008 and February 2009 during which the 
currency fell by 22 % in nominal terms. The exchange rate 
has now been stabilized at around 89 Jamaican dollars (J$) 
to the United States dollar, following intervention by the 
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central bank and some improvement in the current account. 
In light of the impending IMF agreement, the exchange rate 
is likely to remain stable through to the end of the year.
  In terms of growth performance, real GDP declined 
by 2.9% in the first quarter and by 3.7% in the second, so 
that the decrease for the first half of the year was 3.3%. 
This outcome was due to an 8.9% contraction in the 
goods-producing sector (made up of agriculture, mining, 
manufacturing and construction), which accounts for 
around a quarter of GDP. Mining and quarrying posted 
the sharpest decline (43.4%), largely due to a slump in 
bauxite and alumina production. The 50% cutback in 
production at the Alumina Partners of Jamaica (Alpart) 
plant has slashed foreign exchange earnings, revenues 
from bauxite production and the employment rate. 
 The contribution of services to GDP (around three 
quarters) declined by 1.4% in the first quarter, 0.6% in 
the second and an overall 1.2% for the half-year. In this 
sector, the steepest reduction (7.2%) was recorded in 
transport, storage and communication, while hotels and 
restaurants, which capture substantial income from tourism, 
recorded growth of 1.4%. This was due to a 3.4% increase 
in stay-over tourist arrivals in the first six months of the 
year. Visitors from all markets except Canada however, 
showed a decline. Arrivals of cruise ship passengers, the 
lower yield segment of tourists, were down by 14%. GDP 
is expected to contract by around 3% in 2009 and then 
start to recover to an estimated 1% in 2010. 
 Inflation eased during 2009, standing at 7.2% at 
the end of September. However, for the third quarter, 
it increased to 3.1%, up from 2.7% in the second. This 
marginal increase was due to higher fuel costs and 
shortages of some agricultural commodities. Overall, 
non-food inflation (3.7%) exceeded food inflation (2.2%). 
Inflation is now projected to be in the range of 10%-12% 
at the close of the year instead of the 14% forecast in the 
budget. This, however, is subject to depreciation of the 
Jamaican dollar, and to the extent of increases in oil and 
other commodity prices for the rest of the year.
 The balance-of-payments current account deficit 
narrowed substantially thanks to a sharper decline in imports 
than in exports. For the first seven months of 2009, the 
deficit stood at 3.8% of GDP, 83% lower than the deficit 
observed during the same period in 2008. The goods 
balance showed a deficit of 23% of GDP, 45% smaller than 
in 2008. Slacker domestic demand led to a fall of 39% in 
merchandise imports. Goods exports contracted by 54% 
and current transfers (which consist largely of workers’ 
remittances) by 10%. Owing to the increase in tourism, 
the surplus on the services account rose by 70%. On the 
other hand, the capital and financial accounts deteriorated 
by 85% relative to the period January to July 2008. Most 
of this decline in the capital account was the result of a 
fall in private investment flows (84.3%), due to growing 
uncertainty about the future of the Jamaican economy.
JAMAICA: MAIN ECONOMIC INDICATORS
2007 2008 2009 a
Annual percentage growth rates
Gross domestic product 1.4 -0.6 -3.0
Per capita gross domestic product 0.9 -1.0 -3.4
Consumer prices 16.8 16.9 7.7 b
Money (M1) 14.8 2.2 5.2 c
Real effective exchange rate d 3.5 -6.2 11.1 e
Annual average percentages
Unemployment rate f 9.8 10.6 11.3 g
Central government 
  overall balance/GDP h -4.7 -7.4 -11.0
Nominal deposit rate i 5.0 5.1 5.9 j
Nominal lending rate k 22.0 22.3 22.8 j
Millions of dollars
Exports of goods and services 5 069 5 539 1 400 l
Imports of goods and services 8 486 9 914 4 200 l
Current account balance -2 038 -2 794 -700
Capital and financial account balance m 1 598 2 689 836
Overall balance -440 -105 136
Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the 




 Twelve-month variation to October 2009.
c
 Twelve-month variation to September 2009.
d
 A negative rate indicates an appreciation of the currency in real terms.
e
 Year-on-year average variation, January to October.
f
 Includes hidden unemployment.
g




 Average interest rate on savings.
j
 Average from January to October, annualized.
k
 Average lending rate.
l
 In 2009, refers to goods only.
m
 Includes errors and omissions.
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Suriname
Despite adverse international conditions, the Suriname economy is expected to grow by 
2.5% in 2009 owing to strong gold prices and a buoyant oil industry. With lending rates at 
their lowest for decades, credit continued to expand without causing inflation (-4.5% for 
September-September). The current account surplus is expected to decline for the first time 
since 2005, but will remain positive thanks to gold and oil exports. Faced with a crippling 
decline in historically important bauxite revenue, fiscal authorities are expected to post only 
a marginal fiscal deficit by years’ end. Although the level of production capacity remains 
uncertain, stable growth is predicted for 2010.
A small fiscal deficit is expected for the end of the year, 
although half-year data showed a surplus equivalent to 
4.2% of GDP. This forecast is based on an estimated 
drop of 50% in revenue from the bauxite sector (revenue 
from the two major players BHP-Billiton and Suriname 
Aluminium Company (Suralco) are expected to fall by 
68%). Buoyed up by royalties and taxes from gold and 
crude oil, revenue should represent approximately 30% 
of GDP in 2009,, while expenditure should reach around 
31% of GDP. Wages and salaries pushed up expenditure 
by 3% to around 16% of GDP as the government began 
implementing the new salary system for public servants 
in advance of the 2010 elections. 
 Suriname reinforced its reputation as a reliable debtor 
after settling a decades-old debt with Brazil in August 
2009. The government’s priority now is to pay off its 
last line of debt with the United States. Total public debt 
increased marginally, however, from 25.2% to 25.7% of 
GDP, with domestic debt expanding slightly from 12.5% 
to 14.6% of GDP and external debt falling to 11.1% of 
GDP from 12.7% in 2008.
 Monetary policy remained loose without leading 
to inflation. The central bank’s policy is geared towards 
boosting credit availability, attracting foreign direct 
investment and accumulating reserves to defend the currency. 
Notwithstanding, lending rates fell only marginally from 
12% in December 2008 to 11.5% in September, probably 
because of increased depreciation expectations, while 
deposit rates increased by 0.2% to 6.5%. Credit to the 
public sector rose to 6% of GDP and private sector credit 
continued its expansion, soaring to 43% of GDP, up from 
36% of GDP in 2008. Year-on-year M1 swelled by 23% 
to reach 28.3% of GDP in the third quarter. 
 The quasi-fixed regime maintained the exchange 
rate at approximately S$ 2.745 to US$ 1, although 2009 
saw the rate go as high as S$ 2.79 to US$ 1 and as low 
as S$ 2.70 to US$ 1. After two unsuccessful attempts at 
remedying the shortage of United States dollars, which 
was due to imports as well as personal loans, the central 
bank widened the trading band for the United States dollar 
to S$ 2.71-S$ 2.85. 
 Boosted by an expansion in the gold and petroleum 
industries, GDP is expected to grow by 2.5% in 2009. 
Rosebel Gold Mines N.V. doubled its output between 
March and August 2009, and the value of its production 
for 2009 is expected to be three times as high as that 
of 2008. Staatsolie, the state oil company, continued 
refurbishment of its refinery started last year. In response 
to stronger demand for private housing and ongoing public 
infrastructure development projects, construction and 
commercial services continued to expand and accounts 
for 17% of GDP. Agriculture, which employs a sizable 
proportion of the workforce, and in particular the banana 
sector, received investments that should allow it to 
increase its productivity levels. Conversely, the aluminium 
sector’s potential failure is linked to the drastic drop in 
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inward foreign investment on which this sector has been 
highly dependent. If this trend continues, the results will 
be detrimental as mining and aluminium production 
are important contributors to GDP and key for export 
earnings. In 2010, the economy is expected to grow by 
around 4% on the back of increasing gold production and 
an expansion of the petroleum sector. 
 Weaker external prices brought the 12-month inflation 
rate down to -4.5% in September, a colossal drop from 
the rate of 18.1% recorded a year earlier. This negative 
rate is attributable to price decreases for the main items in 
the consumer price index basket: food and non-alcoholic 
beverages. Fuel prices also fell in 2009 in tandem with 
average oil prices. The expectation for 2010 is that inflation 
will increase with the global economic recovery and will 
close the year at 3.5%
 The current account surplus is expected to reach 
13% of GDP at the end of the year compared with 16% 
in 2008. Oil and gold prices, which had escalated by 
more than 40% (November-to-November), helped to 
offset the slump in the aluminium sector. As from June, 
the merchandise trade surplus worsened slightly, while 
the services account improved although it remained in 
deficit. The fall in foreign direct investment inflows, 
from 8% of GDP in 2008 to 0.2% of GDP in June 2009, 
weighed heavily upon the bauxite sector. At close of year, 
the capital and financial account will be in deficit, while 
the overall balance should remain positive. Strengthened 
by a special drawing rights allocation in August 2009, 
net international reserves amounted to seven months of 
import cover.
SURINAME: MAIN ECONOMIC INDICATORS
2007 2008 2009 a
Annual percentage growth rates
Gross domestic product 5.1 4.3 2.5
Per capita gross domestic product 4.1 3.3 1.5
Consumer prices 8.3 9.4 -5.4 b
Money (M1) 25.1 15.7 25.5 b
Annual average percentages
Central government
  overall balance/GDP 7.1 2.3 -1.0
Nominal deposit rate c 6.4 6.3 6.5 d
Nominal lending rate c 13.8 12.2 12.0 d
Millions of dollars
Exports of goods and services 1 604 1 993 1 500
Imports of goods and services 1 354 1 757 1 230
Current account balance 335 344 280
Capital and financial account balance e -158 -292 -9
Overall balance 177 52 271
Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the 




 Twelve-month variation to September 2008.
c
 Rates published by the International Monetary Fund.
d
 Average from January to July, annualized.
e
 Includes errors and omissions.
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Trinidad and Tobago
The global economic crisis has had a profound effect on the economy of Trinidad and Tobago, 
bringing 15 years of uninterrupted growth to a halt. According to projections, the economy 
contracted by about 0.5% in 2009. Inflation fell to one-digit levels starting in June, owing 
to a sharp slowdown in food inflation. The central government posted a deficit equivalent to 
5.3% of GDP in fiscal year 2008-2009.1 This deficit —the first since 2002— is due to lower 
international energy prices and a slowdown in economic activity. The sizeable current account 
surplus shrank by more than 40% between 2008 and 2009 —to almost 25% of GDP— owing to 
a significant reduction in the trade deficit, which, in turn, was due to falling international energy 
prices. Economic policy will continue to be guided by the Vision 2020 national development 
plan and, moving forward, the key economic challenge will continue to be to reduce reliance 
on the energy sector, which accounts for more than 45% of GDP, more than 85% of goods 
exports and more than half of tax receipts. Growth of 2% is projected for 2010.
1
 The fiscal year runs from 1 October to 30 September in Trinidad 
and Tobago. 
TRINIDAD AND TOBAGO: GDP, INFLATION AND UNEMPLOYMENT
Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on 
the basis of official figures.






















































































































Until mid-2009 monetary policy was focused mainly on 
curbing inflation. Since then, however, the aim of both 
fiscal and monetary policy has been to boost economic 
activity. The new policy mix, as well as the quasi-fixed 
exchange rate regime, is expected to remain in place in 
2010 with a view to maintain the stability of the nominal 
exchange rate with the United States dollar. 
 The central government posted a deficit equivalent to 
5.3% of GDP in fiscal year 2008-2009, compared with a 
7.8% surplus in the previous fiscal year. The worsening fiscal 
position stemmed from a 26% decline in tax receipts, only 
partially offset by an 18% reduction in capital expenditures 
from 2007-2008. Nevertheless, total spending was slightly 
up. Consequently, the non-energy deficit rose by more 
than 5 percentage points, to 18.3% of GDP, in fiscal year 
2008-2009. The fiscal gap was financed largely with public 
savings, in particular from the Infrastructure Development 
Fund. Still, the country’s fiscal position remains sound, with 
the equivalent of nearly 14% of GDP held in the Heritage 
Stabilization Fund and a relatively low public debt (31% 
of GDP). The public budget for fiscal year 2009-2010 
assumes 2% GDP growth, an average price of US$ 55 per 
barrel of oil and US$ 2.75 per million cubic feet of natural 
gas. The price of natural gas is crucial, since Trinidad 
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and Tobago’s economy is now heavily geared towards 
gas production, which accounts for more than 80% of 
total energy production. The new budget projects a fiscal 
deficit of 5.4% of GDP, and is oriented towards supporting 
economic recovery. The new property tax regime, which 
enters into force in January 2010, will introduce the rental 
value method for property valuations and lower, uniform 
tax rates throughout the country. 
 The decline in inflation, brought about by lower global 
food prices and sluggish domestic demand, allowed the 
central bank to cut its benchmark interest rate to stimulate 
economic activity. The repurchase rate was cut seven times 
in 2009 —from 8.75% in March to 5.75% in November. In a 
context of high liquidity and surplus reserves in commercial 
banks, the repo rate cuts are mainly a signalling mechanism, 
since most banks rarely resort to borrowing at this rate. 
The rate on three-month treasury bills dropped to 1.49% 
in October (1.85% in September), narrowing the spread 
with the equivalent rate in the United States to 141 basis 
points (175 basis points in September and 607 basis points 
at the start of the year). Lending continued to grow slowly, 
against a backdrop of weak domestic demand: year-on-
year credit growth fell from 5.3% in June 2009 to 2.1% in 
August —well below the 13.7% rate recorded in June 2008. 
Consumer lending contracted by 1.4% in the 12 months 
to August 2009, after having expanded by an average of 
3% during the first three months of the year and 11.3% in 
the first quarter of 2008. Given the inflation differential, 
the real exchange rate continued to appreciate until the 
beginning of the year, given that the central bank was able 
to maintain the quasi-fixed nominal exchange rate nearly 
unchanged —thanks to the country’s sound international 
reserve position. 
 The intervention by the government in CLICO Investment 
Bank (CIB) —which belonged to CL Financial Ltd., a major 
conglomerate with assets estimated to be worth 37% of 
the country’s GDP— in January 2009 in order to prevent 
contagion from spreading to other financial institutions 
continued, for the entire year, to be a key issue for both the 
central bank and the Ministry of Finance. In mid-2009, the 
fundamentals of the country’s banks remained strong, as the 
cash ratio reached 18% (compared with a legal minimum 
of 8%) and loan delinquency rates stood at about 2%. 
 The slight growth in the energy sector —stemming 
from refining activities— was insufficient to counter the 
impact of the economic slowdown in 2009. The non-energy 
sector is estimated to have contracted by nearly 5%, owing 
to a significant downturn in the services sector and in 
construction, in which both public and private projects 
were cancelled or put on hold. 
 After climbing to a 12-month rate of 11.3% in April, 
overall inflation began to subside, falling to 2.7% in 
October (compared with 14.5% in December 2008), the 
lowest rate since January 2003. The easing of inflation 
stemmed mainly from sharply lower food inflation 
—the main catalyst of domestic price hikes— which 
fell to 6.8% in September from 10.1% in June. In the 
last quarter of 2008, Trinidad and Tobago recorded its 
lowest unemployment rate ever (3.9%). However, this 
decline in unemployment was reversed in the first half 
of 2009, reaching 5.1% in June (compared with 4.6% a 
year earlier). The participation rate fell from 64.1% in 
the first quarter of 2009 to 63.6% in the second half of 
the year, reflecting a contraction of the labour force.
 The sharp decline in world energy prices signalled 
the end of Trinidad and Tobago’s export boom. The 
country’s import bill fell, as well, because of lower 
domestic demand along with lower international food 
prices. The trade surplus is expected to slide from 37% 
of GDP in 2008 to close to 30% in 2009. Hence, the 
current account surplus should decline from 34% to 24% 
of GDP in the same period. Together with the recurring 
shortfall in the capital and financial account, the smaller 
trade surplus is expected to reduce international reserves 
to some US$ 8.08 billion at the close of 2009 (down from 
US$ 9.83 billion one year earlier) —the equivalent of 
between 14 and 15 months’ imports. 
TRINIDAD AND TOBAGO: MAIN ECONOMIC INDICATORS
2007 2008 2009 a
Annual percentage growth rates
Gross domestic product 4.6 2.3 -0.5
Per capita gross domestic product 4.2 1.9 -0.9
Consumer prices 7.6 14.5 2.7 b
Money (M1) 12.0 10.1 24.5 c
Real effective exchange rate d -1.8 -5.1 -9.8 e
Annual average percentages
Unemployment rate f 5.6 4.6 5.1 g
Central government 
  overall balance / GDP h 1.8 7.8 -5.3
Nominal deposit rate i 2.4 2.4 2.1 j
Nominal lending rate k 10.5 12.3 12.6 j
Millions of dollars
Exports of goods 13 391 18 686 12 740
Imports of goods 7 670 9 622 6 628
Current account balance 5 364 8 792 5 247
Capital and financial account balance l -3 824 -6 086 -7 000
Overall balance 1 541 2 706 -1 753
Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the 




 Twelve-month variation to October 2009.
c
 Twelve-month variation to August 2009.
d
 A negative rate indicates an appreciation of the currency in real terms.
e
 Year-on-year average variation, January to October.
f
 Includes hidden unemployment.
g




 Average of savings rates.
j
 Average from January to July, annualized.
k
 Prime lending rate.
l
 Includes errors and omissions.
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Eastern Caribbean Currency Union
According to estimates of the Eastern Caribbean Central Bank (ECCB), the economies of 
the Eastern Caribbean Currency Union (ECCU) are expected to contract by about 5.6% in 
2009, a far worse result than the earlier zero-growth projections and the positive 1.9% growth 
reported in 2008. This expectation has been fuelled by the negative effects of the global 
crisis which manifested themselves through a steep decline in tourist activity, construction, 
and mining and quarrying. Consumer prices deflated by 0.8% in the first six months of 
2009 as commodity prices on the international market fell in the last quarter of 2008. The 
overall fiscal balances at the end of June 2009 improved as the deficit shrank from 3.0% of 
GDP in June 2008 to 1.7% of GDP in 2009, although the ratio of total public debt to GDP 
remained unsustainable at 96%. As the impact of the global crisis intensified and began to 
adversely affect the balance of payments, many countries resorted to borrowing from the 
International Monetary Fund (IMF).
Fiscal policy in the ECCU was focused on limiting the 
effects of the global crisis on the economies. To this end, 
the governments have agreed to an eight-point stabilization 
programme that includes financial, fiscal, debt management 
and safety net programmes and aims to ensure stability 
and to foster economic growth and development. At the 
end of June 2009, the fiscal accounts posted a primary 
surplus equivalent to 2.0% of GDP, up from 0.9% for 
the corresponding period in 2008. This was the result 
of a 36% increase in grants along with a 19% decline in 
capital expenditure. Hence, the overall public-sector deficit 
improved to 1.7% of GDP at the end of June 2009, from 
3.0% of GDP for the same period in 2008. 
 The total public-sector debt of ECCU swelled to 96% 
of GDP as at June 2009, compared to 89% of GDP in 
December 2008 as many countries increased their debt stock 
by borrowing from IMF, the Caribbean Development Bank 
(CDB) and the Bolivarian Alternative for Latin America and 
the Caribbean (ALBA), essentially the Bolivarian Republic 
of Venezuela, to cope with falling revenues, tourism receipts 
and remittances and, by extension, to ease the worsening of 
the balance of payments. These funds, most of which were 
received with less stringent conditionalities than in the past, 
will assist countries in the implementation of employment-
generating capital projects and in maintaining an active 
economic environment. Total external debt expanded slightly 
from 44% of GDP in 2008 to 46% of GDP in 2009, while 
domestic debt rose more significantly, from 45% of GDP 
in 2008 to 51% of GDP in 2009 for comparable periods. 
 Monetary policy remained neutral in 2009: there were 
no changes in the discount rate, which remained at 6.5%, 
and the statutory required reserve ratio of commercial 
banks remained at 6%. The inter-bank market rate 
increased slightly, from 6% in December 2008 to 6.6% 
in November 2009, indicating a tighter credit market. In 
light of the collapse of CLICO in January 2009 and the run 
on the Bank of Antigua in February 2009, the Monetary 
Council of ECCU agreed to enhance the regulatory and 
supervisory framework of the financial sector by establishing 
a Regulatory Oversight Committee. 
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 For the period January to August 2009, M1 shrank 
by approximately 8%, reflecting the decline in economic 
activity. Domestic credit was also down by 1.3%, with 
private-sector credit increasing slightly by 1.3% and net 
credit to the public sector declining by 37% owing to 
an increase in government deposits and reduced capital 
expenditure. The net assets of commercial banks declined 
in all countries except Dominica and Saint Kitts and 
Nevis. The level of foreign reserves in support of the 
fixed exchange rate nevertheless remained substantially 
above the statutory minimum of 60%. 
 The economies of the ECCU are expected to contract 
by 5.6% in 2009, in response to the decline in tourism 
(14%), construction (21%) and mining and quarrying 
(17%). In the mainstay tourism sector, overall tourists 
arrivals decreased by 9.2% in the second quarter of 2009, 
compared with the same period in 2008. The high-yield 
segment, stay-over visitors, declined by 14.6%, while 
cruise passengers increased by 18.4%. The drop in stay-
over visitors was particularly severe in Anguilla (18%), 
Grenada (22%) and Saint Kitts and Nevis (27%). Activity 
in the construction sector and the related mining and 
quarrying sector shrank as some public-sector projects 
were completed and private-sector construction projects 
(mainly major tourism projects) slowed down or came 
to a halt owing to the difficulties in accessing finance. 
Economic activity is expected to slowly recover in 2010, 
with growth estimated at 2%.
 Labour market conditions have worsened in 2009 
as the tourism and construction sectors remain sluggish. 
In Antigua and Barbuda, the situation was exacerbated 
by the closure of most businesses formerly owned by Sir 
Allen Stanford, who is currently on trial in the United 
States for fraud. At least 400 persons have lost their jobs 
as a result. In Saint Lucia, public servants received a 3.5% 
wage increase in May-June 2009. 
 The level of inflation measured by the CPI fell in 
all countries in the second quarter of 2009, dipping to 
-0.8% compared with 3.5% for the same period in 2008, 
as the prices of fuel and electricity, transportation and 
communication, housing and utilities decreased. All 
countries, with the exception of Antigua and Barbuda, 
which already posted a low inflation rate of 0.7% in 2008, 
reported substantial drops in inflation, with rates ranging 
from 0% to -2.0%. 
 In the external sector, the current account deficit 
declined by 12.7% to reach 34% of GDP at the end of 
June 2009. This was a slight improvement from December 
2008, when the current account deficit stood at almost 
40% of GDP and was achieved largely on account of the 
near 6% increase in exports (generated by the recovery 
of banana exports in Dominica and Saint Lucia after the 
drop in output caused by Hurricane Dean) and the very 
miniscule 0.3% decline in imports. The services account 
decreased by 19%, mainly because travel receipts slumped 
by approximately 16% owing to the downturn in stay-
over tourists. Despite the 21% decline in private capital 
flows and FDI, the surplus on the capital and financial 
account increased slightly, by 3%, mainly on account of 
the credit received by governments from IMF, CDB and 
ALBA. The Central Bank’s net international reserves also 
increased by 13.5% to reach US$ 858 million, covering 
three months of imports of goods and services.
EASTERN CARIBBEAN CURRENCY UNION:  
MAIN ECONOMIC INDICATORS
2007 2008 2009 a
Annual percentage growth rates 
Gross domestic product 5.4 1.4 -5.6
Consumer prices 5.5 4.8 -0.8 b
Money (M1) 10.4 5.9 -8.9 c
Annual average percentages
Central government 
  overall balance/GDP -3.9 -3.5 -1.1
Nominal deposit rate 3.3 3.3 3.3
Nominal lending rate 9.5 9.5 9.5
Millions of dollars
Exports of goods and services 2 135 1 903 1 833
Imports of goods and services 3 906 3 235 3 139
Current account balance -1 861 -1 404 -1 411
Capital and financial account balance d 1 902 1 395 1 550
Overall balance 40 -9 141
Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the 
basis of official figures. 
a
 Preliminary estimates. 
b
 January-June 2009 variation.
c
 Twelve-month variation to September 2008.
d
 Includes errors and omissions.
Statistical annex
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Table A-1
LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN: MAIN ECONOMIC INDICATORS
2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 a
Annual growth rates
Gross domestic product b 4.0 0.4 -0.4 2.2 6.1 5.0 5.8 5.8 4.1 -1.8
Per capita gross domestic product b 2.5 -1.0 -1.7 0.9 4.7 3.7 4.6 4.5 3.0 -2.9
Consumer prices c 9.0 6.1 12.2 8.5 7.4 6.1 5.0 6.5 8.2 4.5
Percentages
Urban open unemployment d 10.4 10.2 11.1 11.0 10.3 9.1 8.6 7.9 7.4 8.3
Total gross external debt/GDP e 35.1 36.4 39.9 39.9 34.4 25.1 21.0 20.0 18.2 f 19.3 g
Total gross external debt/
  exports of goods and services 172 181 178 169 138 101 84 82 73 f 75 g
Balance of payments h Millions of dollars
Current account balance -48 394 -53 753 -15 854 8 926 21 359 34 375 44 004 9 656 -34 961 -24 343
   Merchandise trade balance -361 -7 233 20 757 41 163 56 567 76 695 91 636 63 798 36 025 36 478
      Exports of goods f.o.b. 363 399 348 458 352 341 383 667 472 849 568 583 676 983 762 335 883 885 676 486
      Imports of goods f.o.b. 363 760 355 691 331 583 342 504 416 282 491 888 585 348 698 538 847 860 640 009
   Services trade balance -15 031 -17 619 -12 691 -11 295 -11 690 -15 745 -17 359 -24 013 -30 472 -25 253
   Income balance -54 437 -55 165 -53 634 -58 724 -68 579 -79 609 -93 974 -96 484 -106 897 -93 238
   Net current transfers 21 435 26 264 29 714 37 777 45 061 53 035 63 701 66 355 66 382 57 671
Capital and financial balance i 63 868 37 340 -10 089 1 538 -8 458 22 504 16 087 112 601 69 580 56 150
   Net foreign direct investment 71 479 66 033 50 219 37 151 48 618 53 766 30 176 88 751 91 532 63 587
   Other capital movements -7 611 -28 693 -60 308 -35 613 -57 076 -31 262 -14 089 23 850 -21 952 -7 436
Overall balance 15 474 -16 414 -25 943 10 463 12 902 56 879 60 091 122 257 34 620 31 808
   Variation in reserve assets j -7 261 193 3 524 -29 102 -21 771 -35 494 -47 161 -124 554 -38 712 -32 227
   Other financing -8 213 16 221 22 419 18 639 8 869 -21 385 -12 930 2 297 4 092 419
Net transfer of resources 951 -1 567 -41 426 -39 517 -69 266 -80 723 -97 561 13 678 -40 098 -44 487
Gross international reserves 171 298 169 408 167 959 201 185 227 838 263 207 320 757 459 550 510 457 ...
Fiscal sector k Percentages of GDP
Overall balance -2.9 -4.2 -4.3 -3.5 -2.3 -1.1 -1.3 -0.6 -1.2 -2.6
Primary balance 0.8 -0.8 -0.8 0.1 1.1 2.2 1.8 2.1 1.5 -0.1
Total revenue 21.5 22.1 22.2 22.2 22.9 24.8 25.0 23.8 24.2 22.7
   Tax revenue 17.1 17.6 17.8 17.8 18.2 19.2 19.8 18.6 18.6 ...
Total expenditure 24.3 26.3 26.5 25.7 25.2 25.9 26.2 24.5 25.2 25.2
Central-government public debt l 42.7 45.0 58.2 57.2 50.9 42.7 35.7 29.9 27.8 28.3
Public debt of the non-financial  
   public-sector l 48.0 50.2 65.0 62.6 55.8 47.6 40.4 33.4 31.4 31.7




 Based on official figures expressed in constant 2000 dollars.
c
 December-December variation. 
d
 The data for Argentina and Brazil have been adjusted to allow for changes in methodology in 2003 and 2002, respectively. 
e
 Estimates based on figures denominated in dollars at current prices. 
f
 Does not include Bahamas and Cuba.
g
 Does not include Bahamas, Barbados, Cuba and Guyana.
h
 Does not include Barbados, Belize, Cuba, Guyana, Saint Kitts and Nevis, Suriname and Trinidad and Tobago.
i
 Includes errors and omissions. 
j
 A minus sign (-) indicates an increase in reserve assets. 
k
 Central government, except for Ecuador, Mexico and the Plurinational State of Bolivia, whose coverage correspond to general government, non-financial public sector and public 
sector, respectively. Simple averages. 
l
 Includes information from 19 Latin American and Caribbean countries: Argentina, Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Dominican Republic, 
Ecuador, El Salvador, Guatemala, Haiti, Honduras, Mexico, Nicaragua, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Plurinational State of Bolivia and Uruguay.
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Table A-2
LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN: GROSS DOMESTIC PRODUCT 
 (Annual growth rates)
2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 a
Latin America and the Caribbean b 4.0 0.4 -0.4 2.2 6.1 5.0 5.8 5.8 4.1 -1.8
Antigua and Barbuda 1.5 2.0 2.5 5.2 7.0 4.2 13.3 9.1 0.2 -6.6
Argentina -0.8 -4.4 -10.9 8.8 9.0 9.2 8.5 8.7 6.8 0.7
Bahamas 3.7 -0.3 2.6 -0.9 -0.8 5.7 4.3 0.7 -1.7 -3.9
Barbados 2.3 -4.6 0.7 2.0 4.8 3.9 3.2 3.4 0.2 -3.6
Belize 12.3 5.0 5.1 9.3 4.6 3.0 4.7 1.2 3.8 -0.5
Bolivia (Plurinational State of) 2.5 1.7 2.5 2.7 4.2 4.4 4.8 4.6 6.1 3.5
Brazil 4.3 1.3 2.7 1.1 5.7 3.2 4.0 5.7 5.1 0.3
Chile 4.5 3.4 2.2 3.9 6.0 5.6 4.6 4.7 3.2 -1.8
Colombia 2.9 2.2 2.5 4.6 4.7 5.7 6.9 7.5 2.4 0.3
Costa Rica 1.8 1.1 2.9 6.4 4.3 5.9 8.8 7.8 2.6 -1.2
Cuba 5.9 3.2 1.4 3.8 5.8 11.2 12.1 7.3 4.1 1.0
Dominica 0.6 -3.8 -4.0 2.2 6.3 3.4 6.3 4.9 3.5 -1.5
Dominican Republic 5.7 1.8 5.8 -0.3 1.3 9.3 10.7 8.5 5.3 2.5
Ecuador 2.8 5.3 4.2 3.6 8.0 6.0 3.9 2.5 6.5 -0.4
El Salvador 2.2 1.7 2.3 2.3 1.9 3.1 4.2 4.7 2.5 -2.5
Grenada 12.0 -3.9 2.1 8.4 -6.5 12.0 -1.9 4.5 0.9 -5.0
Guatemala 3.6 2.3 3.9 2.5 3.2 3.3 5.4 6.3 4.0 -1.0
Guyana -0.7 1.6 1.2 -0.7 1.6 -2.0 5.1 5.3 3.1 0.9
Haiti 0.9 -1.0 -0.3 0.4 -3.5 1.8 2.3 3.4 1.3 2.0
Honduras 5.7 2.7 3.8 4.5 6.2 6.1 6.6 6.3 4.0 -3.0
Jamaica 0.7 1.3 1.0 3.5 1.4 1.0 2.7 1.4 -0.6 -3.0
Mexico 6.6 -0.0 0.8 1.4 4.0 3.3 5.0 3.4 1.3 -6.7
Nicaragua 4.1 3.0 0.8 2.5 5.3 4.3 3.9 3.2 3.2 -1.5
Panama  2.7 0.6 2.2 4.2 7.5 7.2 8.5 12.1 10.7 2.5
Paraguay -3.3 2.1 -0.0 3.8 4.1 2.9 4.3 6.8 5.8 -3.5
Peru 3.0 0.2 5.0 4.0 5.0 6.8 7.7 8.9 9.8 0.8
Saint Kitts and Nevis 4.3 2.0 1.0 0.5 7.6 5.6 5.5 2.0 4.6 -8.5
Saint Vincent and the Grenadines 1.8 2.2 3.8 3.1 6.6 2.1 9.5 8.4 1.1 -0.2
Saint Lucia -0.2 -5.9 2.0 4.1 4.9 5.0 5.9 2.2 0.8 -3.8
Suriname 1.9 5.7 2.7 6.8 0.5 7.2 3.9 5.1 4.3 2.5
Trinidad and Tobago 6.9 4.2 7.9 14.4 8.0 5.4 14.4 4.6 2.3 -0.5
Uruguay -1.4 -3.4 -11.0 2.2 11.8 6.6 7.0 7.6 8.9 1.2
Venezuela (Bolivarian Republic of) 3.7 3.4 -8.9 -7.8 18.3 10.3 9.9 8.2 4.8 -2.3
Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of official figures.
a Preliminary figures.
b
 Based on official figures expressed in 2000 dollars.
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Table A-3
LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN: PER CAPITA GROSS DOMESTIC PRODUCT 
(Annual growth rates)
2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 a
Latin America and the Caribbean b 2.5 -1.0 -1.7 0.9 4.7 3.7 4.6 4.5 3.0 -2.9
Antigua and Barbuda -1.2 -0.5 1.3 3.9 5.7 1.7 11.9 7.8 -1.0 -7.7
Argentina -1.9 -5.4 -11.8 7.8 8.0 8.1 7.4 7.6 5.7 -0.3
Bahamas 2.0 -1.6 1.3 -2.1 -2.1 4.4 2.7 -0.5 -2.9 -5.0
Barbados 2.3 -4.2 0.7 1.6 4.4 3.9 2.8 3.0 0.2 -4.0
Belize 9.2 2.5 2.7 6.9 2.3 0.8 2.5 -1.2 1.7 -2.4
Bolivia (Plurinational State of) 0.4 -0.4 0.4 0.7 2.2 2.5 2.9 2.7 4.3 1.7
Brazil 2.8 -0.1 1.2 -0.2 4.4 1.9 2.8 4.6 4.1 -0.6
Chile 3.2 2.2 1.0 2.8 4.9 4.5 3.5 3.6 2.1 -2.8
Colombia 1.2 0.5 0.8 3.0 3.0 4.1 5.3 6.0 0.9 -1.1
Costa Rica -0.5 -1.0 0.8 4.3 2.4 4.1 7.1 6.3 1.2 -2.5
Cuba 5.6 2.9 1.2 3.6 5.6 11.1 12.0 7.2 4.1 1.0
Dominica 0.6 -3.8 -4.0 2.2 6.3 4.9 6.3 4.9 3.5 -1.5
Dominican Republic 4.0 0.2 4.2 -1.8 -0.2 7.7 9.1 6.9 3.8 1.1
Ecuador 1.4 4.0 3.0 2.4 6.8 4.8 2.8 1.4 5.4 -1.4
El Salvador 1.6 1.2 1.9 2.0 1.5 2.7 3.8 4.2 2.1 -3.0
Grenada 12.0 -3.9 1.1 8.4 -6.5 11.0 -1.9 4.5 -0.1 -5.0
Guatemala 1.2 -0.1 1.3 0.0 0.6 0.7 2.8 3.7 1.5 -3.4
Guyana -0.7 1.5 0.9 -0.9 1.3 -2.1 5.1 5.3 3.2 1.0
Haiti -0.9 -2.7 -1.8 -1.2 -5.0 0.2 0.7 1.7 -0.4 0.3
Honduras 3.5 0.6 1.7 2.5 4.1 3.9 4.5 4.2 1.9 -4.9
Jamaica -0.1 0.5 0.2 2.7 0.7 0.3 2.1 0.9 -1.0 -3.4
Mexico 5.1 -1.3 -0.5 0.2 2.8 2.1 3.9 2.3 0.3 -7.7
Nicaragua 2.4 1.4 -0.6 1.2 4.0 2.9 2.5 1.8 1.9 -2.8
Panama  0.7 -1.3 0.4 2.3 5.6 5.3 6.7 10.2 8.9 0.9
Paraguay -5.3 -0.0 -2.0 1.8 2.1 0.9 2.4 4.8 3.9 -5.2
Peru 1.4 -1.2 3.6 2.6 3.6 5.5 6.4 7.6 8.5 -0.3
Saint Kitts and Nevis 2.1 -0.1 1.0 -1.6 5.4 5.6 3.4 2.0 2.6 -10.3
Saint Vincent and the Grenadines 1.8 2.2 3.8 3.1 5.6 2.1 9.5 8.4 1.1 -0.2
Saint Lucia -1.5 -7.1 1.4 2.8 3.7 4.4 4.6 0.9 0.3 -4.9
Suriname 0.6 4.2 1.2 5.5 -0.9 5.9 2.8 4.1 3.3 1.5
Trinidad and Tobago 6.5 3.8 7.5 14.1 7.5 5.1 14.0 4.2 1.9 -0.9
Uruguay -1.9 -3.6 -11.0 2.2 11.9 6.6 6.8 7.3 8.6 0.9
Venezuela (Bolivarian Republic of) 1.7 1.5 -10.5 -9.4 16.2 8.4 8.0 6.3 3.0 -3.9




 Based on official figures expressed in 2000 dollars.
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Table A-4
LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN: GROSS FIXED CAPITAL FORMATION a
 (Percentages of GDP)
2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 b
Latin America and the Caribbean 18.5 17.9 16.8 16.4 17.4 18.5 19.7 20.9 21.9 20.3 c
Argentina 16.2 14.3 10.2 12.9 15.9 17.9 19.5 20.4 20.9 18.6
Bahamas 32.1 29.9 29.7 31.0 28.7 33.8 39.5 39.1 35.3 …
Belize 28.7 25.6 23.1 18.1 16.4 17.2 16.7 17.4 16.7 …
Bolivia (Plurinational State of) 17.9 13.8 16.0 13.9 13.2 13.4 14.0 15.1 16.9 16.5
Brazil 16.8 16.6 15.4 14.5 15.0 15.0 15.7 16.9 18.3 16.3
Chile 19.8 19.9 19.8 20.2 20.9 24.5 24.0 25.7 29.8 25.3
Colombia 13.0 14.0 14.7 16.0 17.4 19.9 21.8 23.4 23.9 22.5
Costa Rica 17.8 18.0 18.7 18.8 18.0 17.7 18.0 19.7 21.5 20.0
Cuba 11.9 12.6 6.8 6.1 6.2 6.7 8.6 8.2 8.5 …
Dominican Republic 20.5 19.3 19.1 15.3 14.8 15.4 16.9 17.5 18.2 16.1
Ecuador 20.5 24.0 27.4 26.4 25.7 26.8 26.8 26.8 29.2 29.5
El Salvador 16.9 16.9 17.1 17.1 15.9 15.8 16.9 17.1 15.8 15.1
Guatemala 19.1 19.0 20.0 18.9 18.1 18.3 20.1 19.8 18.5 17.4
Haiti 27.3 27.3 28.0 28.8 28.9 28.8 28.8 28.6 28.7 28.9
Honduras 25.8 24.3 21.7 22.1 25.7 23.8 25.3 28.5 30.7 26.9
Mexico 21.4 20.2 19.9 19.7 20.5 21.3 22.3 23.1 23.9 22.8
Nicaragua 29.9 27.4 25.5 25.0 25.4 26.8 26.7 27.9 29.3 26.1
Panama 21.2 15.7 14.4 17.1 17.4 17.3 18.6 23.3 26.4 27.2
Paraguay 17.5 16.1 15.0 15.5 15.6 16.4 16.2 17.3 19.3 17.1
Peru 20.2 18.5 17.5 17.8 18.3 19.2 21.2 24.0 28.7 25.7
Uruguay 16.3 15.3 11.6 10.1 11.7 12.9 15.2 15.1 16.4 16.3
Venezuela (Bolivarian Republic of) 21.0 23.1 20.7 14.1 17.9 22.4 26.4 30.6 28.3 27.4
Source:  Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of official figures.
a Based on official figures expressed in 2000 dollars.
b Preliminary figures.
c Does not include Bahamas, Belize and Cuba.
Table A-5a
LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN: FINANCING OF GROSS DOMESTIC INVESTMENT
 (Percentages of GDP) a
2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 c 2009 b c
1. Domestic saving 20.7 18.7 19.8 20.7 22.7 22.7 23.9 23.2 23.3 20.0
2. Net factor income -2.6 -2.7 -2.9 -3.1 -3.1 -3.0 -3.0 -2.7 -2.6 -2.3
3. Net transfers 1.0 1.3 1.6 2.0 2.0 1.9 2.0 1.8 1.6 1.4
4. Gross national saving 19.1 17.2 18.5 19.5 21.6 21.6 22.9 22.3 22.3 19.1
5. External saving 2.3 2.6 0.8 -0.6 -1.0 -1.4 -1.5 -0.4 0.7 0.4
6. Gross domestic investment 21.4 19.8 19.3 19.0 20.6 20.3 21.4 21.9 23.0 19.5
Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of official figures.
a




 Does not include Cuba.
Table A-5b
LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN: GROSS DOMESTIC INVESTMENT, NATIONAL INCOME AND SAVING
(Annual growth rates)
2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 a
Gross domestic investment 7.4 -2.0 -7.7 -1.9 11.8 6.3 13.0 11.7 11.4 -15.5
Gross national disposable income 4.9 -0.3 -0.3 2.5 7.1 6.1 7.2 6.5 4.8 -3.3
National saving 10.5 -5.6 -0.1 6.6 15.3 8.2 12.4 7.2 6.2 -13.3
Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of official figures expressed in constant 2000 dollars.
a
 Preliminary figures.
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Table A-6
LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN: BALANCE OF PAYMENTS










2007 2008 2009 c 2007 2008 2009 c 2007 2008 2009 c 2007 2008 2009 c  
Latin America and  
the Caribbean d 778 748 906 062 692 199 100 415 114 440 97 268 710 727 862 875 651 032 123 466 143 912 124 492
Antigua and Barbuda 76 76 80 517 520 527 649 662 686 283 290 304
Argentina 55 980 70 021 55 157 10 376 12 090 11 217 42 525 54 557 37 644 10 828 12 979 11 435
Bahamas 802 956 703 2 599 2 543 ... 2 956 3 199 2 468 1 580 1 360 ...
Barbados 481 461 380 1 635 1 589 ... 1 528 1 685 1 303 816 744 ...
Belize 426 466 396 398 386 ... 642 788 616 164 170 ...
Bolivia (Plurinational 
State of) 4 458 6 448 5 029 499 500 475 3 455 4 980 4 333 688 700 731
Brazil 160 649 197 942 154 395 23 954 30 451 27 104 120 617 173 107 128 099 37 173 47 140 43 300
Chile 67 666 66 455 51 835 8 952 10 754 8 994 44 031 57 610 39 175 9 927 11 401 9 545
Colombia 30 577 38 531 31 092 3 636 4 137 4 095 31 173 37 556 30 875 6 243 7 188 6 662
Costa Rica 9 299 9 566 8 901 3 552 4 094 3 730 12 285 14 551 11 486 1 818 1 893 1 785
Cuba 3 830 ... ... 8 192 ... ... 10 083 ... ... 292 ... ...
Dominica 39 36 36 109 116 113 172 197 193 66 71 71
Dominican Republic 7 160 6 949 5 351 4 767 4 911 4 617 13 597 16 095 12 233 1 746 1 819 1 708
Ecuador 14 870 19 147 13 321 1 200 1 313 1 263 13 047 17 776 14 551 2 572 2 954 2 844
El Salvador 4 039 4 611 3 975 1 130 1 041 1 360 8 144 9 004 6 836 1 420 1 625 1 823
Grenada 41 31 31 147 146 135 328 343 319 111 111 114
Guatemala 6 983 7 848 7 260 1 731 1 789 1 634 12 470 13 422 11 169 2 041 2 159 2 050
Guyana 698 798 650 173 ... ... 1 063 1 300 1 000 272 ... ...
Haiti 522 490 549 257 343 347 1 618 2 108 1 937 674 784 827
Honduras 5 594 6 046 5 326 750 910 791 8 556 10 389 8 103 1 037 1 215 1 101
Jamaica 2 363 2 744 1 400 2 707 2 795 ... 6 204 7 547 4 200 2 282 2 367 ...
Mexico 271 875 291 343 227 247 17 489 18 040 15 809 281 949 308 603 234 514 23 794 25 119 22 154
Nicaragua 2 336 2 538 2 422 373 399 403 4 094 4 749 3 878 555 608 582
Panama 9 338 10 289 10 495 4 924 5 864 5 714 12 521 15 003 14 103 2 107 2 601 2 612
Paraguay 5 580 7 812 5 438 962 1 081 1 035 6 093 8 948 6 325 460 595 528
Peru 27 882 31 529 24 861 3 159 3 637 3 492 19 595 28 439 20 788 4 346 5 566 4 691
Saint Kitts and Nevis 58 57 48 174 173 162 242 270 247 102 112 112
Saint Vincent and the 
Grenadines 51 53 54 162 143 135 288 302 287 114 110 106
Saint Lucia 101 186 176 356 368 338 542 578 520 188 189 180
Suriname 1 359 1 708 1 500 245 285 ... 1 045 1 350 1 230 310 407 ...
Trinidad and Tobago 13 391 18 686 12 740 ... ... ... 7 670 9 622 6 628 ... ... ...
Uruguay 5 043 7 100 6 274 1 807 2 158 2 111 5 598 8 654 6 811 1 124 1 414 1 360
Venezuela (Bolivarian 
Republic of) 69 010 95 138 55 078 1 673 1 867 1 669 46 031 49 482 38 476 8 625 10 221 7 868
Preliminary Overview of the Economies of Latin America and the Caribbean • 2009 143
Table A-6 (continued)
 Trade balance  Income balance Current transfers balance
Current account 
balance 
 2007 2008 2009 c 2007 2008 2009 c 2007 2008 2009 c 2007 2008 2009 c  
Latin America and  
the Caribbean d 45 517 14 329 14 619 -97 742 -108 040 -94 825 67 050 67 054 57 715 14 822 -26 767 -19 429
Antigua and Barbuda -340 -356 -383 -64 -51 -51 24 23 22 -379 -384 -413
Argentina 13 003 14 574 17 294 -5 927 -7 651 -8 581 336 111 104 7 412 7 034 8 816
Bahamas -1 135 -1 060 -1 765 -232 -115 ... 52 56 ... -1 315 -1 118 -544
Barbados -227 -379 -923 -101 -85 ... 145 101 ... -182 -363 -187
Belize 17 -105 -220 -159 -157 ... 93 112 ... -52 -150 -80
Bolivia (Plurinational 
State of) 815 1 267 440 -489 -536 -532 1 266 1 284 1 156 1 591 2 015 1 063
Brazil 26 813 8 146 10 100 -29 291 -40 562 -31 791 4 029 4 224 3 273 1 551 -28 192 -18 418
Chile 22 660 8 200 12 110 -18 595 -14 563 -11 834 3 123 2 924 2 631 7 189 -3 440 2 908
Colombia -3 203 -2 075 -2 350 -7 847 -10 296 -8 487 5 231 5 514 4 590 -5 819 -6 857 -6 247
Costa Rica -1 251 -2 784 -640 -865 -391 -950 470 442 395 -1 646 -2 732 -1 195
Cuba 1 647 ... ... -960 ... ... -199 ... ... 488 ... ...
Dominica -90 -115 -116 -16 -18 -18 21 21 20 -85 -112 -114
Dominican Republic -3 416 -6 054 -3 973 -2 081 -1 815 -1 698 3 401 3 432 3 318 -2 096 -4 437 -2 353
Ecuador 452 -270 -2 810 -2 047 -1 598 -1 426 3 246 2 989 2 633 1 650 1 120 -1 603
El Salvador -4 395 -4 978 -3 324 -576 -536 -682 3 750 3 832 3 482 -1 221 -1 682 -524
Grenada -251 -279 -268 -34 -36 -36 24 25 23 -261 -289 -281
Guatemala -5 797 -5 944 -4 325 -843 -929 -904 4 854 5 010 4 601 -1 786 -1 863 -628
Guyana -465 -502 -350 -11 -15 ... 287 329 ... -189 -299 -195
Haiti -1 513 -2 058 -1 868 2 6 6 1 517 1 776 1 793 7 -277 -68
Honduras -3 249 -4 647 -3 087 -598 -350 -308 2 622 3 021 2 266 -1 225 -1 977 -1 129
Jamaica -3 417 -4 375 -2 800 -662 -568 -500 2 040 2 150 1 800 -2 038 -2 794 -700
Mexico -16 379 -24 340 -13 612 -18 371 -16 927 -14 187 26 415 25 461 21 725 -8 335 -15 806 -6 074
Nicaragua -1 941 -2 420 -1 634 -135 -161 -173 1 075 1 068 990 -1 001 -1 513 -818
Panama -365 -1 452 -506 -1 311 -1 579 -1 683 253 238 215 -1 422 -2 792 -1 974
Paraguay -11 -650 -380 -162 -226 -190 373 405 364 200 -471 -205
Peru 7 099 1 161 2 873 -8 374 -8 144 -6 620 2 494 2 803 2 523 1 220 -4 180 -1 224
Saint Kitts and Nevis -112 -153 -149 -32 -11 -33 33 33 32 -110 -131 -151
Saint Vincent and the 
Grenadines -189 -216 -204 -21 -21 -23 20 20 18 -190 -217 -209
Saint Lucia -272 -214 -186 -68 -74 -71 14 14 13 -327 -272 -244
Suriname 250 236 270 8 21 ... 76 87 ... 335 344 280
Trinidad and Tobago 6 268 9 679 6 788 -964 -897 -1 554 60 10 13 5 364 8 792 5 247
Uruguay 128 -811 214 -345 -454 -497 136 146 131 -80 -1 119 -152
Venezuela (Bolivarian 
Republic of) 16 027 37 302 10 403 2 467 698 -2 000 -431 -608 -416 18 063 37 392 7 986
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Table A-6 (concluded)
Capital and
financial balance a Overall balance
 
Reserve assets
 (variation) b Other financing
2007 2008 2009 c 2007 2008 2009 c 2007 2008 2009 c 2007 2008 2009 c
Latin America and  
the Caribbean d 109 470 63 993 49 920 124 282 37 236 30 679 -126 617 -41 808 -31 097 1 951 3 949 419
Antigua and Barbuda 380 377 416 1 -7 3 -1 7 -3 0 0 0
Argentina 4 188 -10 724 -8 323 11 600 -3 690 493 -13 098 -9 -493 1 499 3 699 0
Bahamas 1 269 1 228 919 -46 109 375 46 -109 -375 0 0 0
Barbados 461 142 ... 278 -221 ... -278 -221 ... ... ... ...
Belize 75 208 130 23 58 50 -23 -58 -50 0 0 0
Bolivia (Plurinational 
State of) 361 359 -332 1 952 2 374 731 -1 952 -2 374 -731 0 0 0
Brazil 85 933 31 161 55 758 87 484 2 969 37 340 -87 484 -2 969 -37 340 0 0 0
Chile -10 403 9 884 1 047 -3 214 6 444 3 955 3 214 -6 444 -3 955 0 0 0
Colombia 10 490 9 412 7 396 4 672 2 555 1 149 -4 672 -2 555 -1 149 0 0 0
Costa Rica 2 794 2 384 1 462 1 148 -348 267 -1 148 348 -267 0 0 0
Cuba ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ...
Dominica 84 109 133 -1 -3 19 1 3 -19 0 0 0
Dominican Republic 2 716 4 117 2 230 620 -320 -123 -679 303 123 59 17 0
Ecuador -264 -172 1 725 1 387 948 122 -1 497 -952 -132 111 4 10
El Salvador 1 502 2 016 644 280 334 120 -280 -334 -120 0 0 0
Grenada 271 283 278 11 -6 -3 -11 6 3 0 0 0
Guatemala 2 002 2 195 514 216 333 -114 -216 -333 114 0 0 0
Guyana 188 306 428 -1 7 233 -37 -45 -233 39 38 0
Haiti 148 374 64 154 98 -4 -208 -171 -177 54 73 181
Honduras 1 063 1 912 374 -162 -65 -755 109 42 582 53 23 173
Jamaica 1 598 2 689 836 -440 -105 136 440 105 -136 0 0 0
Mexico 18 621 23 244 -1 422 10 286 7 438 -7 496 -10 286 -7 438 7 496 0 0 0
Nicaragua 1 093 1 499 1 024 92 -14 207 -173 -30 -261 80 45 54
Panama 2 044 3 377 2 124 622 584 150 -611 -579 -150 -10 -5 0
Paraguay 523 850 1 035 723 379 830 -727 -378 -830 5 -0 0
Peru 8 368 7 292 3 676 9 588 3 112 2 452 -9 654 -3 169 -2 452 67 57 0
Saint Kitts and Nevis 117 145 221 7 15 70 -7 -15 -70 0 0 0
Saint Vincent and the 
Grenadines 188 213 211 -2 -3 3 2 3 -3 0 0 0
Saint Lucia 345 269 292 19 -3 48 -19 3 -48 0 0 0
Suriname -148 -302 -9 177 52 271 -177 -52 -271 0 0 0
Trinidad and Tobago -3 824 -6 086 -7 000 1 541 2 706 -1 753 -1 541 -2 706 1 753 0 0 0
Uruguay 1 091 3 352 1 755 1 010 2 233 1 603 -1 005 -2 233 -1 603 -5 -0 0
Venezuela (Bolivarian 
Republic of) -23 805 -28 117 -17 686 -5 742 9 275 -9 700 5 357 -9 456 9 700 0 0 0
Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of official figures from the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and national sources.
a Includes errors and omissions.
b A minus sign (-) indicates an increase in reserve assets.
c Preliminary figures.
d Does not include Cuba.
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Table A-7a
LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN: EXPORTS OF GOODS, f.o.b.
 (Indices 2000=100)
Value Volume Unit value
2007 2008 2009 a 2007 2008 2009 a 2007 2008 2009 a
Latin America and the Caribbean 210.3 243.7 186.7 141.5 142.4 128.8 148.6 171.2 145.0
Argentina 212.5 265.8 209.4 155.6 155.8 146.5 136.6 170.6 143.0
Bolivia (Plurinational State of) 357.8 517.5 403.6 180.1 242.6 217.5 198.6 213.3 185.5
Brazil 291.6 359.3 280.3 195.0 190.2 176.6 149.6 189.0 158.7
Chile 352.2 345.9 269.8 155.3 153.8 146.3 226.9 224.9 184.5
Colombia 222.2 280.0 226.0 143.3 149.2 151.5 155.1 187.6 149.2
Costa Rica 160.0 164.6 153.1 167.3 168.7 165.2 95.6 97.5 92.7
Cuba 228.6 ... ... 98.1 ... ... 232.9 ... ...
Dominican Republic 124.8 121.1 93.3 103.3 94.5 77.4 120.9 128.1 120.4
Ecuador 289.5 372.7 259.3 189.6 196.9 187.6 152.7 189.3 138.2
El Salvador 136.3 155.6 134.1 121.1 133.0 119.4 112.5 117.0 112.3
Guatemala 176.3 198.1 183.3 148.0 151.2 145.7 119.1 131.1 125.8
Haiti 157.4 147.8 165.5 136.7 124.0 126.2 115.2 119.2 131.1
Honduras 167.3 180.8 159.3 168.6 168.7 156.5 99.2 107.2 101.8
Mexico 163.7 175.4 136.8 126.5 126.9 108.8 129.4 138.2 125.8
Nicaragua 265.2 288.2 275.1 249.3 250.8 252.0 106.4 114.9 109.2
Panama 159.9 176.2 179.8 145.3 152.5 157.1 110.1 115.6 114.4
Paraguay 239.6 335.4 233.5 199.8 237.1 191.9 119.9 141.5 121.7
Peru 400.9 453.3 357.5 179.5 193.1 183.5 223.4 234.7 194.8
Uruguay 211.6 297.8 263.2 171.0 182.4 179.1 123.7 163.3 147.0
Venezuela (Bolivarian Republic of) 205.8 283.7 164.3 84.5 85.0 74.6 243.6 333.8 220.3




LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN: IMPORTS OF GOODS, f.o.b.
 (Indices 2000=100)
Value Volume Unit value
2007 2008 2009 a 2007 2008 2009 a 2007 2008 2009 a
 
Latin America and the Caribbean 192.4 233.4 176.5 152.7 165.7 138.8 126.0 140.9 127.1
Argentina 178.0 228.4 157.6 153.2 178.3 139.8 116.2 128.1 112.7
Bolivia (Plurinational State of) 214.6 309.3 269.1 153.5 208.7 204.0 139.8 148.2 131.9
Brazil 216.2 310.3 229.6 154.1 181.3 150.7 140.3 171.2 152.3
Chile 257.6 337.1 229.2 215.1 246.9 199.9 119.7 136.5 114.7
Colombia 281.1 338.7 278.4 225.5 249.3 220.4 124.6 135.9 126.3
Costa Rica 203.9 241.6 190.7 181.1 202.4 181.5 112.6 119.4 105.0
Cuba 210.3 ... ... 155.8 ... ... 135.0 ... ...
Dominican Republic 143.5 169.8 129.1 116.4 124.1 102.5 123.3 136.9 125.9
Ecuador 348.6 474.9 388.8 258.0 311.0 292.7 135.1 152.7 132.8
El Salvador 173.2 191.5 145.4 145.5 150.4 128.3 119.0 127.3 113.3
Guatemala 224.3 241.4 200.9 165.5 157.7 147.4 135.5 153.1 136.3
Haiti 148.9 194.0 178.2 111.7 101.1 110.5 133.2 191.9 161.4
Honduras 214.6 260.5 203.2 176.5 186.3 167.0 121.6 139.8 121.7
Mexico 161.6 176.9 134.4 131.2 135.5 111.9 123.2 130.5 120.1
Nicaragua 227.3 263.6 215.3 168.0 172.4 163.7 135.3 152.9 131.5
Panama 179.3 214.9 202.0 146.6 159.7 158.0 122.3 134.6 127.9
Paraguay 212.6 312.2 220.7 177.4 236.9 186.0 119.8 131.8 118.6
Peru 266.0 386.1 282.2 187.7 224.8 176.7 141.7 171.8 159.8
Uruguay 169.1 261.4 205.7 121.3 150.6 141.1 139.4 173.6 145.8
Venezuela (Bolivarian Republic of) 272.9 293.4 228.1 226.4 219.3 185.3 120.5 133.8 123.1
Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of official figures from the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and national sources.
a
 Preliminary figures.
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Table A-8
LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN: TERMS OF TRADE FOR GOODS f.o.b./f.o.b.
 (Indices 2000=100)
 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 a
Latin America and the Caribbean 100.0 96.3 96.6 98.6 103.6 108.7 115.3 118.0 121.5 114.1
Argentina 100.0 99.3 98.7 107.2 109.2 106.9 113.4 117.5 133.2 126.9
Bolivia (Plurinational State of) 100.0 95.8 96.2 98.5 104.1 111.8 139.8 142.1 143.9 140.7
Brazil 100.0 99.6 98.4 97.0 97.9 99.2 104.4 106.6 110.4 104.2
Chile 100.0 93.3 97.2 102.8 124.9 139.8 183.2 189.5 164.8 160.9
Colombia 100.0 94.2 92.5 95.2 102.3 111.0 115.2 124.4 138.1 118.1
Costa Rica 100.0 98.4 96.9 95.5 91.9 88.3 85.8 84.9 81.7 88.2
Cuba 100.0 114.0 105.1 121.0 133.3 129.8 164.0 172.6 ... ...
Dominican Republic 100.0 100.9 101.5 97.9 96.7 95.8 94.9 98.0 93.6 95.7
Ecuador 100.0 84.6 86.8 89.8 91.5 102.4 109.9 113.0 124.0 104.0
El Salvador 100.0 102.5 101.6 97.7 96.8 96.8 95.5 94.6 91.9 99.1
Guatemala 100.0 96.7 95.8 93.0 92.1 91.3 89.6 87.9 85.6 92.3
Haiti 100.0 101.2 100.2 98.7 96.0 92.4 88.9 86.4 62.1 81.3
Honduras 100.0 94.8 92.0 88.0 87.2 87.2 83.2 81.6 76.6 83.7
Mexico 100.0 97.4 97.9 98.8 101.6 103.6 104.1 105.1 105.9 104.7
Nicaragua 100.0 88.4 87.0 84.1 82.5 81.4 79.4 78.6 75.2 83.0
Panama 100.0 102.7 101.6 97.2 95.3 93.5 90.8 90.0 85.9 89.5
Paraguay 100.0 100.2 96.7 101.4 104.3 97.4 95.5 100.1 107.3 102.6
Peru 100.0 95.6 98.4 102.2 111.3 119.4 152.1 157.6 136.7 122.0
Uruguay 100.0 104.0 102.6 103.5 99.9 90.7 88.6 88.7 94.1 100.8
Venezuela (Bolivarian Republic of) 100.0 82.2 87.6 98.7 118.1 154.4 184.4 202.1 249.5 179.0
Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of official figures from the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and national sources.
a
 Preliminary figures.
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Table A-9
LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN: NET RESOURCE TRANSFER a
 (Millions of dollars)
2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 b
Latin America and the Caribbean 951 -1 567 -41 426 -39 517 -69 266 -80 723 -97 561 13 678 -40 098 -44 487
Antigua and Barbuda 16 48 49 85 56 136 260 316 326 364
Argentina 993 -16 030 -20 773 -12 535 -7 175 -3 722 -10 388 -241 -14 676 -16 905
Bahamas 240 366 175 279 213 358 1 077 1 037 1 113 919
Barbados 241 241 42 131 58 -16 149 360 57 ...
Belize 161 115 91 61 8 25 -50 -84 51 130
Bolivia (Plurinational State of) 182 30 -156 -226 -565 -535 -428 -128 -177 -865
Brazil 4 077 6 778 -10 252 -14 234 -29 955 -35 633 -10 553 56 642 -9 401 23 967
Chile -1 621 -2 022 -2 068 -4 076 -10 102 -10 220 -23 558 -28 997 -4 679 -10 786
Colombia -2 238 -339 -1 453 -2 623 -928 -1 851 -2 923 2 644 -884 -1 091
Costa Rica -714 -63 580 443 432 1 166 2 058 1 929 1 993 512
Dominica 31 39 36 32 23 64 49 68 91 115
Dominican Republic -85 168 -881 -2 787 -2 324 -321 -251 694 2 319 532
Ecuador -2 020 -817 -100 -953 -1 084 -1 580 -3 691 -2 200 -1 766 309
El Salvador 132 -293 -42 595 132 -28 324 925 1 480 -38
Grenada 61 67 109 83 30 131 170 237 247 242
Guatemala 1 494 1 618 993 1 251 1 359 995 1 096 1 160 1 266 -390
Guyana 48 -3 20 -6 -10 143 242 215 329 428
Haiti 45 129 26 5 94 -20 201 204 453 251
Honduras 348 322 86 94 743 177 149 519 1 584 240
Jamaica 517 1 168 208 -246 612 561 797 937 2 121 336
Mexico 6 491 11 161 8 502 4 315 -1 286 -2 674 -15 083 250 6 317 -15 610
Nicaragua 624 455 607 520 616 590 768 1 039 1 383 905
Panama 3 202 -39 -539 -414 418 -589 723 1 792 441
Paraguay -30 237 -134 168 -98 72 168 365 624 845
Peru -293 391 512 -670 -1 262 -4 596 -7 681 61 -796 -2 944
Saint Kitts and Nevis 32 84 95 71 43 23 74 85 135 188
Saint Vincent and the Grenadines 19 30 18 55 99 70 108 167 192 188
Saint Lucia 64 73 75 115 45 62 261 277 195 221
Suriname -17 54 70 118 112 55 -72 -140 -281 -9
Trinidad and Tobago -732 -453 -441 -1 344 -1 309 -2 461 -7 087 -4 787 -6 984 -8 554
Uruguay 672 707 -2 602 979 -137 84 -52 741 2 897 1 258
Venezuela (Bolivarian Republic of) -7 792 -6 030 -14 783 -8 679 -17 292 -22 195 -23 103 -21 338 -27 419 -19 686
Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of official figures from the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and national sources.
a
 The net resource transfer is calculated as total net capital income minus the income balance (net payments of profits and interest). Total net capital income is the balance on the 
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Table A-10
LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN: NET FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT a 
 (Millions of dollars)
 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 b
Latin America and the Caribbean 72 190 66 914 50 996 37 806 49 725 54 741 30 847 89 744 93 524 65 269
Antigua and Barbuda 43 98 66 166 80 214 374 356 253 268
Argentina 9 517 2 005 2 776 878 3 449 3 954 3 099 4 969 7 502 3 408
Bahamas 250 192 209 247 443 563 706 746 700 945
Barbados 18 17 17 58 -16 53 0 0 133 104
Belize 23 61 25 -11 111 126 108 142 187 138
Bolivia (Plurinational State of) 734 703 674 195 63 -242 278 362 508 317
Brazil 30 498 24 715 14 108 9 894 8 339 12 550 -9 380 27 518 24 601 28 587
Chile 873 2 590 2 207 2 701 5 610 4 801 4 556 9 568 9 896 5 689
Colombia 2 111 2 526 1 277 783 2 873 5 590 5 558 8 136 8 346 3 413
Costa Rica 400 451 625 548 733 904 1 371 1 634 2 015 1 400
Dominica 18 17 20 31 26 33 27 53 52 42
Dominican Republic 953 1 079 917 613 909 1 123 1 528 1 579 2 885 2 288
Ecuador 720 1 330 1 275 872 837 493 271 194 993 689
El Salvador 178 289 496 123 366 398 268 1 408 719 98
Grenada 37 59 54 89 65 70 85 174 161 114
Guatemala 230 488 183 218 255 470 552 720 822 648
Guyana 67 56 44 26 30 77 102 110 179 108
Haiti 13 4 6 14 6 26 161 75 30 37
Honduras 375 301 269 391 553 599 669 815 875 502
Jamaica 394 525 407 604 542 582 797 800 685 670
Mexico 17 789 23 045 22 158 15 183 19 249 15 503 13 670 19 272 21 795 9 180
Nicaragua 267 150 204 201 250 241 287 382 626 481
Panama 624 467 99 818 1 019 918 2 498 1 907 2 402 1 548
Paraguay 98 78 12 22 32 47 167 177 238 245
Peru 810 1 070 2 156 1 275 1 599 2 579 3 467 5 425 4 079 4 430
Saint Kitts and Nevis 96 88 80 76 46 93 110 158 88 106
Saint Vincent and the Grenadines 38 21 34 55 66 40 109 110 121 87
Saint Lucia 54 59 52 106 77 78 234 253 105 166
Suriname -148 -27 -74 -76 -37 28 -163 -247 -234 334
Trinidad and Tobago 654 685 684 583 973 599 513 830 1 638 892
Uruguay 274 291 180 401 315 811 1 495 1 139 2 049 1 267
Venezuela (Bolivarian Republic of) 4 180 3 479 -244 722 864 1 422 -2 666 978 -924 -2 932
Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of official figures from the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and national sources.
a
 Corresponds to direct investment in the reporting economy after deduction of outward direct investment by residents of that country. Includes reinvestment of profits.
b
 Preliminary figures.
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Table A-11
LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN: TOTAL GROSS EXTERNAL DEBT a
 (Millions of dollars)
2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 b
Latin America and the Caribbean 742 889 749 520 738 310 767 330 763 459 673 727 663 891 734 045 742 715 766 079
Antigua and Barbuda 456 485 528 602 662 447 529 481 436 357
Argentina 155 014 166 272 156 748 164 645 171 205 113 799 108 873 124 575 124 702 122 932
Bahamas c 350 328 309 363 345 338 334 326 383 436
Barbados 951 1 135 1 163 1 236 1 216 1 346 1 494 1 565 1 523 …
Belize c 431 495 652 806 893 971 986 973 957 969
Bolivia (Plurinational State of) 6 740 6 861 6 945 7 709 7 562 7 666 6 278 5 386 5 930 5 982
Brazil 216 921 209 935 210 711 214 929 201 373 169 451 172 589 193 219 198 340 198 996
Chile 37 177 38 527 40 504 43 067 43 515 46 211 49 497 55 671 64 768 63 868
Colombia 36 130 39 163 37 382 38 065 39 497 38 507 40 103 44 553 46 377 46 509
Costa Rica 5 307 5 265 5 310 5 575 5 710 6 485 6 994 8 341 9 082 8 405
Cuba c d 10 961 10 893 10 900 11 300 5 806 5 898 7 794 8 908 … …
Dominica 154 182 209 230 224 242 249 241 234 232
Dominican Republic c 3 679 4 176 4 536 5 987 6 380 5 847 6 296 6 556 7 237 7 099
Ecuador 13 216 14 376 16 236 16 756 17 211 17 237 17 099 17 445 16 815 16 821
El Salvador e 2 831 3 148 3 987 8 603 8 870 9 420 10 259 9 808 10 691 10 144
Grenada 132 176 316 352 420 447 473 491 502 512
Guatemala c 2 644 2 925 3 119 3 467 3 844 3 723 3 958 4 226 4 382 4 784
Guyana c 1 193 1 197 1 247 1 085 1 071 1 215 1 043 718 834 …
Haiti c 1 170 1 189 1 229 1 316 1 376 1 335 1 484 1 628 1 917 2 017
Honduras 4 711 4 757 5 025 5 343 6 023 5 134 3 935 3 190 3 442 3 435
Jamaica c 3 375 4 146 4 348 4 192 5 120 5 376 5 794 6 122 6 343 6 270
Mexico 148 652 144 526 134 980 132 273 130 925 128 248 116 668 124 433 125 233 149 077
Nicaragua c 6 660 6 374 6 363 6 596 5 391 5 348 4 527 3 385 3 512 3 557
Panama c 5 604 6 263 6 349 6 504 7 219 7 580 7 788 8 276 8 477 8 907
Paraguay 2 640 2 582 2 719 2 478 2 391 2 271 2 240 2 205 2 234 2 158
Peru 27 981 27 195 27 872 29 587 31 244 28 657 28 672 33 137 34 587 34 104
Saint Kitts and Nevis 162 214 265 317 317 311 306 299 308 307
Saint Vincent and the Grenadines 163 173 172 207 243 250 255 219 232 247
Saint Lucia 178 213 260 338 368 377 393 399 364 370
Suriname c 291 350 371 382 384 390 391 299 316 238
Trinidad and Tobago c 1 680 1 666 1 549 1 553 1 382 1 361 1 295 1 392 1 456 1 432
Uruguay 8 895 8 937 10 548 11 013 11 593 11 418 10 560 12 218 12 013 12 215
Venezuela (Bolivarian Republic of) 36 437 35 398 35 460 40 456 43 679 46 427 44 735 53 361 49 087 53 699
Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of official figures from the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and national sources.
a
 Includes debt owed to the International Monetary Fund.
b
 Figures for the first semester.
c
 Refers to external public debt. 
d
 From 2004 on refers only to active external debt; excludes other external debt, 60.2% of which is official debt owed to the Paris Club. 
e
 Up to 2002 corresponds to public external debt.
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Table A-12
LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN: GROSS INTERNATIONAL RESERVES
 (Millions of dollars)
2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
2009
I II III IV a
Latin America and the Caribbean 171 298 169 408 167 959 201 185 227 838 263 207 320 757 459 550 510 457 482 386 490 066 519 018 525 698
Antigua and Barbuda b 64 80 88 114 120 127 143 144 138 94 96 141 c ...
Argentina 32 478 15 318 10 420 13 820 19 299 27 262 31 167 45 711 46 198 46 933 46 026 45 348 47 081
Bahamas b 350 319 381 491 674 586 461 464 568 634 780 944 873 d
Barbados b 473 690 669 738 580 603 636 839 753 ... ... ... ...
Belize b 123 112 115 85 48 71 114 109 166 168 177 216 215 d
Bolivia (Plurinational State of) 1 160 1 129 897 1 096 1 272 1 798 3 193 5 319 7 722 7 762 7 955 8 453 8 597 d
Brazil 33 011 35 866 37 823 49 296 52 935 53 799 85 839 180 334 193 783 190 388 201 467 221 629 236 660
Chile 15 110 14 400 15 351 15 851 16 016 16 963 19 429 16 910 23 162 23 382 23 448 26 040 26 115 d
Colombia 8 740 9 956 10 540 10 608 13 220 14 634 15 109 20 607 23 672 23 475 23 356 24 756 24 820 d
Costa Rica 1 318 1 384 1 502 1 839 1 922 2 313 3 115 4 114 3 799 4 167 3 936 4 059 4 060
Dominica 29 31 45 48 42 49 63 61 55 57 58 74 c ...
Dominican Republic 818 1 341 829 279 825 1 929 2 251 2 946 2 644 2 542 2 498 2 673 2 540 d
Ecuador 1 180 1 074 1 008 1 160 1 437 2 147 2 023 3 521 4 473 3 244 2 675 4 625 5 237
El Salvador 1 894 1 712 1 591 1 910 1 893 1 833 1 908 2 198 2 545 2 524 2 788 2 642 2 623
Grenada b 58 64 88 83 122 94 100 111 105 88 90 103 c ...
Guatemala 1 885 2 359 2 381 2 932 3 529 3 783 4 061 4 310 4 745 5 030 5 137 ... ...
Guyana b 305 287 284 276 232 252 280 313 356 405 432 589 ...
Haiti 232 191 139 112 166 187 305 494 587 602 561 ... ...
Honduras … 1 578 1 687 1 609 2 159 2 526 2 824 2 733 2 690 2 784 2 658 2 321 c ...
Jamaica 1 049 1 903 1 643 1 196 1 882 2 169 2 399 1 906 1 795 1 663 1 661 2 007 1 932 d
Mexico 35 585 44 814 50 674 59 028 64 198 74 110 76 330 87 211 95 302 85 636 81 476 87 806 88 657 d
Nicaragua 497 383 454 504 670 730 924 1 103 1 141 1 078 1 143 1 394 1 462
Panama b 723 1 092 1 183 1 011 631 1 211 1 335 1 935 ... ... ... ... ...
Paraguay 714 662 603 853 1 191 1 292 1 594 2 240 2 737 2 834 2 870 e ... ...
Peru 8 563 8 838 9 690 10 206 12 649 14 120 17 329 27 720 31 233 30 961 30 822 32 163 33 463
Saint Kitts and Nevis b 45 56 66 65 78 72 89 96 110 154 185 180 c ...
Saint Vincent and the Grenadines b 55 61 53 51 75 70 79 87 84 89 74 87 c ...
Saint Lucia b 79 89 94 107 133 116 135 154 143 169 180 192 c ...
Suriname 63 119 106 106 129 126 215 401 433 468 612 705 ...
Trinidad and Tobago 1 405 1 876 1 924 2 258 2 993 4 787 6 777 7 053 9 830 9 097 8 718 8 105 f ...
Uruguay 2 823 3 100 772 2 087 2 512 3 078 3 091 4 121 6 360 6 965 7 438 8 068 8 000
Venezuela (Bolivarian Republic of) 20 471 18 523 14 860 21 366 24 208 30 368 37 440 34 286 43 127 28 992 30 750 33 697 33 363
Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of official figures from the International Monetary Fund (IMF).
a
 Balance as of November.
b
 Does not include gold.
c
 Balance as of August.
d
 Balance as of October.
e
 Balance as of May.
f
 Balance as of July.
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Table A-13
LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN: STOCK EXCHANGE INDICES
 (National indices to end of period, 31 December 2000=100)
2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
2009
I II III IV a
Argentina 100 71 126 257 330 370 502 516 259 270 381 498 515
Brazil 100 89 74 146 172 219 291 419 246 268 337 403 439
Chile 100 109 92 137 166 181 248 281 219 229 285 311 300
Colombia 100 134 206 291 542 1 187 1 393 1 335 944 1 001 1 233 1 405 1 404
Costa Rica 100 113 117 104 88 96 169 193 177 114 116 123 117
Ecuador 100 130 195 178 216 272 353 329 349 342 302 275 300
Jamaica 100 117 157 234 390 362 348 374 277 273 280 277 288
Mexico 100 113 108 156 229 315 468 523 396 347 431 517 548
Peru 100 97 115 202 307 397 1 066 1 450 583 764 1 081 1 253 1 169
Trinidad and Tobago 100 98 124 157 243 242 220 222 191 186 176 178 176
Venezuela (Bolivarian Republic of) 100 96 117 325 439 299 765 555 514 640 653 738 782
Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of information from Bloomberg. 
a
 Figures at 30 November.
Table A-14
LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN: OVERALL REAL EFFECTIVE EXCHANGE RATES a 
(Indices 2000=100, deflacted by CPI)
2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 b 2009 b c 
Latin America and the Caribbean d 99.3 111.0 120.5 119.6 111.4 108.6 105.4 99.1 98.9
Argentina 95.9 225.8 205.0 212.8 213.4 218.0 222.1 229.1 244.1
Barbados 98.3 100.0 104.3 107.4 105.8 104.0 104.9 102.9 98.7
Bolivia (Plurinational State of) 101.1 95.5 104.2 109.5 116.9 119.3 117.9 105.9 95.4
Brazil 120.4 132.6 131.2 123.8 100.4 88.9 82.5 79.2 81.9
Chile 111.7 109.4 114.7 108.5 103.2 100.9 102.5 101.7 105.9
Colombia 104.2 105.7 119.6 107.1 96.7 97.8 85.7 83.0 88.4
Costa Rica 97.5 98.6 104.4 106.0 107.3 106.1 103.5 100.0 99.8
Cuba e 90.5 94.1 99.8 106.1 105.4 112.3 115.1 125.9 ...
Dominica 100.3 101.6 104.2 108.0 110.9 113.2 116.8 119.4 119.5
Dominican Republic f 96.5 98.6 131.4 125.6 87.5 95.7 95.9 98.5 102.2
Ecuador 70.7 61.8 60.3 61.6 64.7 65.3 68.1 68.7 64.4
El Salvador 99.7 99.7 100.2 98.9 101.0 101.4 102.7 103.7 99.8
Guatemala 96.3 88.6 88.7 85.8 79.3 76.9 76.3 72.2 74.3
Honduras 97.1 96.9 98.5 100.9 100.6 98.0 97.8 94.4 87.3
Jamaica 101.7 101.2 116.9 113.6 104.4 104.8 108.5 101.8 113.2
Mexico 94.4 94.0 104.5 108.3 104.6 104.7 105.8 108.1 124.2
Nicaragua 101.2 103.3 106.9 107.7 108.4 107.0 110.9 105.4 104.8
Panama 103.1 101.2 103.2 108.4 111.0 112.7 114.3 112.2 106.9
Paraguay 102.8 106.5 112.5 106.4 118.7 106.5 95.5 83.7 91.5
Peru 98.1 95.8 99.8 99.9 101.1 104.0 104.1 100.3 98.6
Trinidad and Tobago 94.6 91.1 91.9 93.6 91.0 89.1 87.6 83.1 76.4
Uruguay 101.4 118.4 150.5 152.5 134.1 128.3 127.0 116.0 115.2
Venezuela (Bolivarian Republic of) 95.3 125.1 141.1 139.5 141.0 132.4 118.6 96.6 74.2
Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of official figures from the International Monetary Fund (IMF).
a
 Annual averages. A country’s overall real effective exchange rate index is calculated by weighting its real bilateral exchange rate indices with each of its trading partners by each 
partner’s share in the country’s total trade flows in terms of exports and imports. The extraregional real effective exchange rate index excludes trade with other Latin American 
and Caribbean countries. A currency depreciates in real effective terms when this index rises and appreciates when it falls.
b




 Simple average of the extraregional real effective exchange rate for 20 countries; excludes Barbados, Cuba and Dominica. 
e
 Preliminary figures. Yearly calculation by ECLAC, based on consumer price data and nominal exchange rates provided by the National Statistical Office of Cuba.
f
 Owing to lack of data, the period 2002-2009 has been weighted using trade figures for 2001.
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Table A-15
LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN: PARTICIPATION RATE
 (Average annual rates)
2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
2008 2009 a
January to  
September average
Argentina b Urban areas 57.7 57.3 57.2 60.1 60.3 59.9 60.3 59.5 58.8 58.6 59.1
Barbados National total 68.6 69.5 68.4 69.3 69.4 69.6 67.9 67.8 67.6 68.2 67.2 c
Brazil b Six metropolitan areas 58.0 56.4 55.1 57.1 57.2 56.6 56.9 56.9 57.0 56.9 56.6 d
Chile National total 54.4 53.9 53.7 54.4 55.0 55.6 54.8 54.9 56.0 56.0 55.9
Colombia Thirteen metropolitan areas 63.5  64.4 64.8 65.1 63.6 63.4 62.0 61.8 62.6 62.7 64.4 d
Costa Rica National total 53.6 55.8 55.4 55.5 54.4 56.8 56.6 57.0 56.7 56.7 56.5 e
Cuba f National total 70.1 70.9 71.0 70.9 71.0 72.1 72.1 73.7 74.8 ... ...
Dominican Republic National total 55.2 54.3 55.1 54.7 56.3 55.9 56.0 56.1 55.6 55.7 53.6 g
Ecuador h Urban total 57.3 63.1 58.3 58.2 59.1 59.5 59.1 61.2 60.1 60.7 59.4
Honduras National total ... 52.5 51.7 50.0 50.6 50.9 50.7 50.7 51.0 50.7 53.1 i
Jamaica j National total 63.3 63.0 63.6 64.4 64.3 64.2 64.7 64.9 65.4 65.3 63.8 k
Mexico Urban areas 58.7 58.1 57.8 58.3 58.9 59.5 60.7 60.7 60.4 60.6 60.3 d
Panama National total 59.9 60.5 62.6 62.8 63.5 63.5 62.6 62.7 63.9 63.9 64.1 l
Peru Metropolitan Lima 64.4 66.7 68.4 67.4 68.1 67.1 67.4 68.9 68.1 68.5 67.9
Trinidad and Tobago National total 61.2 60.7 60.9 61.6 63.0 63.7 63.9 63.5 63.5 63.0 63.3 m
Uruguay Urban total 59.6 60.6 59.1 58.1 58.5 58.5 60.9 62.7 62.6 62.3 63.3 d
Venezuela (Bolivarian Republic of) National total 64.6 66.5 68.7 69.2 68.5 66.3 65.4 64.9 64.7 64.9 65.1 d
Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of official figures.
a
 Preliminary figures. 
b
 New measurements have been used since 2003; the data are not comparable with the previous series. 
c
 The figures of the last two columns refer to the average for January-June.
d
 The figures of the last two columns refer to the average for January-October.
e
 The figures of the last two columns refer to the measurement of July.
f
 In Cuba, the working-age population is measured as follows: for males, 17 to 59 years and for females, 15 to 54 years.
g
 The figures of the last two columns refer to the data for April.
h
 New measurements have been used since 2007; the data are not comparable with the previous series. 
i
 The figures of the last two columns refer to the data for May.
j
 New measurements have been used since 2002; the data are not comparable with the previous series. 
k
 The figures of the last two columns refer to the average of the January, April and July data.
l
 The figures of the last two columns refer to the data for August.
m
 The figures of the last two columns refer to the average of the March and June data.
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Table A-16
LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN: OPEN URBAN UNEMPLOYMENT 
 (Average annual rates)
2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 a
Latin America and the Caribbean b 10.4 10.2 11.1 11.0 10.3 9.1 8.6 7.9 7.4 8.3
Argentina c Urban areas 15.1 17.4 19.7 17.3 13.6 11.6 10.2 8.5 7.9 8.8 d
Bahamas e National total … 6.9 9.1 10.8 10.2 10.2 7.6 7.9 8.7 12.4
Barbados e National total 9.2 9.9 10.3 11.0 9.8 9.1 8.7 7.4 8.1 10.0 f
Belize e National total 11.1 9.1 10.0 12.9 11.6 11.0 9.4 8.5 8.2 ...
Bolivia (Plurinational State of) Urban total 7.5 8.5 8.7 9.2 6.2 8.1 8.0 7.7 6.7 6.8
Brazil g Six metropolitan areas 7.1 6.2 11.7 12.3 11.5 9.8 10.0 9.3 7.9 8.1 h
Chile National total 9.7 9.9 9.8 9.5 10.0 9.2 7.7 7.1 7.8 9.8 h
Colombia e Thirteen metropolitan areas 17.3 18.2 18.1 17.1 15.8 14.3 13.1 11.4 11.5 13.0 h
Costa Rica Urban total 5.3 5.8 6.8 6.7 6.7 6.9 6.0 4.8 4.8 7.6
Cuba National total 5.4 4.1 3.3 2.3 1.9 1.9 1.9 1.8 1.6 ...
Dominican Republic e National total 13.9 15.6 16.1 16.7 18.4 17.9 16.2 15.6 14.1 14.9 i
Ecuador e j Urban total k 14.1 10.4 8.6 9.8 9.7 8.5 8.1 7.4 6.9 8.6 d
El Salvador j Urban total 6.5 7.0 6.2 6.2 6.5 7.3 5.7 5.8 5.5 ...
Guatemala Urban total ... ... 5.4 5.2 4.4 … ... ... ... ...
Honduras Urban total ... 5.9 6.1 7.6 8.0 6.5 4.9 4.0 4.1 4.9 l
Jamaica e g National total 15.5 15.0 14.2 11.4 11.7 11.3 10.3 9.8 10.6 11.3 m
Mexico Urban areas 3.4 3.6 3.9 4.6 5.3 4.7 4.6 4.8 4.9 6.8 h
Nicaragua Urban total 7.8 11.3 11.6 10.2 9.3 7.0 7.0 6.9 8.0 ...
Panama e Urban total 15.2 17.0 16.5 15.9 14.1 12.1 10.4 7.8 6.5 7.9
Paraguay Urban total 10.0 10.8 14.7 11.2 10.0 7.6 8.9 7.2 7.4 ...
Peru Metropolitan Lima 8.5 9.3 9.4 9.4 9.4 9.6 8.5 8.4 8.4 8.3 h
Suriname National total 14.0 14.0 10.0 7.0 8.4 11.2 12.1 ... ... ...
Trinidad and Tobago e National total 12.2 10.8 10.4 10.5 8.4 8.0 6.2 5.6 4.6 5.1 n
Uruguay Urban total 13.6 15.3 17.0 16.9 13.1 12.2 11.4 9.6 7.9 7.7 h
Venezuela (Bolivarian Republic of) National total 13.9 13.3 15.8 18.0 15.3 12.4 10.0 8.4 7.4 8.0 h




 The data for Argentina and Brazil have been adjusted to reflect changes in methodology in 2003 and 2002, respectively.
c
 New measurements have been used since 2003; the data are not comparable with the previous series. 
d
 Estimate based on data from January to September.
e




 New measurements have been used since 2002; the data are not comparable with the previous series. 
h
 Estimate based on data from January to October.
i
 Figure for April.
j
 New measurements have been used since 2007; the data are not comparable with the previous series. 
k
 Up to 2003, the figures relate to Cuenca, Guayaquil and Quito. 
l
 Figure for May.
m
 Average of the January, April and July data.
n
 Average of the March and June data.
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Table A-17
LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN: EMPLOYMENT RATE
 (Employed population as a percentage of working-age population, average annual rates)
2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
2008 2009 a
January to  
September average
Argentina b Urban areas 49.0 47.4 45.9 49.8 52.0 52.9 54.1 54.5 54.2 53.9 53.9
Barbados National total 62.8 62.7 61.4 61.6 62.7 63.2 61.9 62.7 62.1 62.6 60.4 c
Brazil b Six metropolitan areas 53.8 52.9 48.7 50.1 50.6 51.0 51.2 51.6 52.5 52.4 51.9 d
Chile National total 49.1 48.6 48.4 49.3 49.5 50.4 50.5 51.0 51.7 51.5 50.3 e
Colombia Thirteen metropolitan areas 52.6 52.7 53.4 54.2 53.8 54.5 54.0 54.8 55.3 55.4 55.9 d
Costa Rica National total 50.8 52.4 51.8 51.8 50.9 53.0 53.3 54.4 53.9 53.9 52.1 f
Cuba g National total 66.3 68.0 68.6 69.2 69.7 70.7 70.7 72.4 73.6 … …
Dominican Republic National total 47.6 45.8 46.2 45.4 46.0 45.9 46.9 47.4 47.7 47.8 45.4 h
Ecuador i Urban total 52.1 56.2 52.9 51.5 53.5 54.4 54.3 56.8 56.0 56.6 54.3
Honduras National total … 50.3 49.7 47.4 48.6 48.6 49.0 49.2 49.4 49.2 51.5 j
Jamaica k National total 53.4 53.5 54.0 57.1 56.8 57.0 58.0 58.6 58.5 58.3 56.6 l
Mexico Urban areas 56.8 56.0 55.5 55.6 55.8 56.7 57.9 57.8 57.5 57.7 56.2 d
Panama National total 51.8 52.0 54.1 54.6 55.9 57.3 57.2 58.7 60.3 60.3 59.9 m
Peru Metropolitan Lima 59.7 60.5 62.0 61.1 61.6 60.7 61.8 63.0 62.4 62.7 62.1
Trinidad and Tobago National total 53.8 53.8 54.6 55.2 57.8 58.6 59.9 59.9 57.7 59.9 60.1 n
Uruguay Urban total 51.6 51.4 49.1 48.3 50.9 51.4 53.9 56.7 57.7 57.3 58.4 d
Venezuela (Bolivarian Republic of) National total 55.5 57.6 57.8 56.8 58.1 58.1 58.9 59.5 59.9 59.9 59.9 d




 New measurements have been used since 2003; the data are not comparable with the previous series. 
c
 The figures of the last two columns refer to the period January-June.
d
 The figures of the last two columns refer to the period January-October.
e
 The figures of the last two columns refer to the measurement of September.
f
 The figures of the last two columns refer to the measurement of July.
g
 In Cuba, the working-age population is measured as follows: for males, 17 to 59 years and for females, 15 to 54 years.
h
 The figures of the last two columns refer to the measurement of April.
i
 New measurements have been used since 2007; the data are not comparable with the previous series. 
j
 The figures of the last two columns refer to the measurement of May.
k
 New measurements have been used since 2002; the data are not comparable with the previous series. 
l
 The figures of the last two columns refer to the average of the January, April and July data.
m
 The figures of the last two columns refer to the measurement of August.
n
 The figures of the last two columns refer to the average of the March and June data.
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Table A-18
LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN: TRENDS IN REAL AVERAGE WAGES
 (Average annual Index, 2000=100)
2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 a
Argentina b 100.0 99.2 85.4 83.9 92.2 99.0 107.8 117.6 127.9 142.8 c
Brazil d 100.0 95.1 93.1 84.9 85.5 85.2 88.2 89.5 91.4 93.3 c
Chile e 100.0 101.7 103.7 104.6 106.5 108.5 110.6 113.7 113.5 119.0 f
Colombia b 100.0 99.7 102.7 102.0 103.7 105.3 109.4 109.0 106.9 107.8 c
Costa Rica g 100.0 101.0 105.1 105.5 102.8 100.8 102.4 103.8 101.7 111.3 c
Cuba 100.0 96.2 105.1 107.8 114.6 129.5 144.5 143.1 140.5 ...
Guatemala g 100.0 100.5 99.6 100.0 97.8 93.9 92.9 91.4 89.0 ...
Mexico b 100.0 106.7 108.7 110.1 110.4 110.7 112.3 113.4 115.9 116.6 c
Nicaragua g 100.0 101.0 104.5 106.5 104.2 104.5 105.9 104.0 100.1 107.8 c
Panama h 100.0 98.8 95.8 95.3 94.5 93.4 95.3 96.5 95.9 ...
Paraguay 100.0 101.4 96.3 95.6 97.2 98.2 98.8 101.1 100.4 104.7 i
Peru j 100.0 99.1 103.7 105.3 106.5 104.4 105.7 103.8 106.1 106.4 k
Uruguay 100.0 99.7 89.0 77.9 77.9 81.5 85.0 89.0 92.2 98.9 f
Venezuela (Bolivarian Republic of) 100.0 106.9 95.1 78.4 78.6 80.7 84.8 85.8 81.9 77.4 c




 Manufacturing. From 2005, registered private-sector workers.
c
 Estimate based on data from January to September.
d
 Workers covered by social and labour legislation. Since 2003, only the private sector.
e
 General index of hourly wages.
f
 Estimate based on data from January to October.
g
 Average wages declared by workers covered by social security.
h
 Average wages declared by workers covered by social security. The variation in wages between 2006 and 2007 refers to workers of small, medium-sized and large businesses.
i
 Figure for June.
j
 Private sector workers in the Lima metropolitan area. 
k
 Estimate based on June data.
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Table A-19
LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN: MONETARY INDICATORS
 (Percentages of GDP, end-of-year balances)
 Monetary base  Money Supply (M3) a Foreign-currency deposits
2006 2007 2008 2009 b 2006 2007 2008 2009 b 2006 2007 2008 2009 b
Antigua and Barbuda 14.8 13.2 12.1 ... 90.7 88.3 91.8 ... 7.4 9.0 8.3 ...
Argentina 11.7 11.9 10.3 9.8 c 25.8 26.1 22.4 22.7 2.3 2.6 2.7 3.6
Bahamas 7.8 9.0 8.5 ... 69.6 74.7 77.9 ... 2.2 2.7 2.7 ...
Barbados 13.0 16.1 16.0 ... 110.8 118.6 118.9 ... d 11.3 19.8 14.8 ... d
Belize 13.2 13.2 13.8 ... e 62.0 68.0 70.9 ... c ... ... ... ...
Bolivia (Plurinational State of) 12.2 16.9 18.5 20.5 c 42.4 47.8 46.5 52.3 c 26.7 23.9 20.3 23.4 c
Brazil 5.1 5.6 5.1 4.8 c 27.9 30.1 37.1 36.6 f ... ... ... ...
Chile 4.5 4.3 4.8 5.1 e 53.2 58.2 69.6 67.1 e 4.7 4.8 9.1 7.7 e
Colombia 7.1 7.5 7.7 6.7 c g 31.9 33.4 35.3 33.8 f ... ... ... ...
Costa Rica 6.7 7.6 7.4 7.0 44.3 43.8 47.1 50.2 e 20.8 18.2 22.1 25.2 e
Cuba 26.0 23.6 31.1 ... 38.6 37.2 41.9 ... f ... ... ... ...
Dominica 17.2 16.8 13.1 14.7 90.3 90.8 87.2 96.2 1.4 1.1 1.5 1.5
Dominican Republic 9.0 8.9 8.5 7.6 e 25.2 25.7 24.3 24.6 ... ... ... ...
Ecuador ... 10.0 11.7 9.8 ... 25.9 35.3 32.3 f ... ... ... ...
El Salvador 9.3 10.2 10.4 10.7 38.0 49.9 42.4 43.1 f ... ... ... ...
Grenada 17.2 18.4 15.7 ... 97.3 99.8 95.7 ... 5.0 7.3 6.9 ...
Guatemala 11.1 10.9 9.7 9.9 c 37.8 37.1 35.4 37.3 c 4.2 4.7 4.8 6.2 c
Guyana 27.7 25.1 25.7 ... 78.5 75.1 78.0 ... ... ... ... ...
Haiti 20.0 19.4 18.6 19.8 37.9 35.8 33.9 36.0 15.6 15.2 14.8 16.8
Honduras 9.6 11.2 11.2 9.1 55.0 56.5 51.4 48.3 13.8 14.0 13.3 12.8
Jamaica 7.4 7.3 7.0 6.7 c 32.6 33.6 30.8 29.3 9.6 10.9 10.1 10.2
Mexico 4.3 4.4 4.8 4.5 c 49.3 50.2 54.5 57.6 c 1.4 1.3 1.4 1.6 c
Nicaragua 8.7 9.4 8.4 7.4 d 39.4 41.2 37.5 38.7 c 25.8 27.0 25.6 27.9 c
Panama 4.9 5.1 4.4 4.3 86.1 87.5 ... ... ... ... ... ...
Paraguay 9.2 10.5 10.3 11.6 26.8 30.0 31.3 36.0 10.6 10.7 12.1 14.9
Peru 4.6 5.3 6.0 5.4 e 24.3 26.9 30.3 29.3 c 12.4 12.4 14.2 13.2 c
Saint Kitts and Nevis 18.3 18.7 17.8 30.8 98.7 104.2 107.2 128.7 30.9 32.0 25.9 29.7
Saint Vincent and the Grenadines 14.5 15.5 14.5 ... 69.9 67.2 68.2 ... 2.3 2.6 2.3 ...
Saint Lucia 13.4 14.1 14.4 16.5 81.8 84.4 92.6 98.7 8.3 4.3 6.0 6.5
Suriname 17.2 19.5 17.6 22.0 c 61.0 68.2 61.3 71.0 29.2 32.6 28.4 31.4
Trinidad and Tobago 7.2 7.0 8.6 ... 37.4 37.2 35.7 ... d 9.1 9.0 9.9 ... d
Uruguay 4.5 5.5 5.3 4.3 c 56.5 48.8 54.5 51.3 d 45.3 36.4 42.2 40.3 d
Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of official figures.
a
 According to the ECLAC definition, this corresponds to M1 plus savings and time deposits in national currency plus foreign currency deposits. 
b
 Balance as of September.
c
 Balance as of October.
d
 Balance as of August.
e
 Balance as of November.
f
 Refers to M2.
g
 According to the country’s definition, this also includes deposits of entities in liquidation and term deposit certificates of special entities and demand deposits of non-bank entities.
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Table A-20
LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN: REPRESENTATIVE LENDING RATES
 (Annual average of monthly annualized rates)
2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 a
Antigua and Barbuda b ... ... ... ... ... 11.2 10.7 10.3 10.1 9.8
Argentina c 11.1 26.5 53.0 19.1 6.8 6.2 8.6 11.1 19.5 21.3 d
Bahamas e ... ... ... 12.0 11.2 10.3 10.0 10.6 11.0 10.6 f
Barbados c ... ... ... 7.6 7.4 8.5 10.0 10.4 9.7 8.8 g
Belize h 16.0 15.5 14.8 14.4 13.9 14.2 14.2 14.3 14.2 14.1 i
Bolivia (Plurinational State of) j ... 13.7 10.9 9.1 8.2 8.2 7.8 8.2 8.9 8.6
Brazil k 41.9 41.1 44.4 49.8 41.1 43.7 40.0 34.5 38.8 41.1
Chile l 18.7 16.7 14.4 13.0 11.0 13.5 14.4 13.6 15.2 13.4
Colombia m 18.8 20.7 16.3 15.2 15.1 14.6 12.9 15.4 17.2 13.6
Costa Rica n 28.1 26.7 26.8 26.2 23.4 24.0 22.7 17.3 16.7 21.7
Cuba o ... ... ... 9.6 9.7 9.8 9.4 9.1 9.0 ...
Dominica b ... ... ... ... ... 9.9 9.5 9.2 9.1 10.0
Dominican Republic c 23.6 20.0 21.3 27.8 30.3 21.4 15.7 11.7 16.0 14.0 f
Ecuador p 15.2 15.5 14.1 12.6 10.2 8.7 8.9 10.1 9.8 9.2
El Salvador q 10.7 9.6 7.1 6.6 6.3 6.9 7.5 7.8 7.9 9.4
Grenada b ... ... ... ... ... 10.0 9.8 9.7 9.4 10.8
Guatemala b 20.9 19.0 16.9 15.0 13.8 13.0 12.8 12.8 13.4 13.9
Guyana c 17.2 17.3 17.3 16.6 16.6 15.1 14.9 14.1 13.9 14.0
Haiti r 25.1 28.6 25.5 30.7 34.1 27.1 29.5 31.2 23.3 21.7
Honduras b 26.8 23.8 22.7 20.8 19.9 18.8 17.4 16.6 17.9 19.6
Jamaica s 32.9 29.4 26.1 25.1 25.1 23.2 22.0 22.0 22.3 22.8
Mexico t 16.9 12.8 8.2 6.9 7.2 9.9 7.5 7.6 8.7 7.6 f
Nicaragua u 18.1 18.6 18.3 15.5 13.5 12.1 11.6 13.0 13.2 14.1 f
Panama v 10.3 10.6 9.2 8.9 8.2 8.2 8.1 8.3 8.2 8.3 f
Paraguay w 26.8 28.3 34.3 30.5 21.2 15.3 16.6 14.6 14.6 16.2 f
Peru x ... ... 22.3 20.2 18.7 17.9 17.1 16.5 16.7 16.3
Saint Kitts and Nevis b ... ... ... ... ... 9.9 9.2 9.3 8.6 8.6
Saint Vincent and the Grenadines b ... ... ... ... ... 9.6 9.7 9.6 9.5 9.2
Saint Lucia b ... ... ... ... ... 10.4 10.5 9.9 9.3 9.4
Suriname t 29.0 25.7 22.2 21.0 20.4 18.1 15.7 13.8 12.2 12.0 d
Trinidad and Tobago c 16.5 15.6 13.4 11.0 9.4 9.1 10.2 10.5 12.3 12.6 d
Uruguay y 32.1 38.1 116.4 56.6 26.0 15.3 10.7 10.0 13.1 16.9 f
Venezuela (Bolivarian Republic of) z 24.5 24.8 38.4 25.7 17.3 15.6 14.6 16.7 22.8 21.0
Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of official figures. 
a Average monthly rate from January to October.
b
 Weighted average lending rates. 
c
 Prime lending rate. 
d
 Average monthly rate from January to July.
e
 Interest rate on loans and overdrafts, weighted average. 
f
 Average monthly rate from January to September.
g
 Average monthly rate from January to August.
h
 Rate for personal and business loans, residential and other construction loans; weighted average. 
i
 Average monthly rate from January to March.
j
 Nominal dollar rate for 60-91-day banking operations. 
k
 Preset lending rates for legal persons. 
l
 Lending rates for periods of 90-360 days, non-adjustable operations. 
m
 Total lending rate of the system. Weighted average of all lending rates.
n
 Average rate of the financial system for loans in national currency. 
o
 Corporate lending rate in convertible pesos.
p
 Benchmark dollar lending rate. 
q
 Basic lending rate for up to 1 year. 
r
 Average of minimum and maximum lending rates. 
s
 Average interest rate on loans. 
t
 Lending rate published by the International Monetary Fund. 
u
 Weighted average of the weekly lending rate for loans in national currency in the system. 
v
 Interest rate on 1-year trade credit. 
w
 Weighted average of effective lending rates in national currency, not including overdrafts or credit cards. 
x
 Average lending rate, constant structure. 
y
 Business credit, 30-367 days. 
z
 Average rate for loan operations for the six major commercial banks. 
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Table A-21
LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN: CONSUMER PRICES 
 (Percentage variation December-December)
 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 a
Latin America and the Caribbean b 9.0 6.1 12.2 8.5 7.4 6.1 5.0 6.5 8.2 4.5
Antigua and Barbuda ... ... 2.5 1.8 2.8 2.5 0.0 5.2 2.3 ...
Argentina -0.7 -1.5 41.0 3.7 6.1 12.3 9.8 8.5 7.2 6.5
Bahamas 1.0 2.9 1.9 2.6 1.4 2.2 2.0 2.4 4.8 0.8 c
Barbados 3.8 -1.2 0.9 0.3 4.3 7.4 5.6 4.7 7.3 1.4 d
Belize 0.6 1.1 2.3 2.6 3.1 4.2 3.0 4.1 4.4 -3.5 c
Bolivia (Plurinational State of) 3.4 0.9 2.5 3.9 4.6 4.9 4.9 11.7 11.8 0.8
Brazil 6.0 7.7 12.5 9.3 7.6 5.7 3.1 4.5 5.9 4.2
Chile 4.5 2.6 2.8 1.1 2.4 3.7 2.6 7.8 7.1 -1.9
Colombia 8.8 7.6 7.0 6.5 5.5 4.9 4.5 5.7 7.7 2.7
Costa Rica 10.2 11.0 9.7 9.9 13.1 14.1 9.4 10.8 13.9 4.0
Cuba e ... -1.4 7.3 -3.8 2.9 3.7 5.7 10.6 -0.1 -1.7
Dominica 1.1 1.1 0.5 2.8 0.8 2.7 1.8 6.0 2.0 ...
Dominican Republic 9.0 4.4 10.5 42.7 28.7 7.5 5.0 8.9 4.5 -0.3
Ecuador 91.0 22.4 9.4 6.1 1.9 3.1 2.9 3.3 8.8 3.5
El Salvador 4.3 1.4 2.8 2.5 5.4 4.3 4.9 4.9 5.5 -1.6
Grenada 3.4 -0.7 2.3 1.2 2.5 6.2 1.7 7.4 5.2 ...
Guatemala 5.1 8.9 6.3 5.9 9.2 8.6 5.8 8.7 9.4 -0.7
Guyana 5.8 1.5 6.0 ... ... 8.2 4.2 14.1 6.4 1.3 f
Haiti 19.0 8.1 14.8 40.4 20.2 15.4 10.2 10.0 10.1 -3.5
Honduras 10.1 8.8 8.1 6.8 9.2 7.7 5.3 8.9 10.8 2.7
Jamaica 6.1 8.7 7.3 14.1 13.7 12.9 5.8 16.8 16.9 7.7
Mexico 9.0 4.4 5.7 4.0 5.2 3.3 4.1 3.8 6.5 4.5
Nicaragua 9.9 4.7 4.0 6.6 8.9 9.6 10.2 16.2 12.7 -0.1
Panama 0.7 0.0 1.8 1.5 1.5 3.4 2.2 6.4 6.8 0.7
Paraguay 8.6 8.4 14.6 9.3 2.8 9.9 12.5 6.0 7.5 2.8
Peru 3.7 -0.1 1.5 2.5 3.5 1.5 1.1 3.9 6.6 0.7
Saint Kitts and Nevis ... ... 1.7 3.1 1.7 6.0 7.9 2.1 7.6 ...
Saint Vincent and the Grenadines 0.4 5.5 -0.7 0.5 1.7 3.9 4.8 8.3 8.7 ...
Saint Lucia 1.4 -0.2 0.4 2.7 ... ... ... 6.8 3.8 ...
Suriname 76.2 ... ... 13.5 9.7 15.8 4.7 8.3 9.4 -5.4 c
Trinidad and Tobago 5.6 3.2 4.3 3.0 5.6 7.2 9.1 7.6 14.5 2.7
Uruguay 5.1 3.6 25.9 10.2 7.6 4.9 6.4 8.5 9.2 6.5
Venezuela (Bolivarian Republic of) 13.4 12.3 31.2 27.1 19.2 14.4 17.0 22.5 31.9 28.9
Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of official figures.
a
 Twelve-month variation to October 2009.
b
 The only English-speaking Caribbean countries included are Barbados, Jamaica and Trinidad and Tobago. 
c
 Twelve-month variation to September 2009.
d
 Twelve-month variation to July 2009.
e
 Refers to national-currency markets. 
f
 Variation January-June 2009.
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Table A-22
LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN: CENTRAL GOVERNMENT BALANCE
 (Percentages of GDP)
Primary balance Overall balance
2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 a 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 a
Latin America and the Caribbean 2.2 1.8 2.1 1.5 -0.1 -1.1 -1.3 -0.6 -1.2 -2.6
Latin America 1.2 2.3 2.3 1.0 -1.0 -1.1 0.1 0.3 -0.6 -2.8
Latin America (exc. Cuba) 1.5 2.5 2.5 1.4 -1.0 -1.0 0.3 0.5 -0.3 -2.8
Argentina b 2.3 2.7 2.7 2.8 1.4 0.4 1.0 0.6 0.7 -0.8
Bolivia (Plurinational State of) c 0.4 5.3 3.5 0.8 -1.4 -2.3 3.5 2.3 -0.0 -3.2
Brazil d 2.5 2.1 2.3 2.5 0.9 -3.6 -2.9 -1.9 -1.3 -2.9
Chile 5.4 8.4 9.4 5.8 -3.1 4.6 7.7 8.8 5.3 -3.6
Colombia e -1.2 0.1 1.0 0.9 -0.6 -4.1 -3.5 -2.7 -2.3 -3.7
Costa Rica 2.0 2.7 3.7 2.4 -1.5 -2.1 -1.1 0.6 0.2 -3.8
Cuba -3.3 -2.0 -1.8 -5.3 … -4.6 -3.2 -3.2 -6.7 …
Dominican Republic f 0.7 0.3 1.4 -1.6 -1.4 -0.6 -1.1 0.1 -3.2 -3.0
Ecuador g 2.9 5.4 4.0 -0.2 -3.1 0.7 3.3 2.1 -1.5 -3.8
El Salvador 1.1 2.0 2.2 1.7 0.8 -1.0 -0.4 -0.2 -0.6 -2.3
Guatemala h -0.3 -0.6 0.0 -0.3 -1.9 -1.7 -1.9 -1.4 -1.6 -3.4
Haiti 0.5 0.8 -1.2 -0.9 -1.4 -0.5 -0.0 -1.6 -1.2 -1.7
Honduras -1.1 -0.1 -2.3 -1.7 -3.6 -2.2 -1.1 -2.9 -2.3 -4.2
Mexico i 1.9 2.1 1.9 1.6 0.1 -0.1 0.1 0.0 -0.1 -2.1
Nicaragua 0.1 1.8 1.9 0.0 -2.1 -1.8 0.0 0.4 -1.2 -3.5
Panama j 0.5 4.4 4.7 3.4 1.3 -3.9 0.2 1.2 0.3 -1.8
Paraguay h 2.0 1.5 1.8 3.3 -0.0 0.8 0.5 1.0 2.6 -0.7
Peru 1.1 3.2 3.5 3.6 -0.1 -0.7 1.5 1.8 2.2 -1.4
Uruguay 2.7 3.2 2.1 1.7 0.6 -1.6 -1.0 -1.6 -1.0 -2.1
Venezuela (Bolivarian Republic of) 4.6 2.1 4.5 0.1 -4.1 1.6 0.0 3.0 -1.2 -5.5
The Caribbean k 3.7 1.2 1.8 2.3 1.3 -1.0 -3.5 -2.1 -2.0 -2.3
Antigua and Barbuda 21.8 -4.3 -3.1 -3.6 -4.5 18.0 -7.8 -6.4 -6.7 -7.1
Bahamas 0.2 0.9 0.2 0.6 -2.7 -2.6 -1.5 -2.4 -2.0 -3.0
Barbados 0.6 3.1 2.8 -0.5 0.1 -4.3 -2.0 -1.8 -5.9 -3.2
Belize 3.5 2.8 4.3 4.1 1.6 -3.4 -4.2 0.0 0.3 1.2
Dominica 5.8 5.4 4.0 4.2 4.2 2.6 1.4 1.0 0.8 2.2
Grenada 5.6 -4.5 -4.6 -4.2 -3.6 3.7 -6.4 -6.6 -6.1 -5.8
Guyana -9.1 -9.3 -4.6 -5.1 -4.0 -13.5 -13.1 -7.5 -7.9 -6.5
Jamaica 11.1 8.8 8.1 5.6 3.0 -3.5 -5.3 -4.7 -7.4 -11.0
Saint Kitts and Nevis 4.0 6.0 6.0 8.9 19.7 -4.1 -2.4 -2.4 0.4 10.9
Saint Vincent and the Grenadines -1.3 -0.7 -0.6 2.1 0.7 -4.2 -3.9 -3.6 -1.3 -3.0
Saint Lucia -3.5 -3.0 0.9 2.9 5.5 -6.5 -6.1 -2.1 -0.2 1.3
Suriname 1.7 1.7 5.7 5.8 0.8 -0.8 -0.6 7.1 2.3 -1.0
Trinidad and Tobago 7.5 8.3 3.7 9.7 -3.3 5.0 6.3 1.8 7.8 -5.3








 Central government. The figures are derived from the primary balance based on the-below- the-line criterion and nominal interest.
e
 Central national government. Does not include the cost of financial restructuring. 
f
 Accrual basis. The primary balance and the overall balance includes the residue.
g




 Public sector. Balances include non-recurrent income from the sale of companies and the non-budgetary balance. 
j
 The overall balance for 2005 includes an adjustment for compensation to bondholders amounting to 111.6 million balboas.
k
 Fiscal year.
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Table A-23
LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN: REVENUE AND EXPENDITURES OF THE CENTRAL GOVERNMENT 
 (Percentages of GDP)
Total revenue Tax revenue Total expenditure
2007 2008 2009 a 2007 2008 2009 a 2007 2008 2009 a
Latin America and the Caribbean 23.8 24.2 22.7 18.6 18.6 ... 24.5 25.2 25.2
Latin America 21.7 21.8 19.1 16.3 15.9 ... 21.3 22.5 22.0
Latin America (exc. Cuba) 20.4 20.5 19.1 15.6 15.5 ... 19.9 20.9 22.0
Argentina 18.2 19.3 20.9 17.2 18.0 18.9 17.5 18.6 21.7
Bolivia (Plurinational State of) b 32.7 32.7 28.5 18.3 19.5 … 30.5 32.7 31.8
Brazil 23.8 24.7 24.4 23.8 24.7 24.4 25.7 26.0 27.3
Chile c 27.5 26.4 21.8 20.2 20.1 16.2 d 18.7 21.1 25.4
Colombia e 15.0 15.7 16.1 13.4 13.5 13.6 17.6 18.1 19.8
Costa Rica f 15.5 15.9 14.5 15.2 15.6 13.9 g 14.9 15.7 18.3
Cuba 46.0 45.9 … 27.7 23.6 … 49.2 52.6 …
Dominican Republic f 17.7 15.9 15.4 16.0 15.0 … 17.6 19.6 18.4
Ecuador h 29.4 37.7 33.8 20.9 21.0 23.7 27.3 39.2 37.6
El Salvador f 14.6 14.7 14.2 13.4 13.0 12.6 g 14.8 15.3 16.5
Guatemala  12.9 12.1 10.7 12.3 11.6 9.9 14.3 13.7 14.1
Haiti f 10.9 9.6 9.4 10.3 9.5 9.3 12.4 10.8 11.1
Honduras f 19.1 19.3 17.5 16.3 15.6 … g 21.9 21.7 21.7
Mexico i  22.3 23.8 22.4 9.0 8.3 9.4 j 22.3 23.8 24.6
Nicaragua f 23.3 21.9 20.7 18.1 17.6 16.5 22.9 23.1 24.3
Panama f 19.5 19.7 19.2 10.7 10.6 … 18.3 19.5 21.0
Paraguay 17.6 18.3 18.9 12.6 13.7 14.2 g 16.7 15.7 19.6
Peru 18.2 18.3 15.9 15.6 15.6 13.8 16.4 16.1 17.3
Uruguay 20.3 19.4 20.9 17.8 17.2 17.6 21.8 20.4 23.0
Venezuela (Bolivarian Republic of) 28.9 24.7 18.4 16.1 13.5 … k 25.8 25.8 23.9
The Caribbean l 29.1 30.3 33.8 24.6 25.4 ... 32.4 32.1 35.3
Antigua and Barbuda 24.0 23.8 24.6 22.1 21.3 23.2 30.5 30.5 31.7
Bahamas 17.8 16.9 … 16.1 15.5 … 20.3 18.0 …
Barbados … … … … … … … … …
Belize … … … … … … … … …
Dominica … … … … … … … … …
Grenada 27.2 28.2 29.3 24.4 23.7 27.0 33.8 34.3 35.1
Guyana … … … … … … … … …
Jamaica 32.3 31.1 … 27.7 26.5 … 37.1 38.4 …
Saint Kitts and Nevis 41.9 41.7 51.2 28.8 27.0 31.0 44.3 41.2 40.3
Saint Vincent and the Grenadines 30.5 34.3 34.0 26.7 28.1 30.2 34.1 35.6 37.1
Saint Lucia 27.4 29.6 36.5 25.5 27.1 33.7 29.6 29.8 35.2
Suriname … … … … … … … … …
Trinidad and Tobago 31.3 36.5 27.2 25.6 33.8 24.7 29.5 28.7 32.5






 Total revenue corresponds to revenue plus sales of financial assets.
d
 Total expenditure refers to expenditure plus investment, capital transfers and fixed capital consumption. 
e
 Total revenue includes special funds and incorporates accrued revenues.
f
 Total revenue includes grants.
g
 Total expenditure includes net lending.
h




 Total expenditure includes not-programable expenditure.
k
 Total expenditure includes extrabudgetary expenditure and net lending.
l
 Fiscal year.
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Table A-24
LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN: PUBLIC DEBT
 (Percentages of GDP)
Central government Non-financial public sector
2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 a 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 a
Latin America and the Caribbean 60.2 53.6 47.2 45.7 48.0 51.4 44.8 38.8 37.8 38.4
Latin America 42.7 35.7 29.9 27.8 28.3 47.6 40.4 33.4 31.4 31.7
Argentina b 72.8 63.6 55.7 48.3 52.1 87.6 76.3 66.7 56.9 60.8
Bolivia (Plurinational State of) c 75.6 49.8 37.1 33.8 34.7 d 78.3 52.6 40.0 36.7 34.3
Brazil e 30.9 31.0 31.4 25.2 29.6 f 38.5 47.0 46.2 39.9 44.0
Chile g 7.3 5.3 4.1 5.2 4.0 g 13.0 10.6 9.1 12.1 9.4
Colombia h 39.6 37.6 32.9 33.5 35.0 i 50.8 47.5 43.7 42.9 43.1
Costa Rica 37.5 33.3 27.6 24.9 24.8  42.9 38.4 31.9 29.9 29.8
Dominican Republic 22.0 20.4 18.4 20.0 23.4 j … … 19.0 20.8 24.1
Ecuador 35.9 29.4 27.5 22.7 21.2 d 38.6 32.0 30.0 24.8 23.2
El Salvador c 37.6 37.5 34.5 33.4 33.8 d 39.7 39.7 36.6 35.7 36.2
Guatemala c 20.8 21.7 21.4 20.2 20.8 d 21.5 21.9 21.6 20.5 21.1
Haiti k 44.1 35.6 32.2 37.6 36.5 k 47.5 38.1 34.5 39.6 38.4
Honduras 44.7 28.7 17.3 16.6 16.8  44.8 30.0 18.2 18.3 18.3
Mexico l 20.3 20.7 21.2 24.7 27.1 m 23.0 22.7 23.0 27.2 34.5
Nicaragua 92.6 68.7 42.4 38.2 34.6
 
92.8 69.1 43.3 39.3 35.6
Panama n 65.1 60.3 53.2 44.6 43.0
 
66.2 61.0 53.7 45.2 44.3
Paraguay 31.4 23.8 16.9 15.3 16.1
 
32.8 24.8 19.9 18.3 18.7
Peru o 36.9 30.1 26.2 24.4 22.3  38.2 31.3 27.2 24.8 22.6
Uruguay  64.2 57.2 48.2 46.2 48.3 67.4 60.4 51.4 49.4 51.6
Venezuela (Bolivarian Republic of) p 32.7 23.9 19.3 14.0 13.3 32.7 23.9 19.3 14.0 13.3
The Caribbean 85.8 79.7 72.6 71.8 79.3 74.3 71.5 72.9 78.3 102.0
Antigua and Barbuda 107.8 94.6 82.0 82.6 90.2 … … … … …
Bahamas 32.9 32.8 35.1 36.6 … 41.8 42.6 44.7 47.9 …
Barbados 82.0 79.0 84.0 88.0 101.7 99.0 95.0 101.0 103.0 116.0
Belize 79.5 75.1 71.4 82.7 86.8 82.1 76.8 72.9 84.0 88.0
Dominica 95.9 92.6 82.0 74.1 72.3 … … … … …
Grenada 109.5 112.4 107.5 100.0 95.8 … … … … …
Guyana 188.4 155.3 98.8 103.7 115.2 … … … … …
Jamaica 119.1 117.8 110.9 109.9 118.5 … … … … …
Saint Kitts and Nevis 115.1 112.0 109.4 100.7 105.2 … … … … …
Saint Vincent and the Grenadines 70.6 66.3 56.1 54.1 57.8 … … … … …
Saint Lucia 55.8 56.8 61.7 60.7 63.2 … … … … …
Suriname 38.9 24.9 28.5 25.2 25.7 … … … … …
Trinidad and Tobago 20.1 16.8 16.8 14.5 19.0 … … … … …
Source: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), on the basis of official figures.
a
 Preliminary figures to June 2009.
b
 National public administration. As from 2005, does not include debt not presented for swap. 
c
 Does not include publicly guaranteed private debt.
d
 Includes external debt of the non-financial public sector and domestic debt of the central government.
e
 Net public debt. Federal government and central bank.
f
 Net public debt. Public sector.
g
 Consolidated gross public debt.
h
 Central national government.
i








 Includes external debt of the public sector and domestic debt of the federal government.
n
 Does not include domestic floating debt.
o
 Includes local and regional government debt with the Banco de la Nación.
p
 Non-financial public sector.
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